The 'Occupation of the Ruhr' between 1923 and 1925, by troops from
France and
Belgium, was a response to the failure of the
German Weimar Republic under
Cuno to pay
reparations in the
aftermath of World War I. Having been thwarted in its attempts to establish more robust security guarantees vis-à-vis Germany after
World War I, France had sought to tip the economic balance more into its favour by exacting arguably over-severe German reparations, which Britain at first supported, only to reconsider later.
John Maynard Keynes, a leading figure in the Treasury in the post-War period, suggested that if Germany were to be crippled, Britain, its second largest trading partner, would go down with it. Thus, Britain proposed that Germany could pay more installments of lesser amounts of the $33 billion dollars owed.
Initiated by
French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré, the
invasion took place on
January 11 1923, with the aim of occupying the centre of German
coal,
iron and
steel production in the
Ruhr area valley, in order to both gain the money that Germany owed, and to cripple Germany forever.
The economic strain of the German resistance was incalculable. The French occupation forces had cut off the Ruhr economically from the rest of the nation. The french occupation brought the industrial activity of Germany almost to a grinding halt. More than 150,000 Germans were deported from the Ruhr occupation zone, some 400 were killed and more than 2,000 wounded.
The occupation was initially greeted by a campaign of
passive resistance, and a few incidents of
sabotage (which the
Nazis later exaggerated for a myth of widespread armed resistance). In the face of economic collapse, with huge
unemployment and
hyperinflation, the
strikes were eventually called off in September 1923 by the new
Gustav Stresemann coalition government, which was followed by a
state of emergency. Despite this, civil unrest grew into
riots and
coup attempts targeted at the government of the Weimar Republic, including the
Beer Hall Putsch.
The
Rhenish Republic was proclaimed at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) in October 1923.
Internationally the occupation did much to boost sympathy for Germany, although no action was taken in the
League of Nations in response to what was a clear breach of League rules. The French, with their own economic problems, eventually accepted the
Dawes Plan and withdrew from the occupied areas in July and August 1925. The last French troops evacuated
Düsseldorf,
Duisburg, and
Ruhrort, ending French occupation of the Ruhr region on
August 25 1925.
The unsuccessful conclusion from the French point of view may have contributed to France's failure to oppose
Hitler's
Remilitarization of the Rhineland eleven years later, in a clear violation of the
Treaty of Versailles on Germany's part.
Bibliography
★ Michael Ruck, ''Die Freien Gewerkschaften im Ruhrkampf 1923'' (Frankfurt am Main, 1986);
★ Barbara Müller, ''Passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf. Eine Fallstudie zur gewaltlosen zwischenstaatlichen Konfliktaustragung und ihren Erfolgsbedingungen'' (Münster, 1995);
★ Stanislas Jeannesson, ''Poincaré, la France et la Ruhr 1922-1924. Histoire d'une occupation'' (Strasbourg, 1998);
★ Elspeth Y. O'Riordan, ''Britain and the Ruhr crisis'' (London, 2001);
★ Gerd Krüger, Das "Unternehmen Wesel" im Ruhrkampf von 1923. Rekonstruktion eines misslungenen Anschlags auf den Frieden, in Horst Schroeder, Gerd Krüger, ''Realschule und Ruhrkampf. Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts'' (Wesel, 2002), pp. 90-150 (Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte von Wesel, 24) [esp. on the background of so-called 'active' resistance];
★ Conan Fischer, ''The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924'' (Oxford / New York, 2003);
★ Gerd Krumeich, Joachim Schröder (eds.), ''Der Schatten des Weltkriegs: Die Ruhrbesetzung 1923'' (Essen, 2004) (Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens, 69);
★ Gerd Krüger, "Aktiver" und passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf 1923, in Günther Kronenbitter, Markus Pöhlmann, Dierk Walter (eds.), ''Besatzung. Funktion und Gestalt militärischer Fremdherrschaft von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert'' (Paderborn / Munich / Vienna / Zurich, 2006), pp. 119-30 (Krieg in der Geschichte, 28);