(Redirected from Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945))
The 'Second Sino-Japanese War' (
July 7,
1937 to
September 9,
1945) was a major
war fought between
China and
Japan, both before and during
World War II. It was the largest Asian war in the twentieth century.
[2]
Although the two countries had fought intermittently since
1931, full-scale war started in earnest in
1937 and only ended with the
surrender of Japan in
1945. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese
imperialist policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily to secure its vast raw material reserves and other resources. At the same time, the rising tide of
Chinese nationalism and notions of
self determination made the war of resistance inevitable. Before 1937, the two sides fought in small, localized engagements in the so-called "incidents," as the two sides for a variety of reasons refrained from fighting a total war. The 1931
invasion of
Manchuria by Japan is known as the "
Mukden Incident". The last of these incidents was the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the official beginning of
full scale war between the two countries.
From
1937 to
1941, China fought alone. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the Second Sino-Japanese War merged into the greater conflict of
World War II.
Nomenclature
In
Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the 'War of Resistance Against Japan' (), but also known as the 'Eight Years' War of Resistance' (八年抗戰), or simply 'War of Resistance' (抗戰).
In
Japan, the name is most commonly used due to its neutrality. When the war began in
July 1937 near
Beijing, the government of Japan used 'North China Incident' (北支事変, ''Hokushi Jihen''), and with the outbreak of war in Central China next month, it was changed to 'China Incident' (支那事変, ''
Shina Jihen'').
The word ''incident'' (事変, ''jihen'') was used by
Japan as neither country declared war on each other.
Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries such as the
United Kingdom and particularly the
United States, which had been the biggest
steel exporter to Japan. American President
Roosevelt would have had to impose an embargo due to the
Neutrality Acts had the fighting been named a war.
In
Imperial Japanese
propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "'
holy war'" (''seisen''), the first step of the ''
Hakko ichiu'' (eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, prime minister
Konoe thus launched the
League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy War. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by ''
Greater East Asia War'' (大東亜戦争, ''Daitōa Sensō'').
Although the
Japanese government still uses "Shina Incident" in formal documents, because the word
''Shina'' is considered a derogatory word by
China, media in
Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like 'The Japan-China Incident' (日華事変 [''Nikka Jihen''], 日支事変 [''Nisshi Jihen''], which were used by media even in the 1930s.
Also, the name ''Second Sino-Japanese War'' is not usually used in Japan, as the
First Sino-Japanese War (日清戦争, ''Nisshin-Sensō''), between Japan and the
Qing Empire in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage with the second, between Japan and the
Republic of China.
Background
The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the
First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the
Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede
Taiwan and recognize the independence of
Korea in the
Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign
imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a
great power through its effective measures at
modernization. The
Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the
Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than before due to the dominance of
warlords. The prospect of unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord
Zhang Zuolin of
Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China.
In 1915,
Japan issued the ''
Twenty-One Demands'' to further its political and commercial interests in
China. Following
World War I, Japan acquired
German sphere of influence in
Shandong. China under the
Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions until the
Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the
Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) rival government based in
Guangzhou. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in
Shandong, where
Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the
Kuomintang Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the
Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was also
assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under
Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928.
Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as
Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals of the
Three People's Principles was to rid China of foreign imperialism. However, the
Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rival Kuomintang factions. In addition, the
Chinese Communists revolted against the central government following a purge of its members. Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of ''first internal pacification before external resistance''. This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its aggression. In 1931, the Japanese
invaded Manchuria right after the
Mukden Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the
puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China,
Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the
League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the
Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s,
appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of
raw materials and also as a
buffer state against the
Soviet Union.
Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the
January 28 Incident. The war resulted in the demilitarization of
Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an
ongoing campaign to defeat the
volunteer armies that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese
attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the
Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of
Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was
Nanjing.
In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only extended around the
Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government in bringing greater unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various
Chinese traitors for cooperation and helped these men lead some "autonomous" governments that were friendly to Japan. This policy was called the ''Specialization'' of
North China (), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were
Chahar,
Suiyuan,
Hebei,
Shanxi, and
Shandong.
In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the
He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operation in
Hebei and effectively ended Chinese control of North China. In the same year, the
Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from
Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated from North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed
East Hebei Autonomous Council and the
Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established.
Motives
In order to understand the complexity of the involvement of
China and
Japan, and the later involvement of the
Soviet Union, the
UK, the
US and
France in the Sino-Japanese War, it is important to appreciate the underlying reasons and motives of the different parties that they brought to the war.
'
Japan:' Imperial Japan launched the war in an effort to destroy the Chinese central government under the Kuomintang, and to create
puppet governments that followed Japanese interests. From these actions Japan would obtain a secured supply of raw materials and a market to ensure the prosperity of the Japanese home islands. However, Japan's inability to bring the war in China to an acceptable conclusion, coupled with increasingly unfavorable trading restrictions from the West in response to Japan's continued actions in China, meant that Japan also needed to control sizable natural resources, such as those in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which were at the time controlled by Britain, the Netherlands, and the USA, respectively. Japan's strategy to seize these embargoed resources led to the
attack on Pearl Harbor, opening the Pacific Theater of World War II.
'
China (
Nationalist (Kuomintang)):' Before the onset of full scale war, Nationalist China focused its energies on modernizing the army and building a viable defense industry to increase its combat power vis-à-vis Japan. Because China under the Kuomintang was unified only nominally, it was also constantly preoccupied with fighting internal wars against the communists, resurgent warlords, and other militarist factions. However, once the war against Japan broke out, backing down was impossible, even though China was far from prepared for fighting a war on such a massive scale against a vastly superior enemy. In sum, Nationalist China had several goals: to resist Japanese aggression, to unite China under one central government, to rid China of foreign imperialism, to defeat communism, and to re-emerge as a strong country. In essence, the war of resistance was seen by many as a war of national revival.
China (
Communist): Chinese Communists generally avoided large-scale frontal fighting against the Japanese, while conducting guerrilla warfare and political activities in occupied territories to expand their base areas. As one of its main goals was expansion, the CCP sought to avoid direct conflicts with the Japanese Army in order to emerge from the war stronger than the Nationalist forces, so in the inevitable struggle for dominance, the CCP would be the victor.
'
Soviet Union:' To allow Japan to overextend itself in China such that the USSR could fight Germany in the West without having to garrison strong forces in the East against possible Japanese aggression. Also, a weakened China would allow Chinese Communists to develop and eventually take over the country, providing a potential ally and a buffer zone against Western and Japanese expansionism.
'
United Kingdom:' Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, British attitude was conciliatory toward Japan, as the two had already formed the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Many in the British community in China also supported Japanese actions to weaken the Chinese Nationalist government. This was because British economic interests suffered substantially when the Chinese Nationalist government successfully revoked much foreign concessions, and regained the right to set its own
tariff without British influence. Once World War II began, the UK had to fight Germany in Europe while at the same time hoping China and Japan fight to a stalemate, in order to buy time to regain its Pacific colonies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Burma, and Singapore. The majority of British forces were committed to fighting in Europe, and could spare little for the war in the Pacific.
'
United States:' The United States was generally
isolationist prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor and did not wish to directly provoke Japan, while it aided China with its volunteer airmen and oil/steel embargoes. Following the American entrance to WWII, the US had to defeat Japan in the Pacific while also fighting Germany in the European Theater, with the emphasis on defeating Germany first. The US began a campaign of island hopping in order to secure bases close enough to Japan to support bombing raids and an eventual invasion. When Germany capitulated, the war in the East was to be finished as fast as possible with minimal US casualties. President
Franklin Roosevelt also wished to aid China so that it would emerge as a democratic nation friendly to the US and a source of stability in post-war East Asia.
'
Vichy France:' With massive U.S. supply coming to
Yunnan through
French Indochina's northern state of
Tonkin, the Japanese wanted to blockade the Chinese-Indochinese border. In 1940, following the establishment of the
Vichy France puppet state, Japan staged an
invasion of French Indochina. In March 1945, the Japanese staged a
coup d'état in French Indochina and created their own colonies as the
Empire of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia.
'
Free France:' In December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Free France leader
Charles de Gaulle declared war on Japan. In 1943 de Gaulle created the
Light Corps of Intervention (CLI) Special Forces within the
FEFEO to support the French Resistance in Indochina. From 1944 to 1945 the CLI operated against the Japanese in Vietnam, using the southern Chinese border as a sanctuary. In September French
general Leclerc heading the
CEFEO signed the armistice with Japan and landed in Vietnam and Java with the Franco-British task force to regain control of the colony in October. A partition was established with the Communist Chinese controlling north Vietnam and the British-French controlling southern Vietnam until 1946 when the
First Indochina War broke out.
It is then clear that Nationalist China had an intensely difficult task in hand, with its
Allies all having interests not necessarily in congruence with China's. With these in mind some decisions of the other Allies are much easier to understand.
Invasion of China
Casualties of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese
bombing of Chongqing. More than 5000 civilans died during the first two days of air raids in 1939
[3]
Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War at the
Battle of Lugou Bridge (
Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on
July 7,
1937. Some Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the
Mukden Incident of
September 18,
1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese
Kwantung Army occupied
Manchuria and established the
puppet state of
Manchukuo on
February 18 1932. Japan pressured China into recognising the independence of Manchukuo.
Following the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the Japanese occupied
Shanghai,
Nanjing and Southern
Shanxi in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Historians estimate up to 300,000 people perished in the
Nanking Massacre, after the
fall of Nanjing on
December 13,
1937, while some Japanese historians
denied the existence of a massacre at all. Throughout the next few years, the Japanese air force launched air bombing raids on nearly every city in China, leaving millions homeless.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open,
undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the
Kuomintang-
Communist Party of China (CCP)
Second United Front. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CPC. The distrust between the two
antagonists was scarcely veiled. Their
alliance was forged literally at gun point when
Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in the
Xi'an incident by his own generals and forced to ally with the CPC. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late
1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich
Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, open conflict between the
Nationalists and
Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control, culminating in the
New Fourth Army Incident. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms,
land and
tax reform measures favoring
peasants, while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence and fight the Japanese at the same time.
The Japanese had neither the intention nor the capability to directly administer China. Their goal was to create friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army made the governments that were set up very unpopular. In addition, the Japanese refused to negotiate with the
Kuomintang or the
Communist Party of China, which fueled further anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese also forced the Chinese people living under their control to change their money into military banknotes, which the current Japanese government still refuses to exchange even today.
Chinese strategy
Chinese soldiers march to the
front in 1939.
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for
total war and had little military-industrial strength, no
mechanized divisions, and few
armored forces. Up until the mid-
1930s China had hoped that the
League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a
civil war against the
Communists. Chiang famously was quoted: "''the Japanese are a disease of skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart''". Though the communists formed the
New Fourth Army and the
8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the
National Revolutionary Army, the
United Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its military strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countrysides were almost always hotbeds of
partisan activity.
However, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the
United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast
retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the
Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent his
German-trained divisions, the best of his troops, to defend China's largest and most
industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While the battle was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world. The battle lasted over three months and proved to be an enormous
morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt of conquering Shanghai in three days and China in three months.
While this direct army-to-army fighting lasted during the early phases of the war, large numbers of Chinese defeats compared to few victories eventually led to the strategy of stalling the war. Large areas of China were conquered during the early stages of the war, but the Japanese advancements began to stall in mid-
1938. The Chinese strategy at this point was to prolong the war until it had sufficient strength to defeat the Japanese. Chinese troops often engaged in a practice of
scorched earth in an attempt to slow down the Japanese.
Dams and
levees were sabotaged which led to the
1938 Huang He flood. In addition, industry was transported from coastal industrialized areas to inland cities such as
Chongqing. By
1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions, while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the "
Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) (三光政策,
Hanyu Pinyin: ''Sānguāng Zhèngcè'',
Japanese On: ''Sankō Seisaku''). It was during this time period that the bulk of Japanese
atrocities were committed.
On
December 7,
1941, the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor, which brought the United States into the war. China officially declared war on Japan on
8 December 1941. It refused to declare war earlier because receiving military aid while officially at war would break the
neutrality of the donor nation. At this point, the priority changed from survival to victory. Enriched with foreign aid, China's army, now better trained and equipped, began taking the fight to the enemy. Chinese forces took part in the
Burma Campaign to liberate
Burma from the Japanese. By 1945 China was making significant progress, liberating large areas conquered by Japan during
Operation Ichigo. Operations BETA and CARBONADO, were joint Chinese-American plans to liberate the entire Chinese mainland, starting with a push into
Guangdong and then north to Shanghai. But the dropping of the
atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war,
Operation August Storm, ended the war faster than anyone had expected.
The basis of Chinese strategy during the war, which can be divided into three periods:
#First Period:
7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) –
25 October 1938 (Fall of
Hankou). In this period, one key concept is the trading of "space for time" (
Chinese: 以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northeastern cities, to allow the
home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into
Chongqing to build up military strength.
#Second Period:
25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou) - July, 1944. During the second period, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to
ambush,
flanking attacks, and
encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of
Changsha numerous times.
#Third Period: July 1944 -
15 August 1945. This period employs general full frontal counter-offensives.
Stalemate
By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China,
guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of
Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of
Chongqing. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in
modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within
Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army
defending Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained independence from the central government. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning seized territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the
fall of France and Western Europe to
Nazi Germany.
Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the
Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months.
However,
Germany and the
Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had
close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped and trained with Germany assistance did not materialize when Germany withdrew its support in 1938. The Soviet Union wished to keep China in the war to hinder the Japanese from invading
Siberia, thus saving itself from a
two front war. In September
1937 the Soviet leadership signed
Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, began aiding China and approved
Operation Zet, a Soviet volunteer air force. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport.
Bombers,
fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet
war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the
Battle of Halhin Gol. Prior to the entrance of Western allies, the Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to China, totalling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In 1941 Soviet aid ended as a result of the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed after
Operation Barbarossa. This pact avoided the Soviet Union from fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time.
Other prominent
powers, including the
United States of America, the
United Kingdom, and
France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the
attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a significant influx of trained military personnel and supplies boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight.
Public opinion in the west was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930s,
public opinion had tended to support the Japanese. However, from December 1937, events such as the Japanese
attack on the USS ''Panay '' and the Nanking Massacre, swung public opinion sharply against Japan, and increased fear of Japanese expansionism. In 1938,
Australia prevented a Japanese Government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned
iron ore exports.
[4]
By mid-
1941, the United States organized the
American Volunteer Group, or Flying Tigers. Their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their shark painted P-40 fighters earned them wide recognition while Allies were suffering heavy losses. Entering soon after the U.S. and Japan were at war, their dogfighting tactics would be adopted by US forces. They would also transmit the appreciative Chinese
thumbs-up gesture for number one into military culture.
In addition, the United States, Britain and the
Netherlands East Indies began oil and/or steel
embargos. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks on the western Allies on
December 8 1941 (
December 7 in U.S. time zones), such as the
raid on Pearl Harbor.
Entrance of Western Allies
Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the
United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the
Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so between the closing of the
Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the
Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over
The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little from the Eastern Front. Because of these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major offensive.
Chiang was appointed
Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in
1942. General
Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, while commanding US forces in the
China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due to a number of factors. Some historians suggested it is largely due to the
corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. However, some historians believed it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume control of Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell did not appreciate the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the Chinese Communist during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a multi-front war - the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other) Stilwell criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American
media, and to President
Franklin Roosevelt. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops away from the main front because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the
Pacific Ocean Areas and
South West Pacific Area, employing an
island hopping strategy. Three months after the cessation of hostilities in the
western front, as per the agreement made in the
Yalta Conference, the USSR launched an overwhelming
attack in Manchuria against the Japanese. Following the surrender of the Japanese to the Allied powers, the USSR proceeded to dismantle nearly all of the industrial equipment in Manchuria for transport back to the USSR. During this time, the CCP took refuge in the area, and looted what the Soviets had left, including most of the arms retreating Japanese forces left behind.
Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war.
Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the
Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Churchill's "
Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into
Indochina in the
Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and prevent the gate to
India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers, a strategy that
Claire Chennault supported. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of
Indian Independence in a meeting with
Mahatma Gandhi in
1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.
The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In
1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the
IJA launched
Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the
Hunan,
Henan, and
Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration. The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas led to the replacement of Stilwell by Major General
Albert Wedemeyer. However, Chinese troops under the command of
Sun Li-jen drove out the Japanese in North Burma to secure the
Ledo Road, a supply route to China. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives and retook Guangxi and other southwestern regions. With the Chinese army well in the progress training and equipping, Albert Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guandong, obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.
Casualties assessment
A terrified baby in Shanghai's South Station after a Japanese bombing
The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).
Chinese casualties
★ The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
★ The Chinese lost approximately 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million
civilians died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all" operation (
sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in North China by general
Yasuji Okamura and authorized on 3 December 1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.
[5]
Chinese sources list the total military and non-military casualties, dead and wounded, of the Chinese were 35 million.
[1] Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million.
Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383,301.3 million US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times of the
GDP of Japan at that time (7,700 million US dollars).
★ In addition, the war created 95 million
refugees.
Japanese casualties
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing, although this number is disputed. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200,000, but this is believed to be extremely low when considering the length of the conflict. The combined Chinese forces claimed to have killed at most 1.77 million Japanese soldiers during the 8-year-war. Most academics put Japanese casualties suffered during the Second Sino-Japanese War at 1.1 million.
Aftermath
As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. On August 6, an American
B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic bomb used in combat on
Hiroshima, in an attempt to force Japan to surrender, which it did not. Two days later, on
8 August the Soviets launched
Operation August Storm. The Soviet Union, having renounced its non-aggression pact with Japan, attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the
end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. In less than two weeks the
Kwantung Army in Manchuria consisting of over a million men had been destroyed by the Soviets. Three days later, another atomic bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki. Japan capitulated to the
Allies on
August 15,
1945. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on
September 9,
1945 and by the provisions of the
Cairo Conference of 1943 the lands of
Manchuria,
Taiwan and the
Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the
Ryukyu Islands were maintained as Japanese territory.
The Chinese return to
Liuchow (Liuzhou) in July 1945.
In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but was actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out
civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of a long, costly war and internal strife, by spiraling
inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering,
speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, as large swathes of the prime farming areas were ravaged by the fighting. Millions were rendered homeless by floods and the destruction of towns and cities in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the
Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan. Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet
sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering.
The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At
Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas,"
Mao was able to adapt
Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The
Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the CPC was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CPC. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CPC power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CPC doctrine that came to be formalized as "
Mao Zedong Thought". With skillful organizational and
propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon,
all out war broke out between the KMT and CPC, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to
Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the
mainland.
Legacy
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for
Sino-Japanese relations today, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the
Nanjing Massacre,
comfort women, and
Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of
historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.
The PRC government has also been accused of greatly exaggerating the CPC's role in fighting the Japanese. The PRC has traditionally emphasized the role of communist guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines and claimed that the KMT refused to fight the Japanese. Such viewpoint is often challenged by contemporary generals and historians. One such notable critic is General
Hau Pei-tsun, who refused to attend a joint celebration in China marking the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in
2005, claiming that the PRC continues to distort history. In reality, the KMT army, including Chiang Kai-shek's central army and other non-Whampoa provincial armies, carried the brunt of combat during the war. The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CPC increased its military strength from practically nothing to 1.7 million men. In addition, many surviving KMT officers and soldiers, who were not able to evacuate to
Taiwan following the
Chinese Civil War, were also persecuted by the communist government and sent to
labor camps for having served under Chiang Kai-shek's command. Their descendants and relatives also faced hardships as they were categorized as "counter-revolutionaries" during the
Cultural Revolution.
The legacy of the war is more complicated in the
Republic of China on
Taiwan. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the
Victory Day on
September 9 (now known as
Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's
Retrocession Day on
October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more pro-
Taiwan independence pan-green coalition and the rise of
desinicization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwan independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China (and even sympathize with Japanese actions). Still, commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the
pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold
Taipei held a series of talks in the
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters.
Number of troops involved
National Revolutionary Army
:''Main article:
National Revolutionary Army''
The
National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370
Standard Divisions (正式師), 46 New Divisions (新編師), 12
Cavalry Divisions (騎兵師), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (暫編師), and 13
Reserve Divisions (預備師), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. The number of active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about 170 NRA divisions. The average
NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army was roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower but the Chinese forces were largely lacked artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker when relative capacity in aspects of warfare, such as
intelligence,
logistics, communications, and medical services, are taken into account.
The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called ''dixi'' (嫡系, "direct descent") group, which comprised divisions trained by the
Whampoa Military Academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army (中央軍) of the NRA. The second group is known as the ''zapai'' (雜牌, "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army (省軍). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the
Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the
Guangxi,
Shanxi,
Yunnan and
Ma Cliques.
:''Main article:
Chinese Red Army''
Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the
NRA, the number of those on the CPC side, due to their
guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the
Eighth Route Army,
New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.
For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see
Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Imperial Japanese Army
Main articles: Imperial Japanese Army
★ The IJA had approximately 2,000,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the
Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the
Pearl Harbor attack, the IJA had 51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower.
★ The
Collaborationist Chinese Army in 1938 had 78,000 people, and grew to 145,000 in 1940. Their growth was explosive around 1942-43, and according to KMT estimates 1,186,000 people were involved in the collaborationist army by the war's end. However, 2 million is also a figure often-quoted, which would make China the only country in
World War II with a collaborationist army which outnumbered the invading army. At their height they fielded a maximum of 900,000 troops. Almost all of them belonged to the regional
puppet governments such as
Manchukuo,
Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Beijing),
Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later
collaborationist Nanjing Nationalist Government or
Wang Jingwei regime. The puppet and collaborationist troops were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CPC.
Chinese and Japanese equipment
The National Revolutionary Army
The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent
brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two
artillery brigades, 16 artillery
regiments and three armored battalions. The
Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the
Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft.
Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the
Hanyang and
Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the
German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made
7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and
Karabiner 98k. A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the "
Chiang Kai-shek rifle" a Chinese copy from the ''Mauser Standard Modell'' another rifle they used was
Hanyang 88. The standard
light machine gun was a local copy of the
Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also
Belgian and
French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the famous ''
Maschinengewehr 34''s from
Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each
platoon.
Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made
1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German
blueprints. On average every
battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the
7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol.
Some divisions were equipped with 37mm
PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or
mortars from
Oerlikon,
Madsen, and
Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French
Brandt 81 mm
mortars and 6
Solothurn 20mm
autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with
Bofors 72mm L/14, or
Krupp 72mm
L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 ''
Rheinmetall'' 150mm
L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in
1934) and 24 Krupp 150mm
L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in
1936).
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned
Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German
M35 helmets (standard issue for the ''
Wehrmacht'' until late in the
European theatre) rolled off the production lines in
1935, and until
1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a
gas mask.
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's ''
Dadao Teams'' and the
Yunnanese army.
Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of
Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the
Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim
Ma Clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.
The Imperial Japanese Army
Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and
submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks.
Special forces were also available.
The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of
Battle of Shanghai (1937)).
See Also:
★ ''
List of Japanese infantry weapons used in the Second-Sino Japanese War''
★ ''
List of armour used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War''
★ ''
List of Japanese aircraft in use during the Second Sino-Japanese War''
Who fought the War of Resistance?
The question as to which political group directed the
Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the
Japanese still remains a controversial issue.
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the
Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CPC has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CPC that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CPC's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of
Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.
Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a minuscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerrilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang.
[6] This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists
Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline,
[7] although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the
Hundred Regiments Campaign and the
Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to
defend Shanghai from the Japanese. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy
[8] and
bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.
[9] Also, the main bulk of Japanese forces were fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in
Shaanxi.
Major figures
China: Nationalist
★ Bai Chongxi (白崇禧)
★ Chen Cheng (陳誠, 陈诚)
★ Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石, 蒋介石)
★ Du Yuming (杜聿明)
★ Fang Xianjue (方先覺, 方先觉)
★ Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥, 冯玉祥)
★ Gu Zhutong (顧祝同, 顾祝同)
★ He Yingqin (何應欽, 何应钦)
★ H. H. Kung (孔祥熙)
★ Hu Kexian (胡克先)
★ Hu Zongnan (胡宗南)
★ Li Zongren (李宗仁)
★ Long Yun (龍雲, 龙云)
★ Ma Zhanshan (馬占山)
★ Song Zheyuan (宋哲元)
★ Soong May-ling (宋美齡, 宋美龄)
★ T. V. Soong (宋子文)
★ Sun Lianzhong (孫連仲, 孙连仲)
★ Sun Liren (孫立人, 孙立人)
★ Tang Enbai (湯恩伯, 汤恩伯)
★ Tang Shengzhi (唐生智)
★ Wang Jingwei (汪精衛, 汪精卫)
★ Wei Lihuang (衛立煌, 卫立煌)
★ Xue Yue (薛岳)
★ Yan Xishan (閻錫山, 阎锡山)
★ Xie Jinyuan (謝晉元, 谢晋元)
★ Ye Ting (叶挺)
★ Zhang Fakui (張發奎)
★ Zhang Zhizhong (張治中, 张治中)
★ Zhang Zizhong (張自忠, 张自忠)
★ Zhu Shaoliang (朱紹良)
|
China: Communist
★ Chen Yi (陳毅, 陈毅)
★ Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平, 邓小平)
★ He Long (賀龍, 贺龙)
★ Lin Biao (林彪)
★ Liu Bocheng (劉伯承, 刘伯承)
★ Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇, 刘少奇)
★ Luo Ronghuan (羅榮桓, 罗荣桓)
★ Mao Zedong (毛澤東, 毛泽东)
★ Nie Rongzhen (聶榮臻, 聂荣臻)
★ Peng Dehuai (彭德懷, 彭德怀)
★ Su Yu (粟裕)
★ Xu Xiangqian (徐向前)
★ Ye Jianying (葉劍英, 叶剑英)
★ Zhang Aiping (张爱萍)
★ Zhou Enlai (周恩來, 周恩来)
★ Zhu De (朱德)
|
Japan: Imperial Japanese Army
★ Emperor Shōwa (昭和天皇) Hirohito (裕仁)
★ Abe Nobuyuki (阿部 信行)
★ Anami Korechika (阿南 惟幾)
★ Prince Asaka Yasuhiko (朝香宮)
★ Prince Chichibu Yasuhito (秩父宮)
★ Doihara Kenji (土肥原 賢二)
★ Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu (伏見宮博恭王)
★ Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本 欣五郎)
★ Hata Shunroku (畑 俊六)
★ Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko (東久邇宮 稔彦王)
★ Honma Masaharu (本間 雅晴)
★ Ishii Shiro (石井 四郎)
★ Isogai Rensuke (磯谷 廉介)
★ Itagaki Seishiro (板垣 征四郎)
★ Prince Kan'in Kotohito (閑院宮 載仁親王)
★ Konoe Fumimaro (Kyūjitai: 近衞 文麿, Shinjitai: 近衛 文麿)
★ Kanji Ishiwara (石原 莞爾)
★ Koiso Kuniaki (小磯 國昭,小磯 国昭)
★ Matsui Iwane (松井 石根)
★ Mutaguchi Renya (牟田口 廉也）
★ Nakajima Kesago (中島 今朝吾)
★ Nishio Toshizo (西尾 壽造, 西尾 寿造)
★ Okamura Yasuji (岡村 寧次)
★ Sakai Takashi (酒井 隆)
★ Sugiyama Hajime (杉山 元)
★ Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi (竹田宮 恒徳王)
★ Terauchi Hisaichi (寺内 壽一, 寺内 寿一)
★ Tojo Hideki (Kyūjitai: 東條 英機, Shinjitai: 東条 英機)
★ Umezu Yoshijiro (梅津 美治郎)
★ Yamaguchi Tamon (山口 多聞)
★ Yamashita Tomoyuki (山下 奉文)
|
Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Campaigns
★
Honan-Hupeh Campaign
★
Western Hunan Campaign
★
Japanese Campaigns in Chinese War
Battles
Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941.
★
Mukden September 1931
★
Invasion of Manchuria September 1931
★
★
Jiangqiao Campaign October 1931
★
★
★
Resistance at Nenjiang Bridge November 1931
★
★
Chinchow Operation December 1931
★
★
Defense of Harbin January 1932
★
Shanghai (1932) January 1932
★
Pacification of Manchukuo March 1932
★
★
Manchukuoan Anti Bandit Operations March 1932
★
Operation Nekka January 1933
★
★
Great Wall January 1933
★
★
Battle of Rehe February 1933
★
Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933-36)
★
★
Suiyuan October 1936
★
Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937
★
Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
★
Chahar August 1937
★
Battle of Shanghai August 1937
★
Beiping–Hankou Railway Operation August 1937
★
Tianjin–Pukou Railway Operation August 1937
★
Taiyuan September 1937
★
★
Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937
★
★
Battle of Xinkou September 1937
★
Battle of Nanjing December 1937
★
Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
★
★
Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938
★
Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
★
★
Battle of Lanfeng May 1938
★
Amoy Operation May 1938
★
Battle of Wuhan June 1938
★
★
Battle of Wanjialing
★
Canton Operation October 1938
★
Hainan Island Operation February 1939
★
Battle of Nanchang March 1939
★
★
Battle of Xiushui River March 1939
★
Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939
★
Swatow Operation June 1939
★
Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939
★
Battle of South Guangxi November 1939
★
★
Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939
★
1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
★
★
Battle of Wuyuan March 1940
★
Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940
★
Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940
★
Indochina Expedition September 1940
★
Central Hupei Operation November 1940
★
Battle of South Henan January 1941
★
Western Hopei Operation March 1941
★
Battle of Shanggao March 1941
★
Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
★
Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941
★
Battle of Changsha (1942) January 1942
★
Battle of Yunnan-Burma Road March 1942
★
★
Battle of Toungoo
★
★
Battle of Yenangyaung
★
Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi April 1942
★
Battle of West Hubei May 1943
★
Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan October 1943
★
Battle of Changde November 1943
★
Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi April 1944
★
Battle of Changsha (1944) August 1944
★
Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou August 1944
★
Battle of West Hunan April - June, 1945
★
Operation August Storm August – September, 1945
Aerial Engagements
★
Aerial Engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Japanese invasion and planned operations
★
Sczechwan Invasion
★
Kuolichi-Taierhchuang Operation
★
CHE-KIANG Operation
★
Peiping-Hankow Operation
★
Siang-Kwei Operation
★
Canton-Hankow Operation
★
Kiangsi-Fukien Operation
★
Kwanchow-Wan Occupation
★
Laohokow Operation
★
Chichiang Operation
★
Disembarc in Tsingtao
===
List of Japanese political and military incidents =
Attacks on civilians==
★
Nanking Massacre
★
Unit 731
★
Unit 100
★
Unit 516
★
Unit 1855
★
Unit 2646
★
Unit 8604
★
Unit 9420
★
Unit Ei 1644
★
Comfort women
★
Sanko sakusen
★
Shantung Incident
★
Taihoku Air Strike
★
Bombing of Chongqing
★
Kaimingye germ weapon attack
★
Changteh Chemical Weapon Attack
★
Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi
★
Sook Ching Massacre (specifically against Chinese nationals in Singapore)
See also
★
History of China
★
History of the Republic of China
★
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
★
History of Japan
★
Military of the Republic of China
★
Military history of China
★
Military history of Japan
★
Military of the People's Republic of China
★
New 1st Army
★
Mitsubishi
★
Republic of China Air Force
★
Events preceding World War II in Asia
Notes
1. Jowett, Phillip, Rays of the Rising Sun, pg.72.
2. Bix, Herbert P. ''The Showa Emperor's "Monologue" and the Problem of War Responsibility'',Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Summer, 1992), pp. 295-363.
3. Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2000, p.364
4. "Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs 10 May 1940"
5. Himeta, ''Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô'', Iwanami Bukuretto 1996, p.43.
6. Chang and Ming, July 12 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286–287
7. Chang and Ming, July 12 2005
8. Chang and Halliday, pg. 231
9. Chang and Halliday, pg. 232
References
★
Chang, Flora and Ming, Chu-cheng. (July 12 2005). Rewriters of history ignore truth. ''Taipei Times'', pg. 8.
★
Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931–1945" ''Journal of Military History'' (Jan 2006) v 70#1, pp 137–82. Historiographical overview of major books from the 1970s through 2006
★ Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, (London, 2005); Jonathan Cape, ISBN 0-679-42271-4
★ Annalee Jacoby and Theodore H. White, ''Thunder out of China'', New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946
★
Rays of the Rising Sun: Japan's Asian Allies 1931–45 Volume 1: China and Manchukuo, , Phillip, Jowett, Helion and Company Ltd, 2005, ISBN 1-874622-21-3 - Book about the Chinese and Mongolians who fought for the Japanese during the war.
★
History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945), , Hsu, Long-hsuen, Chung Wu Publishers, 1972, ASIN B00005W210
External links
★
World War 2 Newspaper Archives - War in China, 1937-1945
★
Annals of the Flying Tigers
★
KangZhan.org - Gallery and history of the Sino-Japanese war
★
Japanese soldiers in the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-1938 (Japanese)
★
History and Commercial Atlas of China, Harvard University Press 1935, by Albert Herrmann, Ph.D. See bottom of the list for 1930s maps.
★
Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, China 1:250,000, Series L500, U.S. Army Map Service, 1954- . Topographic Maps of China during the Second World War.
★
Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection Manchuria 1:250,000, Series L542, U.S. Army Map Service, 1950- .
Topographic Maps of Manchuria during the Second World War.
★ Joint Study of the Sino-Japanese War, Harvard University. Multi-year project seeks to expand research by promoting cooperation among scholars and institutions in China, Japan, the United States, and other nations. Includes extensive bibliographies
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