'Sŏn'gun', often spelled 'Songun', is
North Korea's “Military First” policy, which prioritizes the
Korean People's Army in the affairs of state and allocates national resources to the army first. “Military First” has been playing many roles, including that of “Military First Politics”, serving as a political system, that of “a line of Military First Economic Construction” acting as an economic system, and of “Military First Ideology” making it the new guiding ideology of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (
DPRK).
''Songun'' elevates the
Korean People's Army within North Korea as an organization and as a state function, granting it the primary position in the
North Korean government and society. It guides
domestic policy and
international interactions.
[1] It is the framework for the government, designating the military as the "supreme repository of power." The
North Korean government grants the
Korean People's Army the highest economic and resource-allocation priority, and positions it as the model for society to emulate.
[2] ''Songun'' is also the ideological concept behind a shift in policies since 1994 which emphasize the military over all other aspects of state and society.
History
''Songun'' did not appear as an official government policy until after
Kim Il Sung's death in 1994. In 1995, "military first" policies were introduced as "a revolutionary idea of attaching great importance to the army" and as "a politics emphasizing the perfect unity and the single-hearted unity of the
Party,
Army and the people, and the role of the army as the vanguards."
[3] This was a slight shift from the
government's previous guiding policy,
Kim Il Sung's ''
juche'', or self-reliance policy.
[4]
In 1997, an editorial published in ''Nodong Sinmun'', the
North Korean government's mouthpiece, stated: "Never before have the status and role of the
People's Army been so extraordinarily elevated as today when it is being led energetically by the Respected and Beloved Comrade Supreme Commander." By this point, the
People's Army had also become "synonymous with the people, the state, and the party."
[5] Together, all of this indicates not only the centrality of
Kim Jong Il to the ''songun'' ideology, but also its increasing rhetorical centrality to the state and society.
In 1998, ''songun'' began appearing in conjunction with other terms, including "military first revolutionary idea", "military first revolutionary leadership", and "military first politics", expanding the concept of ''songun'' into even more aspects of North Korean governance.
[6]
''Songun'' became an even more prominent concept in January of 1999, making its first appearance in the important New Year's Day editorial published jointly by all the major news organs of the
DPRK. The editorial tied ''songun'' with
Kim Jong Il by declaring that he practiced military-first leadership, which is "one in which the
People's Army serves as the main force of revolution and in which the unity of the army and the people helps to safeguard as well as build
socialism."
In January of 2003, the New Year's editorial added military first ideology (''songun sasang'') to the pantheon of military first concepts. In December of 2003, the "Essential Attributes of Military-First Politics" was published as a new vision of the driving force of the
revolution in the quasi-
Communist North Korea. It assigned the main force of the
revolution to the
Korean People's Army.
This is a role traditionally, in
Communist societies, assigned to the
proletariat or, in
China, to the
peasantry. For
North Korea, "only the army meets the criteria of loyalty, revolutionary spirit, cohesiveness, and esprit de corps."
January of 2004 saw another increase in the omnipresence of ''songun'', as it was mentioned more frequently than any other word in the New Year's Editorial, and was used to describe everything from politics to Korea itself.
''Songun'' has continued to expand in importance, and is even included in the ideological discussion of
reunification with
South Korea. The North Korean press stated, "''songun'' politics is the guarantee that will secure the re-unification of the Fatherland."
[7] The
DPRK also credits ''songun'' with safeguarding the peace on the peninsula, and states that it is the only thing preventing the US from attacking the North.
[8] ''Songun'' has become intrinsic to
North Korea's domestic politics,
foreign policy, and decision-making, and has certainly taken its place alongside ''
juche'' as a guiding principle of the regime.
Why ''Songun''?
There are two separate lines of argument on why, after
Kim Il Sung's death, the
DPRK shifted to ''songun'' as their primary ideology. One strand of the debate points to the
DPRK's desire to increase its military strength due to its precarious international position.
[9] In this sense, ''songun'' is perceived as an aggressive, threatening move to increase the strength of the
DPRK military at the expense of other parts of society.
This argument also often points to the series of crises that befell
North Korea in the early 1990's, beginning with the fall of
Communism and its long-time ally the
Soviet Union in 1991, followed by the death of
Kim Il Sung in 1994, which was then trailed by several natural disasters and the
North Korean famine and its concurrant economic crisis, all before 1999. These also could have served as motivation for a new method of consolidation of power.
[10]
The second strand focuses on
internal DPRK politics as the cause for the move to military first politics. When
Kim Il Sung died, he left leadership of the
DPRK to his son,
Kim Jong Il. At the time of his father's death, the most important position held by
Kim Jong Il in the
North Korean government was military, specifically second in command of the military. This left him with no choice but to use the
Korean People's Army to consolidate his own power.
Additionally, in order to keep control of the government,
Kim Jong Il would need to secure his support base within the
Korean People's Army.
This line of argument points out that
Kim Jong Il deliberately chose to sideline other aspects of the government in order to assert the primacy of the
Korean People's Army. This included abolishing the Central People's Committee, the state presidency, and sidelining the DPRK Administration Council.
Through these efforts,
Kim Jong Il was able to consolidate his power and hold on to the government after
his father's death.
Political Implications
One implication of ''songun'' policies is that it is not only working with ''
juche'', the self-reliance ideal promoted by
Kim Il Sung, but also replacing it as the central state ideology as
Kim Jong Il consolidates his power.
[11] Some point to the policy as a sign that the government is crumbling, and could soon collapse.
The ascendency of the
Korean People's Army concerns
South Korea, and ties into the debate over the
Sunshine Policy, its most recent vision of
Korean reunification.
[12] Given
North Korea's insistence that ''songun'' will facilitate
reunification, it is difficult to tell what they expect in the future from
South Korea, whose government is not at all supportive of ''songun'' policies, going so far as to outlaw websites within
South Korea that promote
North Korea's military-first ideas.
[13]
''Songun'' politics have also thrived on the ongoing
nuclear crisis.
[14] For the
United States, given that its primary concern is the
denuclearization of the peninsula, the concept of military-first politics and ideology is a troubling one.
[15] ''Songun'' also seems to fit very well with the possession of
nuclear weapons, and can be seen as a way of making such weapons central to the government's guiding ideology of self-governance.
[16] This leads to the concern that, the longer military-first ideology guides the
North Korean government, the less likely it will be that the
United States will be able to convince
North Korea to give up its
nuclear weapons program. A similar concern is that
North Korea could perceive attempts at
denuclearization and normalization of affairs with the
United States as a threat to the primacy of the military within the
DPRK and, thus, a threat to ''songun'' ideology, a fear which puts into doubt the idea that the
DPRK is actually willing to give up its
nuclear weapons program at all.
[17]
Economic Implications
The origin of “Military First” traces back to “Arduous March”
[18] through the “Revolutionary Spirit of Soldiers.” In order to overcome the economic crisis, the army is expected to work in the forefront. Concepts of “Arduous March” and “Revolutionary Spirit of Soldiers” have evolved into “Military First” policy with an economic implication. DPRK’s “Military First” is comparable with South Korea’s military-led administration during the
Park Chung-hee regime. The Kim Jong Il regime has strategically aimed at "A Powerful and Prosperous Nation" (''kangseong taeguk'') through "Military First" policy.
Notes
1. Alexander V. Vorontsov, “North Korea’s Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing?” ''Brookings Institution'', 26 May 2006, 26 March 2007.
2. Jae Kyu Park, “North Korea since 2000 and prospects for Inter Korean Relations” ''Korea.net'', 19 Jan 2006, 12 May 2007.
3. Global Security “Songun Chongch’I [Army First] ''Global Security.org'', 27 April 2005, 20 March 2007.
4. Korean Overseas Information Service, “Is N.K. Trying an Experiment for Survival?” ''Korea.net'', 6 Aug 2002 < http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/IssueDetailView.asp?board_no=3508> 12 May 2007.
5. Byung Chul Koh, “Military-First Politics and Building a ‘Powerful and Prosperous Nation’ In North Korea” ''Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online'', 14 April 2005, 20 March 2007.
6. Global Security
7. “N. Korea’s Songun ideology the Next ''Juche''?” ''Chosun Ilbo'', 3 May 2005, 11 May 2007.
8. “N.Korean Propaganda Machine Judders Into Action” ''Chosun Ilbo'', 3 August 2006, 11 May 2007.
9. Bruce Cumings, ''North Korea: Another Country'' (New York: The New Press, 2004): 102.
10. Soyoung Kwon “State Building in North Korea: From a ‘Self-Reliant’ to a ‘Military-First’ State” ''Asian Affairs'' 34:3, Nov 2003, 286-296: 293.
11. Kwon: 294.
12. Park
13. Korea Overseas Information Service, “S. Korea bans 32 pro-N. Korea Internet sites” ''Korea.net'', 26 March 2007, 11 May 2007.
14. Gavan McCormack, “A Denuclearization Deal in Beijing: The Prospect of Ending the 20th Century in East Asia” ''Japan Focus'', 14 Feb 2007, 2 April 2007.
15. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs “Background Note: North Korea” US State Department Website, April 2007, 12 May 2007.
16. Wada Haruki, “The North Korean Nuclear problem, Japan, and the Peace of Northeast Asia” Trans. Gavan McCormack, ''Japan Focus'', 10 March 2006, 2 April 2007.
17. McCormack
18.
References
★ Cheong Wook-Sik, "Military First Policy", Presented at Washington Peace Network, Washington, DC. April 19, 2007
★ Chun Mi-Young, The Kim Jong Il administration’s recognition of politics, ''KINU policy series'',September 2006
★ John Feffer, Forgotten Lessons of Helsinki: Human Rights and U.S.-North Korean Relations, ''World Policy Journal'', v.XXI, no.3, Fall 2004
★ Alexander Platkovskiy, Nuclear Blackmail and North Korea's Search for a place in the sun, The North Korean Nuclear Program. New York and London: Routledge, 2000
See also
★ ''
Juche''
★
North Korea
★
Kim Jong Il
★
Korean People's Army
★
Park Chung-Hee
العربية
中国
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