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'Unrestricted submarine warfare' is a type of naval warfare in which submarines sink merchant ships without warning.
There have been three major campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare:
#The First Battle of the Atlantic during World War I (waged intermittently by Germany between 1915 and 1918). (Ostensibly the ''casus belli'' for the United States entry into World War I in 1917.)
#The Second Battle of the Atlantic during World War II (1939–1945). (waged by Germany)
#The Pacific War during World War II (1941–1945). (waged by the United States)
In 1912, British Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher, by then a retired First Sea Lord, presented a paper to the Cabinet. He developed the argument that submarines would find adherence to Prize Rules impossible, for practical reasons: a submarine could not capture a merchant ship, for it would have no spare manpower to deliver the prize to a neutral port, neither could it take survivors or prisoners, for lack of space. "''...there is nothing a submarine can do except sink her capture.''" If a merchant ship were armed, as was permitted by a conference in London in 1912, then a submarine was under more pressure to destroy a ship. He asked: "''What if the Germans were to use submarines against commerce without restriction?''"
This last comment was thought to be unsupportable. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty and political head of the Navy, supported by senior naval opinion, said it was inconceivable that "''...this would ever be done by a civilised power.''".
It was Fisher who was proved correct, though - as will be shown in the following section - the Germans themselves did not plan for this kind of warfare and went in practice through the stages which Fisher had predicted.
Main articles: First Battle of the Atlantic
The evidence suggests that Germany had not started World War I with an appreciation of the impact on commerce and supply that submarines could have. They had fewer than 30 operational boats, all with small torpedo capacities. At first, merchant ships would be stopped, occupants safely evacuated and then the vessel sunk, usually by gunfire, all following Prize Rules. This had little effect and increasingly placed the German submarine—U-boat—at risk from defensive weaponry.
Germany had practical strategic problems. War-weariness affected the German home situation. The best chance of achieving an early advantageous peace with Britain was to stifle its trade and imports. Surface ships had not been effective, neither could the German Navy force the Royal Navy off the seas—the Battle of Jutland had shown this, despite an apparent German victory.
The gamble which was taken was that unrestricted submarine warfare would critically damage Britain before an incensed United States could make a practical impact. However, it failed.
The submarine sinking of merchant ships without warning is in violation of the 1930 First London Naval Treaty, which specifies that "...except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety...."
However, the London Rules were obsolete before they were signed (though the Kriegsmarine based its Prize Rules on them). The use of disguised guns on auxiliary cruisers increased the risk inherent in stop-and-search rules, but the primary danger came from the wide-spread adoption of radio, which meant that a merchant could call for help as soon as a submarine appeared, even before it could issue its demands. Coupled with the rapidly-growing speed, range, and destructive power of combat aircraft, this technology ensured that complying with these rules would be suicide for any submarine.
For the first few weeks of the World War II, the Kriegsmarine attempted to honour Germany's treaty obligations, but that attempt was in trouble almost immediately following the sinking of SS ''Athenia'' by ''U 30'', and it was abandoned at the end of November or the beginning of December 1939 with the issuing of War Order No. 154.
The United States, from the first day it entered the war against Japan, decided that unrestricted submarine warfare was to be carried out in the Pacific Ocean[1]. This fact was mentioned by Admiral Chester Nimitz during the post war Nuremberg Trials, in evidence presented at the trial of Karl Dönitz on his orders to the U-boat fleet to breach the London Rules.[2]
Since the introduction of long-range anti-ship missiles after World War II, which are able to destroy a ship from beyond the horizon, the London Rules are universally regarded as entirely void. It is indicative that despite the rules being used in the indictment of Admiral Karl Dönitz, and although he was found guilty of breaching the 1936 Naval Protocol, his sentence was not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare at the Nuremberg Trials.
★ Submarine warfare
★ Intensified submarine warfare
★ Commerce raiding
★ Tonnage war
★ Arabic pledge
★ Sussex pledge
★ War crimes
★ Laconia incident
1. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/fullhist.html
2. Judgement : Doenitz the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School
There have been three major campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare:
#The First Battle of the Atlantic during World War I (waged intermittently by Germany between 1915 and 1918). (Ostensibly the ''casus belli'' for the United States entry into World War I in 1917.)
#The Second Battle of the Atlantic during World War II (1939–1945). (waged by Germany)
#The Pacific War during World War II (1941–1945). (waged by the United States)
| Contents |
| Admiral Fisher's 1912 prediction |
| World War I |
| World War II |
| London Rules on naval warfare |
| Germany in the Atlantic |
| The United States in the Pacific |
| Post-WWII conception |
| See also |
| Notes |
Admiral Fisher's 1912 prediction
In 1912, British Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher, by then a retired First Sea Lord, presented a paper to the Cabinet. He developed the argument that submarines would find adherence to Prize Rules impossible, for practical reasons: a submarine could not capture a merchant ship, for it would have no spare manpower to deliver the prize to a neutral port, neither could it take survivors or prisoners, for lack of space. "''...there is nothing a submarine can do except sink her capture.''" If a merchant ship were armed, as was permitted by a conference in London in 1912, then a submarine was under more pressure to destroy a ship. He asked: "''What if the Germans were to use submarines against commerce without restriction?''"
This last comment was thought to be unsupportable. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty and political head of the Navy, supported by senior naval opinion, said it was inconceivable that "''...this would ever be done by a civilised power.''".
It was Fisher who was proved correct, though - as will be shown in the following section - the Germans themselves did not plan for this kind of warfare and went in practice through the stages which Fisher had predicted.
World War I
Main articles: First Battle of the Atlantic
The evidence suggests that Germany had not started World War I with an appreciation of the impact on commerce and supply that submarines could have. They had fewer than 30 operational boats, all with small torpedo capacities. At first, merchant ships would be stopped, occupants safely evacuated and then the vessel sunk, usually by gunfire, all following Prize Rules. This had little effect and increasingly placed the German submarine—U-boat—at risk from defensive weaponry.
Germany had practical strategic problems. War-weariness affected the German home situation. The best chance of achieving an early advantageous peace with Britain was to stifle its trade and imports. Surface ships had not been effective, neither could the German Navy force the Royal Navy off the seas—the Battle of Jutland had shown this, despite an apparent German victory.
The gamble which was taken was that unrestricted submarine warfare would critically damage Britain before an incensed United States could make a practical impact. However, it failed.
World War II
London Rules on naval warfare
The submarine sinking of merchant ships without warning is in violation of the 1930 First London Naval Treaty, which specifies that "...except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety...."
However, the London Rules were obsolete before they were signed (though the Kriegsmarine based its Prize Rules on them). The use of disguised guns on auxiliary cruisers increased the risk inherent in stop-and-search rules, but the primary danger came from the wide-spread adoption of radio, which meant that a merchant could call for help as soon as a submarine appeared, even before it could issue its demands. Coupled with the rapidly-growing speed, range, and destructive power of combat aircraft, this technology ensured that complying with these rules would be suicide for any submarine.
Germany in the Atlantic
For the first few weeks of the World War II, the Kriegsmarine attempted to honour Germany's treaty obligations, but that attempt was in trouble almost immediately following the sinking of SS ''Athenia'' by ''U 30'', and it was abandoned at the end of November or the beginning of December 1939 with the issuing of War Order No. 154.
The United States in the Pacific
The United States, from the first day it entered the war against Japan, decided that unrestricted submarine warfare was to be carried out in the Pacific Ocean[1]. This fact was mentioned by Admiral Chester Nimitz during the post war Nuremberg Trials, in evidence presented at the trial of Karl Dönitz on his orders to the U-boat fleet to breach the London Rules.[2]
Post-WWII conception
Since the introduction of long-range anti-ship missiles after World War II, which are able to destroy a ship from beyond the horizon, the London Rules are universally regarded as entirely void. It is indicative that despite the rules being used in the indictment of Admiral Karl Dönitz, and although he was found guilty of breaching the 1936 Naval Protocol, his sentence was not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare at the Nuremberg Trials.
See also
★ Submarine warfare
★ Intensified submarine warfare
★ Commerce raiding
★ Tonnage war
★ Arabic pledge
★ Sussex pledge
★ War crimes
★ Laconia incident
Notes
1. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/fullhist.html
2. Judgement : Doenitz the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School
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