(Redirected from Walther Model)
'Otto Moritz Walter Model' () (
24 January 1891 –
21 April 1945) was a
German general and later
field marshal during
World War II. He is noted for his defensive battles in the latter half of the war, mostly on the
Eastern Front but also in the west, and for his close association with
Adolf Hitler and
Nazism. He has been called the
Wehrmacht's best defensive tactician.
[1]
Although he was a hard-driving, aggressive
panzer commander early in the war, Model became best known as a practitioner of
attrition warfare—his associate, General
Erhard Raus, called it "zone defence".
[2] It emphasised strong
fortifications, a reluctance to give ground (although not an ''absolute'' refusal to withdraw), and the importance of not allowing major enemy breakthroughs. This approach brought him much success, but his death in 1945 meant he would later be overshadowed by his rivals who advocated
manoeuvre warfare.
Model first came to Hitler's attention before World War II, but their relationship did not become especially close until
1942. His tenacious style of fighting and aggressive personality won him plaudits from Hitler, who considered him his best commander and repeatedly tasked him with retrieving desperate situations. However, the relationship had broken down by the end of the war, after Model was defeated at the
Battle of the Bulge.
In personal terms, Model was a leader of great vigour and energy, who led from the front and accepted no excuses for failure. By all accounts an unpleasant man, he was bad-tempered, foul-mouthed, bullied and abused his subordinates, and generally made life miserable for those around him. On the other hand, he was held in high regard by his rank-and-file troops, who appreciated his constant visits to the front line and his down-to-earth, straight-talking demeanour.
Early life and career
Model's decision to burn his papers at the end of World War II means relatively little is known about his early years. Born in
Genthin,
Saxony-Anhalt, he was the son of a music teacher and belonged to a lower-middle class, non-military family. He entered the army officer cadet school (''Kriegsschule'') in
Neisse in
1908, where he was an unexceptional student, and was commissioned as a
lieutenant (''Leutnant'') into the 52nd Infantry Regiment ''von Alvensleben'' in 1910. He made few friends among his fellow officers, and soon became known for his ambition, drive and blunt outspokenness. These were characteristics that would mark his entire career.
[3]
World War I
In
World War I, the 52nd Infantry formed part of the 5th Division, fighting on the
Western Front. Model served as the
adjutant of his regiment's 1st Battalion. In May
1915 he was severely wounded near
Arras, and in October he won the
Iron Cross, First Class. His deeds brought him to the attention of his divisional commander, who despite misgivings about his "uncomfortable subordinate", recommended him for a posting to the
General Staff. Among other things, this meant that Model took part in only the initial stages of the
Battle of Verdun, and escaped the carnage of
the Somme, to which his division was committed in his absence.
Model sailed through the abbreviated staff officers' course and returned to the 5th Division as adjutant of the 10th Infantry Brigade, followed by postings as a company commander in both the 52nd Infantry and the 8th Life Grenadiers. He was promoted to
captain (''Hauptmann'') in November
1917, and in
1918 was assigned to the staff of the Guard
Ersatz Division, which fought in the German
Spring Offensive of that year. He ended the war with the 36th Reserve Division.
Inter-war years
By the end of the war, Model had gained a reputation as a capable officer with great potential. In addition, he was already known to
Hans von Seeckt, head of the slimmed-down
Reichswehr, from his staff postings during the war; and he was equipped with an excellent reference from Major-General Franz von Rantau, commander of the 36th Reserve Division. It was thus no surprise that he was one of the 4,000 officers retained in the Reichswehr. Model generally kept away from politics in the chaotic period that marked the birth of the
Weimar Republic, although as an army officer he was involved in the bloody suppression of the
1920 communist uprising in the
Ruhr. The next year he married Herta Huyssen, and they would eventually have three children: Christa, Hella and Hansgeorg. Model hated war stories, and never discussed politics or the war with his wife.
[5]
In
1925 Model was posted to the 3rd Infantry Division, an elite formation of the Reichswehr, and one which was heavily involved in testing the new technical innovations of that era. From
1928 he lectured in tactics and war studies for the basic General Staff training course, and in
1930 was transferred to the Training Branch of the
Truppenamt. He became known both for his enthusiastic support for modernising the army, and his complete lack of tact. In
1938, the year he became a
major general (''Generalmajor''), he gave a demonstration of an assault on mocked-up Czech fortifications that impressed
Hitler and annoyed the army chief of staff
Ludwig Beck (who was trying to dissuade Hitler from
occupying the Sudetenland).
[6] Like many other army officers at the time he was a supporter of the
Nazi party; his time in
Berlin also brought him into contact with senior members of the Nazi regime, and in particular he was friends with
Joseph Goebbels and
Hermann Göring.
[7]
World War II
Model spent the first year of
World War II as a chief of staff, first of IV Corps during the
invasion of Poland, and then of
Sixteenth Army during the
Battle of France. He was promoted to
lieutenant general (''Generalleutnant'') in
April 1940, and earned his first senior command posting in
November that year, when he was assigned to lead the
3rd Panzer Division. He immediately proceeded to ignore all formalities of organisation and command, which endeared him to his men and exasperated his staff—who often had to clean up the mess he left behind. He also instituted a
combined arms training program where his men were thrown together in various ad-hoc groupings regardless of their parent unit:
tankers would train with
infantry,
engineers with
recon units, and so on. Model thus anticipated by some months the regular German use of
kampfgruppen in World War II; while this would become routine later on, it was still not a universal practice in the
Wehrmacht in late 1940 and early 1941.
[8]
Invasion of the Soviet Union
Main articles: Operation Barbarossa
For
Operation Barbarossa, the 3rd Panzer Division was assigned to the XXIV Panzer Corps, itself part of the
Second Panzer Group, commanded by
Heinz Guderian. The campaign opened on
22 June 1941, with Guderian urging his divisions forward at breakneck speed. This suited Model just fine, and by
4 July, his advance elements leading the panzer group's charge had reached the
Dnieper, an exploit that earned him the
Knight's Cross. Crossing it in strength was another matter, however, as the
Red Army was prepared to defend the river line. 3rd Panzer's vanguard was thrown back by the Soviet 21st Army, and it was not until
10 July that the Germans were in a position to force a crossing. For this operation, Model, now reinforced with additional troops, reorganised his command into three groups: an infantry-heavy force that would cross the river and establish a bridgehead, a mobile
armoured group that would pass through the bridgehead and continue the advance, and a fire support group containing nearly all his
artillery. The plan worked so successfully that the river crossing cost scarcely any casualties. There followed two weeks of hard fighting to defend the panzer group's flank, during which he was assigned the 1st Cavalry Division in addition to 3rd Panzer as ''Gruppe Model'', and then an attack to break up Soviet forces massing near
Roslavl.
[9]
After the fall of
Smolensk, Hitler ordered a change of direction, and Guderian's panzer group turned south into the
Ukraine. Its objective was to trap the Soviet forces defending
Kiev, an unsupported advance of 275 km (172 mi), and again 3rd Panzer would form the spearhead. From
24 August to
14 September Model conducted a lightning thrust into the rear of the
Soviet Southwestern Front, in which he impressed on his men that speed was everything. The maneuver reached its conclusion when 3rd Panzer made contact with the
16th Panzer Division from
Army Group South at Lokhvitsa. While it would take several more days to eliminate all resistance, the trap around Kiev had been closed.
[10][11]
Throughout the opening stages of Barbarossa, Model had driven his men hard, achieving the rapid pace of advance that Guderian called for. He had taken great risks—at one point 3rd Panzer had only 10 tanks operational
[12]—but his audacity and improvisational skills (and the tactical ineptness of his foes) had brought him rich rewards.
Before Moscow
Main articles: Battle of Moscow
Anti-tank fortifications on Moscow streets, 1941.
Shortly thereafter Model was promoted to
general of panzer troops and placed in command of
XLI Panzer Corps, which was embroiled in
Operation Typhoon, the assault on
Moscow. The attack had begun on
2 October,
1941, and Model arrived at his new command on
14 November in the midst of the battle, which did not help to endear him to his staff.
The corps, part of
Georg-Hans Reinhardt's
Third Panzer Group, was located at
Kalinin, 160 km (100 mi) northwest of Moscow. It was worn out, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line (Model had been promoted on
28 October, and needed two weeks just to get to Kalinin), and the cold weather was starting to hamper the Germans. Nevertheless morale remained high, and the final push towards Moscow began shortly after his arrival. Model was a whirlwind of energy, touring the front and exhorting his troops to greater efforts; he also ran roughshod over the niceties of protocol and chains of command, and in general left his staff trailing in his wake. By
5 December, XLI Panzer Corps'
6th Panzer Division had reached Iohnca, just 35 km (22 mi) from the
Kremlin. There, the advance stopped, as the winter—thus far comparatively mild by Russian standards—took hold. Temperatures dropped to 20 to 40°C below zero, weapons and vehicles froze solid, and the Germans were forced to call a halt to offensive operations.
[13]
Just as the Germans had made that decision, the Soviet
Kalinin,
Western and
Southwestern Fronts launched a massive
counteroffensive, aimed at driving
Army Group Centre back from Moscow. The attacks were especially strong against Third Panzer Group, which had made some of the closest penetrations to the city. In three weeks of confused, savage fighting, Reinhardt extricated his troops from potential encirclement and fell back to the
Lama River line. Placed in charge of covering the retreat, Model's harsh, almost brutal style of leadership now paid dividends as panic threatened to infect the German columns. On several occasions he restored order at a congested crossroads with a drawn pistol, but the retreat never became a
rout.
[14]
During this period, Model noticed that the Soviet attacks—made
en masse and with poor tactical coordination—tended to be most successful when the Germans employed a strongpoint defence instead of a continuous line. Moreover, Soviet
logistics were still inadequate to support a fast-moving battle; thus even if a gap was made, it did not automatically mean a crisis. Therefore he ordered his men to spread themselves out, which exploited his corps' advantage in
artillery over the Soviets, while he created small mechanised kampfgruppen to deal with any breakthrough. His tactics were successful, if costly (by the end of 1941, 6th Panzer Division mustered 1,000 men, including all frontline, support and staff personnel). He would continue to advocate similar tactics throughout his career.
[15]
Rzhev
Main articles: Battles of Rzhev
Soviet ski troops on the attack supported by armour, December 1941.
Model's success in holding his front had not gone unnoticed, and in January
1942 he was placed in charge of the
Ninth Army occupying the
Rzhev salient, leapfrogging at least 15 more senior commanders in Army Group Centre alone.
[16] When Model took over, his sector was in a shambles: the Kalinin Front had broken through the line and was threatening the Moscow-Smolensk railway, the main supply route for Army Group Centre. Despite the danger, he realised the precarious position the attackers themselves were in and immediately counterattacked, cutting off the Soviet 39th Army. In the ferocious battles that followed, he repelled multiple Soviet attempts to relieve their trapped soldiers, the last being in February. He then squeezed out the pocket at his leisure, in a series of operations culminating in mid-July.
[17] For this, he was awarded the
Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross and promoted to
colonel general (''Generaloberst'').
Having restored Ninth Army's front, Model set about holding it. His defensive doctrine, which combined conventional thinking with his own tactical innovations, was based on the following principles:
[18]
★ Up-to-date
intelligence, based on frontline sources and reconnaissance instead of relying on reports from rear-area analysts.
★ A continuous
front line, no matter how thinly held. This was counter to standard German doctrine, which called for a screen of outposts and the main body held further back.
★ Tactical
reserves to halt any imminent breakthrough. In practice, this meant dispersing his
armour into individual platoons and companies along the front to support the infantry, instead of concentrating it into a sizable striking force.
★ Centralised
artillery command and control. Since the end of
World War I, German
divisions had had their artillery spread out amongst their component
regiments, which made it difficult to bring the maximum weight of fire to bear on any one point. Model reorganised his artillery into special battalions under the direct control of the divisional and
corps commanders.
★ Multiple static
lines of defence, to delay the enemy's advance. Hitler had in fact forbidden the construction of multiple lines, saying that soldiers would be tempted to abandon their current line in favour of falling back to the next; Model simply ignored this inconvenient order.
Using these tactics, he would successfully defend his front throughout 1942 and into
1943, despite giving up troops and vehicles for the battles further south. In this time he fought off several major Soviet offensives; one of these, codenamed
Operation Mars by the Soviets, has been described as Marshal
Georgy Zhukov's worst defeat of the war.
[19][20] It all added to his reputation as a "lion of defence".
Ninth Army eventually evacuated the salient in Operation Buffalo (''Büffel'') in March 1943, as part of a general shortening of the line. Large-scale anti-
partisan sweeps were carried out in the weeks before the operation (the army's sector was a hotbed for partisan activity), in which an estimated 3,000 Russians were killed, the great majority of whom were unarmed. The withdrawal itself took two weeks, with minimal casualties or disruption: no mean feat when the army numbered about 300,000 men including civilian hangers-on, 100 tanks and 400 guns. In its wake, Model personally ordered the deportation of all male civilians, wells to be poisoned, and at least two dozen villages razed.
[21] In the same month, he received the Swords to his Knight's Cross, and Ninth Army received orders to move into
Orel.
Kursk and Orel
Main articles: Battle of Kursk,
Operation Kutuzov
On
5 July,
1943 Model led the northern assault on
Kursk during
Operation Citadel, a plan which had caused great controversy within the German high command.
Günther von Kluge and
Erich von Manstein, commanding
Army Groups Centre and
South respectively, had originally urged that the salient be attacked in May, before the Soviets could prepare their defences. Others, including
Heinz Guderian, felt that attacking was unnecessary, and the Germans should instead wait for the Soviets to launch their own offensive before defeating it. Model was also dubious about attacking, pointing out that
Konstantin Rokossovsky's
Central Front was strongly dug in and outnumbered him two to one in men, tanks and artillery. Rather than conclude that the offensive be called off, however, he said it should be postponed until he could receive further reinforcements, in particular the new
Panther tanks and
Ferdinand tank destroyers.
[22]
Model prior to Operation Citadel.
Model's true opinion on the value of the offensive remains unclear. Von Manstein took his recommendation at face value, while Guderian said that he was categorically against attacking.
[23] It has similarly been suggested that Model in fact hoped to scuttle the operation, by causing it to be delayed until the Soviets launched their own attack.
[24][25]
Model's assault was a failure, as Ninth Army quickly became enmeshed in the elaborate Soviet
fortifications. If he had hoped to gain an advantage by waiting for reinforcements, he had made a critical error: the Red Army's strength in the salient was in fact growing much faster than that of the attacking force. Nor did his tactical plan of attack meet with great success. Having less armour and more artillery than von Manstein in the south, and fearing that the deep Soviet defences would stall an armour-heavy attack (the hallmark of the German ''
Blitzkrieg''), he decided to use his infantry to breach Rokossovsky's line before unleashing his armour. It did not work. The Germans took heavy losses to advance less than 12 km (8 mi) in seven days, and were unable to break through to open ground. Model threw his armour into the fray, but with little effect beyond incurring more casualties. (As mitigating factors, the Soviets had concentrated more of their strength facing Model in the north; and Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated where the attack would come, defending that sector heavily.
[26] Model's use of infantry assaults also meant his losses in armour were lower than von Manstein's.)
[27]
Prior to Kursk, Model had anticipated the possibility of a Soviet attack into the Orel salient, and had (without
OKH's knowledge) constructed extensive defensive works to meet such an attack. Following the stalling of his advance, the Soviet counteroffensive,
Operation Kutuzov, duly opened on
12 July. It involved not just Rokossovsky's Central Front, but also the
Bryansk and
Western Fronts, a greater concentration of forces than Model had assaulted in Operation Citadel. For the battle, von Kluge placed him in command of
Second Panzer Army in addition to Ninth Army—again, a larger total force than he had commanded in Citadel.
[28] The Soviet preponderance of strength was such that
Stavka expected it to take only 48 hours to reach Orel, splitting the German forces into three parts;
[29] instead, the battle ended three weeks later with Model's orderly withdrawal from the salient. An idea of the scale of the fighting compared to Citadel can be gained from the combined casualty lists for Second Panzer and Ninth Armies: from 1 to 10 July, the Germans took 21,000 casualties, and from 11 to
31 July, 62,000. Despite these losses he had inflicted similarly heavy casualties on the three Red Army Fronts, shortened the line, and avoided annihilation.
[30][31] His reputation thus survived the failure of Citadel.
Northern Russia
Main articles: Baltic Offensive
Soviet advances on the
Eastern Front, August 1943 to December 1944.
After the loss of Orel, Model
withdrew to the Dnieper as the Soviets went on the offensive from
Smolensk in the north to
Rostov in the south. He was relieved of command of the Ninth Army at the end of September, and took the opportunity to go on three months' leave in
Dresden with his family. It was the last Christmas he would spend at home.
[32]
Model's relief was not a sign that he had lost Hitler's confidence, but rather that he had gained it: the Führer wanted him available should another emergency break out needing his attention. Thus on
29 January 1944, he was urgently sent to command
Army Group North, which two weeks earlier had seen its stranglehold on
Leningrad broken by the
Volkhov,
Leningrad and
2nd Baltic Fronts. The situation was dire (a circumstance that Model would come to be familiar with): two of the three corps of the German
Eighteenth Army had been shattered, and contact lost with the
III SS Panzer Corps defending
Narva.
The army group's previous commander,
Georg von Küchler, had pleaded for permission to withdraw to the
Panther Line in
Estonia, which was still only half-completed at that stage. Model immediately cracked down on such talk, instituting a new policy he called Shield and Sword (''Schild und Schwert''). Under this doctrine, ground would only temporarily be ceded, to gather reserves for an immediate counterattack that would drive the Soviets back and relieve pressure on other areas of the front. These statements of aggressive intent won over Hitler and
OKH, who had no substantial reserves to send him but were still unwilling to lose territory. Historians have since debated their significance; some claim that Shield and Sword was Hitler's invention,
[33] while others say they were a calculated ploy by Model to disguise his true intent—to pull back to the Panther Line.
[34]
Regardless, the "temporary" loss of ground usually became permanent, as Model conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Panther Line. He delegated responsibility for the Narva front to Otto Sponheimer commanding Army Detachment Narva, while he concentrated on extricating Eighteenth Army from its predicament. Without OKH's notice or approval, he constructed a series of interim defensive lines to cover its retreat, slowing down and inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets in the process.
By March, the withdrawal was complete. His forces were mostly intact, but the fighting had been fierce: his Shield and Sword counterattacks alone had cost him some 10,000–12,000 men. These counterattacks usually failed to recover ground, but they kept the Soviets off-balance and won Model time to pull his units back. They also allowed him to say to Hitler that he was pursuing an aggressive approach, even as the front moved steadily to the west.
On
1 March Model was promoted to
field marshal (''
Generalfeldmarschall''), the youngest in the Wehrmacht.
[35] His meteoric rise from colonel to field marshal had taken just six years.
Ukraine and Poland
Main articles: Operation Bagration,
Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive,
Lublin-Brest Offensive
On
30 March Model was placed in command of
Army Group North Ukraine in
Galicia, which was withdrawing under heavy pressure from Zhukov's
1st Ukrainian Front. He replaced von Manstein, who had fallen out of favour with Hitler; despite von Manstein's previous victories, the Führer wanted someone who could be unyielding in defence, and Model fit the bill.
[36] There, he came into conflict with von Manstein's associates, in particular
Hermann Balck and
Friedrich von Mellenthin at the
XLVIII Panzer Corps. Like their previous commander, they favoured the concept of "
elastic defence", which called for a thinly held front line and strong armoured reserves to counterattack Soviet breakthroughs; they now refused to implement Model's preferred tactics. Model solved the problem by transferring XLVIII Panzer Corps' tanks to Hermann Breith's
III Panzer Corps, leaving Balck and von Mellenthin in charge of four weak infantry divisions in the front line.
[37]
By mid-April Zhukov's advance had come to a halt, before the argument over which defensive doctrine was superior could be decided. On
28 June Model was sent to rescue Army Group Centre, which had been torn apart by
Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive in
Belorussia. The
Ninth Army (Model's old command) and
Fourth Army were trapped, and the Soviets were about to liberate
Minsk. Despite the catastrophic situation, Model believed that he could still hold Minsk, but this would require Fourth Army to break out of its pocket, and reinforcements to counterattack the Soviet advance. The reinforcements in turn could only be obtained by pulling back, thus shortening the line and freeing up troops.
[38] The consensus is that the German position was doomed regardless of what Model could have done,
[39][40] but Hitler rendered the issue moot by refusing to sanction either Fourth Army's escape or a general withdrawal until it was too late.
Minsk was liberated by the Soviet
1st and
3rd Belorussian Fronts on
3 July, but Model still hoped to re-establish the front to the west of the city, with the aid of divisions from Army Groups North and North Ukraine.
[41][42] However, German strength was unequal to the task, and he had been driven out of
Vilnius and
Baranovichi by
12 July. At the same time, the 1st Ukrainian Front (now commanded by
Ivan Konev) and the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing (which had been uncommitted thus far) opened up a
fresh offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. In this battle the
First Panzer Army managed to hold the line east of
Lvov using Model's defensive tactics, but was forced to retreat when the
Fourth Panzer Army, weakened by the steady flow of units to Army Group Centre, was unable to stem the Soviet penetrations of its front.
[43] Model stopped the Red Army's advance just short of
Warsaw, after Hitler finally consented to release four experienced and fresh
panzer divisions to him (
3rd SS Panzer,
5th SS Panzer,
''Hermann Göring'' and
''Grossdeutschland''). It should be noted that he was assisted in this by the Soviets themselves, who paused their offensive to regroup and resupply, and allow the Germans to crush the non-
communist Warsaw uprising.
At various times in 1944, Model commanded each of the three major army groups on the
Eastern Front, and for a short period in the middle of the year was commanding both Army Groups Centre and North Ukraine simultaneously. He therefore came closer than anyone else in the Wehrmacht to effective command of the entire theatre.
Remains of a German convoy destroyed near Falaise.
Normandy
Main articles: Battle of Normandy
On
17 August 1944, Model received from a grateful Hitler the Diamonds to go with his Knight's Cross with Oakleaves and Swords, a reward for patching up the Eastern Front. Simultaneously, he was transferred to the west, replacing von Kluge as commander-in-chief of
Army Group B and
OB West. The front in
Normandy had collapsed after nearly two months of severe fighting, the
U.S. Third Army was driving for the
Seine, and the army group was in danger of being completely annihilated in the
Falaise pocket.
Model's first order was that Falaise be defended, which did not impress his staff.
[44][45] However he quickly changed his mind, convincing Hitler to authorise the immediate escape of the German
Seventh Army and
Panzer Group Eberbach—something that von Kluge, with his limited political clout, had not been able to do. He was thus able to salvage a remarkable proportion of his units, albeit at the cost of nearly all his armour and heavy
materiel. When Hitler demanded that
Paris be held, Model replied that he could do so, but only if given an extra 200,000 men and several panzer divisions—an act that has been described as naivety by some,
[46] and canny bargaining by others.
[47] The reinforcements were not forthcoming, and
the city's liberation took place on
25 August. Meanwhile, Model fell back to the German border.
By early September, Model was finding the task of juggling his responsibilities at Army Group B and OB West increasingly difficult, in the face of Allied air superiority and his own predilection for roaming the front lines. Thus he was happy to relinquish OB West in that month to Field Marshal
Gerd von Rundstedt. He retained command of Army Group B, a post he would keep until the army group's final dissolution in April
1945.
[48]
Retreat to Germany
Main articles: Operation Market Garden,
Battle of Hurtgen Forest
After the debacle of Normandy, Model established his headquarters at
Oosterbeek, near
Arnhem in the
Netherlands, where he set about the massive task of rebuilding Army Group B. On
17 September, his lunch was rudely interrupted when the
British 1st Airborne Division dropped into the town:
Operation Market Garden, the Allied attempt to capture the bridges on the lower
Rhine,
Maas and
Waal, was under way. Model initially thought they were trying to capture him and his staff, but the size of the assault quickly disabused him of that notion.
[49]
When Model perceived what the Allies' real objective was, he ordered the
II SS Panzer Corps into action. The corps, containing the
9th SS Panzer and
10th SS Panzer Divisions refitting after Normandy, had been overlooked by Allied intelligence: while still seriously understrength, it was composed of veteran troops and a deadly threat to lightly equipped
paratroopers. 9th SS Panzer took on the British at Arnhem, while the 10th moved south to defend the bridge at
Nijmegen.
Model believed that the situation represented not just a threat, but also an opportunity to counterattack and possibly clear the Allies out of the southern Netherlands. Towards this end, he forbade SS General
Willi Bittrich and SS Lieutenant General Heinz Harmel, commanding II SS Panzer Corps and 10th SS Panzer respectively, from destroying the Nijmegen bridge. With the exception of this tactical error, Model is considered to have fought an outstanding battle and handed the Allies a sharp defeat. The bridge at Arnhem was held and the 1st Airborne Division destroyed, dashing the Allies' hopes for a foothold over the Rhine before the end of the year.
[50]
Arnhem restored much of Model's self-confidence, which had been shaken by the experience of Normandy.
[51] From September to December he fought another Allied thrust to a standstill, this time by
Omar Bradley's
U.S. 12th Army Group into the
Hürtgen Forest and
Aachen. While he interfered less in the day-to-day movements of his units than at Arnhem, he still kept himself fully informed on the situation, slowing the Allies' progress, inflicting heavy casualties and taking full advantage of the fortifications of the
Siegfried Line.
The Hürtgen Forest cost the
U.S. First Army at least 33,000 killed and incapacitated, including both combat and noncombat losses; Germans casualties were between 12,000 and 16,000. Aachen eventually fell on
22 October, again at high cost to the
U.S. Ninth Army. The Ninth Army's push to the
Roer River fared no better, and did not manage to cross the river or wrest control of its dams from the Germans. Hürtgen was so costly that it has been called an Allied "defeat of the first magnitude", with specific credit being assigned to Model.
[52][53][54]
''Wacht am Rhein''
Main articles: Battle of the Bulge
With a German soldier during the Battle of the Bulge.
Following the end of Market Garden, Hitler decided that the Germans should launch an offensive in the west, which would catch the
Western Allies by surprise. The objective he had in mind was to split the Allied front and capture
Antwerp. This operation, codenamed ''Wacht am Rhein'' (Watch on the Rhine), would force the British and Americans to sue for peace, leaving Germany free to concentrate on fighting the Soviet Union.
Model, along with all the other commanders involved, believed the idea was unachievable given the scarce resources available in 1944. At the same time, both he and von Rundstedt felt that a purely defensive posture—as had been adopted since retreating from Normandy—could only delay Germany's defeat, not prevent it. Thus he prepared
Operation Herbstnebel, a less ambitious attack that did not attempt to cross the
Meuse, but would still have inflicted a severe setback on the Allies. A similar plan had been developed by von Rundstedt at OB West, and the two field marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to Hitler. It was rejected, and the "big solution" of aiming for Antwerp went ahead.
[55][56][57]
For this operation, Model had at his disposal
Sixth SS Panzer Army,
Fifth Panzer Army and
Seventh Army, including a dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions, representing the last strategic
reserve of the Third Reich. Despite his misgivings, Model threw himself into the task with his usual energy, cracking down on any defeatism he might find. A staff officer complained about shortages, causing him to snap: "If you need anything, take it from the Americans".
[58][59] He remained acutely aware of both the operation's significance, and its most likely outcome. When Colonel
Friedrich August von der Heydte, ordered to lead a parachute drop as part of the operation, said that the jump had no more than a 10 per cent chance of success, he replied: "Well, then it is necessary to make the attempt, since the entire offensive has no more than a 10 per cent chance of success. It must be done, since this offensive is the last remaining chance to conclude the war favourably."
[60][61]
The operation was launched on
16 December 1944 and enjoyed initial success, but it lacked
air cover and
infantry, and most critically,
fuel. Sixth SS Panzer Army ran into stiff resistance, and while Fifth Panzer Army managed to make a deep thrust into Allied lines, Model was unable to exploit the breakthrough. The Germans had failed to capture the vital road junction at
Bastogne; combined with the poor weather and impassable terrain, this caused the German columns to bank up into huge traffic jams on the roads behind the front. Starved of fuel and ammunition, the attack had ground to a halt by
25 December, and was called off on
8 January.
[62]
Defeat at the Ruhr
Main articles: Ruhr Pocket
The failure of ''Wacht am Rhein'' marked the end of Model's special relationship with Hitler, who on
21 January 1945, issued an order that all the divisions of Army Group B would thenceforth be personally responsible to him. Withdrawing to the Rhine was forbidden, and the army group was directed to conduct its defence without giving up an inch of ground.
[63]
It was an impossible task, and by mid-March Model had been forced back to the
Ruhr. On
1 April, Army Group B was encircled there by the
U.S. First and
Ninth Armies. Hitler's response was to declare the Ruhr a fortress, from which surrender or escape were denied (much like
Stalingrad had been); he further ordered its industries to be destroyed to prevent them falling into Allied hands. Model ignored these orders.
[64][65]
On
15 April, after the Allies had split the pocket in two, Major General
Matthew Ridgway, commanding the
U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, urged Model to surrender rather than throw the lives of his soldiers away. The reply was that Model, still bound by his oath to Hitler and his sense of honour as a field marshal, considered surrender out of the question. Rather than continue fighting, however, he ordered the army group dissolved. The oldest and youngest soldiers were discharged, and the remainder given the option of surrendering or attempting to break out on their own. In fact, he could do little else: the Fifth Panzer Army had already laid down its arms, and German command and communications in the pocket had all but disintegrated. On
20 April,
Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry denounced Army Group B as traitors, marking the final break between Model and the collapsing Nazi regime.
[66][67]
Suicide
Model's decision ended the war for his men, but he himself had little desire to witness the aftermath of defeat. He said to his staffers before dissolving his command: "Has everything been done to justify our actions in the light of history? What can there be left for a commander in defeat? In antiquity they took poison".
His decision to commit
suicide was sealed when he learned that the Soviets had indicted him for
war crimes, specifically the deaths of 577,000 people in
concentration camps in
Latvia and the deportation of 175,000 others as
slave labour.
After his attempts to seek death on the front line came to nothing, he shot himself in the head in a wooded area on
21 April 1945. The location, between
Duisburg and the village of
Lintorf, is today part of the city of
Ratingen.
Postscript
Model was buried where he fell. In
1955 his son, Hansgeorg Model, guided by his father's former officers, recovered his father's body. Walter Model was reinterred in the ''Soldatenfriedhof Vossenack'', a German military cemetery near the town of Vossenack in the
Hürtgen Forest. Hansgeorg himself served as an officer cadet with the
''Grossdeutschland'' Division in late 1944 and 1945; after the war he joined the
Bundeswehr, rising to the rank of
brigadier general.
Generalship
Limitations
Unlike
Erwin Rommel, another field marshal who preferred to lead from the front, Walter Model was almost universally disliked by those who had to work with him. For example, when he was made commander of the XLI Panzer Corps in 1941, the entire corps staff asked to be transferred.
[69][70] Not only was he foul-mouthed and abusive, but he made a habit of micromanaging his subordinates, changing plans without consultation, and bypassing the chain of command when it suited him. He was oblivious to the niceties of etiquette, often reprimanding or castigating his officers in public. When he departed Army Group North in March 1944 after being sent to the Ukraine, the army group's chief of staff remarked: "''Schweinfuhrt''" (the swine has flown).
[71] It was a reference to Model's nickname among his staffers, that he had earned during his time at XLI Panzer Corps: "''Frontschwein''" (the frontline pig).
[72]
He was not an operational genius in the mould of
von Manstein, who had masterminded the plan that
defeated France in 1940. Model had led the spectacular advance of 3rd Panzer Division during Operation Barbarossa, and come excruciatingly close to the heart of Moscow in 1941, but his record with offensive operations at army level and above was mediocre.
As Ninth Army commander he encircled and destroyed large enemy formations that had penetrated his front, but at Kursk he miscalculated the effect of delaying the offensive, and his plan of attack was uninspired at best, flawed at worst.
In the Ardennes, he was unable to overcome the problems of supply and coordination that hobbled the operation. His command style had worked when he was leading a division or corps, but once promoted to command of an army, it opened him to criticism over whether the advantages gained were enough to offset the loss of efficiency that followed.
[73]
Nor did Model show any outstanding ability at
strategy. On both the Eastern and Western Fronts, he had held commands that included control of multiple army groups; on both occasions, his stints were marked by the lack of any coherent plan. His decision during Operation Bagration to reinforce Army Group Centre with divisions from Army Group North Ukraine only had the effect of weakening the latter. It has been observed that he showed little ability or inclination to contemplate those stretches of the front he did not command.
[74][75]
Strengths
What Model possessed was an excellent
tactical mind, especially on the defensive, and an "outstanding talent for improvisation".
At 3rd Panzer Division he was a pioneer in the use of
kampfgruppen, which would soon become standard practice for the Germans. He had a formidable memory and eye for detail, which allowed him to dominate his staff officers, especially those in charge of specialist areas such as artillery, transport and communications.
[76] His
operational doctrine was very unlike that of his colleagues who dominated postwar evaluations of German operations: men like Guderian, von Manstein, von Mellenthin and Balck, who emphasised
manoeuvre warfare as the key to winning battles. To some extent, this was a product of their respective experiences. Model fought nearly all his battles in the northern and central parts of the Eastern Front; he was never tested on the
steppes of southern Russia, where the open terrain would have made mobile warfare a more attractive proposition. Nevertheless, his defensive record indicated the value of his approach. At Rzhev, Orel, in Galicia and in Estonia he stymied opponents who expected to overwhelm him, and as late as November 1944, he gave the U.S. 12th Army Group a bloodied nose in the Hürtgen Forest.
His approach was not pretty. Model was a ruthless commander, willing to inflict and take casualties to stabilise his front.
[77] In addition to the instances noted above, he would send theatre or operational reserves into the line where the fighting was toughest, thus preserving the units he saw as organic to his own command.
[78] For example, he was given the elite
''Grossdeutschland'' Division in September 1942, when his Ninth Army was under heavy attack during
Operation Mars. Told that the division was not to be broken up, Model nonetheless split it into battalions and companies, which he used to plug any gaps that appeared. ''Grossdeutschland'' took nearly 10,000 casualties out of a strength of 18,000 men, and at one point was reportedly close to mutiny; but from Model's viewpoint, these losses were acceptable because they meant that Ninth Army's own troops did not have to suffer them.
[79] That said, he did not simply treat these units as disposable either. In early 1942, the ''Der Führer'' Regiment of the
2nd SS Division ''Das Reich'' was infamously reduced to a handful of men in three weeks of bitter fighting—but in that time it also received at least 1,500 reinforcements, including
88 mm guns, artillery pieces, and
StuG III assault guns, and Model himself visited the sector daily, calculating the minimum support that would be needed to hold off the Soviet attacks.
[80][81]
Allied to this were his boundless determination and vigour, and stubborn refusal to countenance defeat. He held himself to the same high standard as he held those around him, saying: "He who leads troops has no right to think about himself".
His visits to the front may not have helped operational efficiency, but they energised his men, who consistently held him in much higher regard than did his officers. As commanding general of Ninth Army he was once recorded as personally leading a battalion attack against a Soviet position, pistol in hand.
[82][83] Even his peers respected his ability and iron will, detest his personality though they might. Guderian thought him the best choice to command Army Group Centre during the crisis of Operation Bagration,
[84] and the Ninth Army's War Diary recorded, after he arrived at army group headquarters in Minsk: "The news of Field Marshal Model's arrival is noted with satisfaction and confidence."
[85]
Assessment
Relationship with Hitler
Before the war, Model had been content to leave politics to the politicians, preferring instead to concentrate on military affairs. Despite this, he became one of the Wehrmacht's field marshals most closely identified with
Hitler. Postwar opinions on him have varied. Some historians have called him "blindly loyal"
[86] or a "zealous disciple"
[87] of Hitler; others take a more nuanced view, seeing in Model a coldly calculating opportunist who used the Führer to his advantage, whether or not he was committed to him or the ideals of
Nazism.
[88] The contradictions between his
Lutheran upbringing and his later association with the Nazis have similarly been the subject of comment.
As one of the few German generals of
middle class upbringing, Model's background appealed to Hitler, who distrusted the old
Prussian
aristocratic order that still dominated the Wehrmacht's
officer corps. His defensive tactics were a much better fit to Hitler's instincts never to give ground, than airy talk of "elastic defence"—even if Model did not entirely share those instincts.
[90] His stubbornness, energy and ruthlessness were more qualities that Hitler found admirable, and Model's blunt and direct manner of speaking also made an impression. In a much-noted incident, the two of them clashed over the disposition of reinforcements to the Ninth Army at Rzhev. When the argument became heated, Model demanded: "Who commands the Ninth Army, my Führer, you or I?"
[91][92] Hitler backed down, indicating that if he might not see reason, he could be bullied into submission. Importantly, however, Model never challenged Hitler on political issues: a point that has been identified as the secret to their successful relationship.
Helped by his defensive successes, he thus gained Hitler's full trust and confidence; the Führer called him "my best field marshal" and (after Operation Bagration) "the saviour of the Eastern Front".
[93] In turn, this granted Model a degree of flexibility available to no other German general. He frequently disputed, ignored or bypassed orders that he felt unsupportable: at Rzhev and Orel he had constructed defensive fortifications in defiance of a ban, and his use of Shield and Sword tactics while at Army Group North proved to be simply a cover for a staged withdrawal. His relationships with his superiors were marked by dissembling, where what he wrote in his reports could bear little resemblance to what was actually happening.
[94] While other generals who clashed with Hitler were fated to be dismissed, Model's standing remained undiminished—so long as he produced results. After he failed at the Ardennes and the Ruhr, he was discarded.
Model and Nazism
Many of Model's fellow officers considered him a Nazi. He had voiced pro-Nazi sentiments before and during the war, and he frequently harangued his troops to have faith in the Führer and uphold the virtues of National Socialism.
Furthermore, he appointed a
Waffen-SS officer as his
adjutant at Army Group North in 1944,
[95] repeatedly requested to have
SS officers assigned to his staff at each of his army group commands, and filled the ''National Sozialistischer Führungs Offizier'' (NSFO, essentially a Nazi
political commissar) post at Army Group B that had been vacant before his arrival. His habit of parroting the Führer's orders caused him to be viewed as a sycophant, even if he often undermined or ignored those orders in practice.
Following the
July 20 Plot, Model was the first senior commander to reaffirm his loyalty to Hitler. However, he also refused to give up General
Hans Speidel, his chief of staff at Army Group B who was heavily implicated in the plot, to the
Gestapo. Model was well aware of Speidel's political leanings, as were his predecessors at Army Group B,
Rommel and
von Kluge. Like them, he shielded Speidel for as long as possible, while ignoring such treasonous talk as might take place.
[97][98]
While on the Eastern Front, Model showed no objection to the treatment of civilians by the SS in the areas under his command, and oversaw several anti-
partisan operations, mostly while commanding Ninth Army. These operations, conducted by Wehrmacht troops as well as SS, were bloody, although not unusual by German Eastern Front standards. In conjunction with the ruthless
scorched earth policies he followed during his retreats, they would lead to the Soviet Union declaring him a
war criminal.
[99]
Despite this, while commanding Army Group Centre, he refused to dispatch troops to put down the
Warsaw uprising (a task that ultimately was carried out by the SS), viewing it as a rear-area matter. He stated that the revolt arose from the mistreatment of the Polish population by the Nazis, and the army should have nothing to do with it.
[100] On the other hand, he showed no hesitation in clearing the Warsaw suburbs of
Praga and
Saska Kępa, through which vital supply lines ran,
[101] and he stood by when the Germans razed the city afterward.
It has been argued that the best explanation for Model's behaviour and suicide is that he was not necessarily a Nazi, but an
authoritarian militarist who saw in Hitler the strong leader that Germany needed.
[102] This characterised many in the German officer corps, but in Model's case it was accompanied by a cynical willingness to placate the Nazi regime to expedite his own goals, and a complete internalisation of the image of the professional, apolitical soldier. He had dedicated his life to the army, whether the Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht, and in his final days in the Ruhr, more than one observer had detected in him a struggle to cope with the fact that its destruction was imminent. In this view, Model's decision to take his own life was less to do with matters of honour or Soviet retribution, as with an inability to come to terms with utter defeat.
[103][104]
Summary of career
Dates of rank
★
22 August 1910: 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry
★
25 February 1915: 1st Lieutenant
★ March
1918: Captain
★
1929: Major
★
1932: Lieutenant Colonel
★
1 October 1934: Colonel
★
1 March 1939: Major General
★
1 April 1940: Lieutenant General
★
1 October 1941: General of Panzer Troops
★
28 February 1942: Colonel General
★
1 March 1944: Field Marshal
Service history
★
1909: Officer cadet training
★
1910: 52nd Infantry Regiment ''von Alvensleben''
★
1917: Staff assignments
★
1925: Commanding officer, 9th Company, 8th Infantry Regiment
★
1928: Staff officer, 3rd Division, Berlin
★
1930: Staff officer, Section 4 (Training), Truppenamt, Berlin
★
1932: Chief of Staff, Reich Kuratorium for Youth Fitness
★
1933: Battalion commander, 2nd Infantry Regiment
★
1935: Head of Section 8, General Staff, Berlin
★
1938: Chief of Staff, IV Corps
★
1939: Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army
★
1940: Commander, 3rd Panzer Division
★
1941: Commander, XLI Panzer Corps
★
1942: Commander, Ninth Army
★ January – March
1944: Commander, Army Group North
★ March – June 1944: Commander, Army Group North Ukraine
★ June – August 1944: Commander, Army Group Centre
★ August – September 1944: Commander-in-Chief, OB West
★ August 1944 – April
1945: Commander, Army Group B
[105]
References
1. Newton (2006), p.362.
2. Newton (2006), p.281.
3. D'Este (1989), p.320.
4. Newton (2006), pp.27–28.
5. D'Este (1989), p.321.
6. D'Este (1989), p.322.
7. Newton (2006), pp.58–61.
8. Newton (2006), pp.108–109.
9. Newton (2006), pp.120–134.
10. Carell (1966), pp.126–128.
11. Newton (2006), pp.136–143.
12. Carell (1966), pp.124–127.
13. Newton (2006), pp.150–156.
14. Newton (2006), pp.160–167.
15. Newton (2006), pp.166–168.
16. Newton (2006), p.172.
17. Center of Military History (1986), pp.7–16.
18. Newton (2006), pp.197–206.
19. Newton (2006), p.209.
20. Title of Glantz (1999).
21. Newton (2006), pp.212–216.
22. Ziemke (1986), pp.129–130.
23. Clark (1995), p.324.
24. Newton (2006), pp.218–220.
25. Newton (2002), pp.102–105.
26. Zetterling and Frankson (2000), pp.15–20.
27. Zetterling and Frankson (2000), pp.120–122.
28. Newton (2002), pp.135–136.
29. Newton (2006), p.256.
30. Newton (2006), 255–262.
31. Ziemke (1986), pp.139–142.
32. Newton (2006), pp.265–267.
33. Ziemke (1986), pp.258–260.
34. Newton (2006), pp.273–275.
35. D'Este (1989), p.325.
36. Clark (1995), p.381.
37. Newton (2006), p.282.
38. Newton (2006), pp.291–292.
39. Mitcham (2001), pp.45–47.
40. Newton (2006), pp.291, 293.
41. Adair (1994), p.164.
42. Zaloga (1996), p.72.
43. Newton (2006), p.283.
44. Speidel (1950), pp.130–131.
45. Newton (2006), p.308.
46. Speidel (1950), pp.134–135.
47. Newton (2006), p.309.
48. Newton (2006), pp.313–314.
49. Newton (2006), p.317.
50. Newton (2006), pp.319–321.
51. Newton (2006), p.322.
52. Whiting (1989), pp.xi–xiv, 271–274.
53. MacDonald (1963), pp.102–103.
54. Newton (2006), pp.323–326.
55. Parker (1999), pp.95–100.
56. Mitcham (2006), p.38.
57. Newton (2006), pp.329–334.
58. von Mellenthin (1977), p.154.
59. Newton (2006), p.334.
60. Newton (2006), p.336.
61. Mitcham (2006), p.49.
62. Mitcham (2006), pp.155–158.
63. Newton (2006), pp.348–349.
64. Newton (2006), pp.352–353.
65. D'Este (1989), p.329.
66. Newton (2006), p.356–357.
67. Mitcham (2006), p.165.
68. Newton (2006), p.356.
69. D'Este (1989), p.323.
70. Newton (2006), p.149.
71. Newton (2006), p.276.
72. Newton (2006), p.162.
73. Newton (2006), p.247.
74. Newton (2006), pp.362–363.
75. D'Este (1989), p.330.
76. Parker (1999), p.196.
77. Newton (2006), pp.259, 274, 362.
78. Newton (2006), pp.200–201.
79. Newton (2006), pp.201–204.
80. Newton (2006), pp.189–192.
81. Carell (1966), pp.402–407.
82. Mitcham (2006), p.15.
83. Carrell (1966), p.398.
84. D'Este (1989), p.319.
85. Adair (1994), p.118.
86. Seaton (1971), p.269.
87. Toland (1966), p.214.
88. Newton (2006), pp.358–365.
89. Mitcham (2006), p.13.
90. Newton (2006), p361.
91. D'Este (1989), p.324.
92. Newton (2006), pp.180–181.
93. Mitcham (2006), p.18.
94. Newton (2006), pp.212, 253–254, 274, 297.
95. Newton (2006), p.269.
96. Newton (2006), p.364.
97. Newton (2006), p.314.
98. Speidel (1950), pp.137–138.
99. Newton (2006), p.216.
100. Mitcham (2001), p.99.
101. Newton (2006), pp.301–302.
102. Newton (2006), pp.363–364.
103. Newton (2006), pp.349–365.
104. von Mellenthin (1977), p.158.
105. Abbreviated from D'Este (1989), pp.332–333.
Bibliography
★
Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944, , Paul, Adair, London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994,
★
Hitler Moves East, 1941–43, , Paul, Carell, New York, NY: Bantam, 1966,
★
Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign, , , Center of Military History, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986,
★
Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–45, , Alan, Clark, London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1995,
★
★
Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942, , David M., Glantz, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999,
★
The Battle of Kursk, , David M., Glantz, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999,
★
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, , Max, Hastings, London: Pan McMillan, 1984,
★
Operation "Zitadelle" July 1943: The Decisive Battle of World War II, , Franz, Kurowski, Winnipeg, Man: J J Fedorowicz, 2003,
★
The Battle of the Huertgen Forest, , Charles B., MacDonald, Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1963,
★
German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them, , Friedrich W., von Mellenthin, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977,
★
Crumbling Empire: The German Defeat in the East, 1944, , Samuel W., Mitcham, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001,
★
Panzers in Winter: Hitler's Army and the Battle of the Bulge, , Samuel W., Mitcham, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006,
★
Kursk: The German View, , Steven H., Newton, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2002,
★
Hitler's Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model – Hitler's Favorite General, , Steven H., Newton, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006,
★
The Battle of the Bulge, The German View: Perspectives from Hitler's High Command, , Danny S., Parker, London: Greenhill, 1999,
★
The Battle for Moscow, , Albert, Seaton, New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1971,
★
Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign, , Hans, Speidel, Chicago, IL: Regnery, 1950,
★
The Last 100 Days, , John, Toland, New York, NY: Random House, 1966,
★
The battle of Hurtgen Forest: The Untold Story of a Disastrous Campaign, , Charles, Whiting, New York, NY: Orion, 1989,
★
Atlas of the Second World War, , Peter, Young, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973,
★
Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, , Steven, Zaloga, London: Osprey, 1996,
★
Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, , Niklas, Zetterling, London: Cass, 2000,
★
Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, , Earl F., Ziemke, New York, NY: Dorset, 1986,
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