STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS
In economics and game theory, the decisions of two or more players are called 'strategic complements' if they mutually reinforce one another, and they are called 'strategic substitutes' if they mutually offset one another. These terms were originally coined by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).[1]
To clarify what is meant by 'reinforce' or 'offset', it is helpful to consider a situation in which the players all have similar choices to make, as in the paper of Bulow et al., where all the players are imperfectly competitive firms each choosing how much to produce. In that context, the production decisions are strategic complements if an increase in the production of one firm increases the marginal revenues of the others, because in that case the others will have an incentive to produce more too. This tends to be the case if there are sufficiently strong aggregate increasing returns to scale and/or the demand curves for the firms' products have a sufficiently low own-price elasticity. On the other hand, the production decisions are strategic substitutes if an increase in one firm's output decreases the marginal revenues of the others, giving them an incentive to produce less.
Mathematically, consider a symmetric game with two players that each have payoff function , where represents the player's own decision, and represents the decision of the other player. Assume is increasing and concave in the player's own strategy . Under these assumptions, the two decisions are strategic complements if an increase in each player's own decision raises the marginal payoff of the other player. That is, the decisions are strategic complements if the second derivative is positive. Equivalently, this means that the function is supermodular.
On the other hand, the decisions are strategic substitutes if is negative, that is, if is submodular.
★ Supermodular
★ Coordination game
★ Uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibrium
★ Multiplier (economics)
1. J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, and P. Klemperer (1985), 'Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and strategic complements'. ''Journal of Political Economy'' 93, pp. 488-511.
To clarify what is meant by 'reinforce' or 'offset', it is helpful to consider a situation in which the players all have similar choices to make, as in the paper of Bulow et al., where all the players are imperfectly competitive firms each choosing how much to produce. In that context, the production decisions are strategic complements if an increase in the production of one firm increases the marginal revenues of the others, because in that case the others will have an incentive to produce more too. This tends to be the case if there are sufficiently strong aggregate increasing returns to scale and/or the demand curves for the firms' products have a sufficiently low own-price elasticity. On the other hand, the production decisions are strategic substitutes if an increase in one firm's output decreases the marginal revenues of the others, giving them an incentive to produce less.
| Contents |
| Calculus formulation |
| See also |
| References |
Calculus formulation
Mathematically, consider a symmetric game with two players that each have payoff function , where represents the player's own decision, and represents the decision of the other player. Assume is increasing and concave in the player's own strategy . Under these assumptions, the two decisions are strategic complements if an increase in each player's own decision raises the marginal payoff of the other player. That is, the decisions are strategic complements if the second derivative is positive. Equivalently, this means that the function is supermodular.
On the other hand, the decisions are strategic substitutes if is negative, that is, if is submodular.
See also
★ Supermodular
★ Coordination game
★ Uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibrium
★ Multiplier (economics)
References
1. J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, and P. Klemperer (1985), 'Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and strategic complements'. ''Journal of Political Economy'' 93, pp. 488-511.
This article provided by Wikipedia. To edit the contents of this article, click here for original source.
psst.. try this: add to faves

العربية
中国
Français
Deutsch
Ελληνική
हिन्दी
Italiano
日本語
Português
Русский
Español