A 'policy of deliberate ambiguity' (also known as a policy of 'strategic ambiguity') is the practice by a nation of being intentionally ambiguous on certain aspects of its
foreign policy or whether it possesses certain
weapons of mass destruction. It may be useful if they have contrary foreign and domestic policy goals, or if they want to take advantage of
risk aversion to abet a
deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation's intentions, leading to actions that run counter to that nation's wishes.
Examples
★
United States
★
★ Whether it would retaliate from a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons; specifically, during the
Persian Gulf War.
★
★ Whether it would defend the
Republic of China (
Taiwan) in the event of an attack by the
People's Republic of China. This policy was intended to discourage both a
unilateral declaration of
independence by
ROC leaders and an invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. The United States has since been much less ambiguous after
George W. Bush stated to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan,
[1] but has continued to express dissatisfaction over moves towards a unilateral
declaration of independence. The US and several other nations have long felt a need to be ambiguous regarding Taiwan; see
Foreign relations of the Republic of China.
★
Israel
★
★ Whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons (see
Israel and weapons of mass destruction).
★
Flexible response
External links
★
Arms Control Association: U.S. Nuclear Policy: "Negative Security Assurances"
References
1. Bush vows 'whatever it takes' to defend Taiwan
See Eric M. Eisenberg (2007), Strategic ambiguities: Essays on communication, organization, and identity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.