(Redirected from Miracle of the Vistula)
The 'Battle of Warsaw' (sometimes referred to as the 'Miracle at the Vistula',
Polish: ''Cud nad Wisłą'') was the decisive
battle of the
Polish-Soviet War, which began soon after the end of
World War I in 1918 and lasting until the
Treaty of Riga (1921).
The Battle of Warsaw was fought from 13 to
25 August 1920 as
Red Army forces commanded by
Mikhail Tukhachevski approached the
Polish capital of
Warsaw and nearby
Modlin Fortress. On
August 16,
Polish forces commanded by
Józef Piłsudski counter-attacked from the south, forcing the
Russian forces into a disorganised
withdrawal eastward and behind the
Niemen River. Estimated
Bolshevik losses were 10,000 killed, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 66,000
taken prisoner, compared with Polish losses of some 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing and 22,000 wounded.
Before the Polish victory at the
Vistula, both the Bolsheviks and the majority of foreign experts considered Poland to be on the verge of defeat. The stunning, unexpected Polish victory crippled the Bolshevik forces. In the following months, several more Polish victories secured Poland's independence and eastern borders.
The battle
Prelude to the battle
The Poles were fighting to preserve their
newly regained independence, lost in the 1795
third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to carve out the borders of a new multinational federation (
Międzymorze) from the territories of their former partitioners,
Russia,
Germany and the
Austria-Hungary.
[3]
The Bolsheviks had in 1919 gained the upper hand in the
Russian Civil War, having dealt crippling blows to the
White Russians.
viewed Poland as a bridge that had to be crossed so that communism could be brought to
Central and
Western Europe, and the
Polish-Bolshevik War seemed the perfect way to test Bolshevik strength. Bolshevik speeches asserted that the revolution was to be carried to western Europe on the
bayonets of Soviet ''soldat''s and that the shortest route to
Berlin and
Paris lay through Warsaw.
[4]
After early setbacks against Poland in 1919, the Bolshevik offensive that eclipsed the Polish
Kiev Operation began in early 1920 and had been overwhelmingly successful. By mid-1920, Poland's very survival was at stake and the entire world expected Poland to collapse at any moment.
[5] The Soviet strategy called for a massed push toward the Polish capital, Warsaw. Its capture would have had a tremendous
propaganda effect for the Soviets, who expected it not only to undermine the morale of the Poles, but to spark an international series of communist uprisings and clear the way for the Red Army to join the
German Revolution.
Polish defences at Miłosna, near Warsaw.
The Soviet
1st Cavalry Army under
Semyon Budyonny broke through Polish lines in early June 1920.
[6] This led to a collapse of all Polish
fronts in the east. On
July 4,
1920,
Mikhail Tukhachevski's
Western Front began an all-out assault in
Belarus from the
Berezina River, forcing Polish forces to
retreat. On
July 19 the
Red Army seized
Grodno, on
July 28, it reached
Białystok, and three days later, the
Brześć Fortress was captured.
The battle plan
Polish plan
Polish commander: Józef Piłsudski.
By the beginning of August, the Polish retreat had become more organized. At first,
Józef Piłsudski wanted to base his operation on the
Bug River and
Brest-Litovsk, but their unexpected fall made it impossible.
On the night of August 5—6, Piłsudski conceived a revised plan at the
Belweder Palace in Warsaw. It called in the first phase for Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and defend the bridgeheads at
Warsaw and at the
Wieprz River. Some 25% of the available
divisions would be concentrated to the south for a strategic counteroffensive. Next, Piłsudski's plan called for the 1st and 2nd Armies of Gen.
Józef Haller's Central Front (10 1/2 divisions) to take a passive role, facing the Soviet frontal attack on Warsaw from the east and holding their
entrenched positions at all costs. At the same time, the 5th Army (5 1/2 divisions) under Gen.
Władysław Sikorski, subordinate to Gen. Haller, would defend the northern area near the
Modlin Fortress and, when it became feasible, strike from behind Warsaw, thus cutting off Soviet forces attempting to envelop Warsaw from that direction, and break through the enemy front and fall upon the rear of the Soviet Northwestern Front. An additional five divisions of the 5th Army were to defend Warsaw from the north. General
Franciszek Latinik's 1st Army would defend Warsaw itself, while General
Bolesław Roja's 2nd Army was to hold the Vistula River line from
Góra Kalwaria to
Dęblin.
The most important role, however, was assigned to a relatively small (some 20,000-man), newly assembled "Reserve Army" (also called the "Assault Group" - ''Grupa Uderzeniowa''), commanded personally by Józef Piłsudski, comprising the most battle-hardened and determined Polish units drawn from the southern front. They were to be reinforced by General
Leonard Skierski's 4th Army and General
Zygmunt Zieliński's 3rd Army, which, after retreating from the
Western Bug River area, had moved not directly toward Warsaw but had crossed the
Wieprz River and broken off contact with their pursuers. The Assault Group's assignment was to spearhead a lightning northern offensive from the Vistula-Wieprz River triangle south of Warsaw, through a weak spot identified by Polish intelligence between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Fronts. This would separate the Soviet Western Front from its reserves and disorganize its movements. Eventually the gap between Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army and the advancing Assault Group would close near the East Prussian border, leaving the Soviet offensive "trapped in a sack."
Although based on fairly reliable information provided by Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet
radio communications,
[7][8][9] the plan was labelled as 'amateurish' by many high-ranking army officers and military experts, who were quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of formal military education. Many Polish units, a mere week before the planned date of the counter-attack, were fighting in places as far as 100-150 miles (150 to 250 km) from the concentration points. All of the troop movements were within striking distance of the Red Army. One strong push by the Red Army could derail plans for a Polish counter-attack and endanger the cohesion of the whole Polish front. Piłsudski's plan was strongly criticized by Polish commanders and officers of the
French Military Mission. Even Piłsudski himself admitted in his memoirs that it was a very risky gamble and the reasons he decided to go forward with the plan were the defeatist mood of politicians, fear for the safety of the capital and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost. Only the desperate situation persuaded other army commanders to go along with it, as they realized that under such circumstances it was the only possible way to avoid a devastating defeat. Ironically, when a copy of the plan accidentally fell into Soviet hands it was considered to be a poor deception attempt and ignored.
A few days later, the Soviets paid dearly for this mistake.
Soviet commander: Mikhail Tukhachevski.
There is some controversy as to the authorship of the plan.
Due to Piłsudski's political image, he was largely unpopular with the right wing of Polish politics. Because of that, after the battle many journalists suggested that the plan was in fact prepared either by
Maxime Weygand or by the Polish Chief of Staff
Tadeusz Rozwadowski.
According to recent research,
[10] the
French Military Mission to Poland proposed only a minor tactical counter-attack of two divisions towards
Mińsk Mazowiecki. Its aim would have been to push the Bolshevik forces 30 kilometres back in order to ease subsequent ceasefire negotiations.
[11] On the other hand, Gen. Rozwadowski's plan called for a deeper thrust into Russian lines from the area of Wieprz. However, Piłsudski proposed a large scale operation, with significant forces committed to beating the enemy forces rather than merely pushing them back. The plan was opposed by the French mission, which did not believe that the Polish Army would be able to regroup after a 600 kilometre retreat.
[12] Nonetheless for many years, a
myth persisted that it was the timely arrival of Allied forces that had saved Poland, a myth in which Weygand occupied the central role.
[13]Bolshevik plan
Mikhail Tukhachevski planned to encircle and surround
Warsaw by crossing the
Vistula river, near
Włocławek to the north and south of the city and launch an attack from the northwest. With his 24 divisions, he planned to repeat the classic maneuvre of
Ivan Paskievich, who in 1831, during the
November Uprising, had crossed the
Vistula at
Toruń and reached Warsaw practically unopposed.
[14] This move would also cut the Polish forces off from
Gdańsk, the only port open to shipments of arms and supplies.
The main weakness of the Soviet plan was the poorly defended southern flank, secured only by the
Pinsk Marshes and the weak
Mozyr Group; the majority of the Soviet Southwest Front was engaged in the
battle of Lwów (1920).
First phase, August 12
Meanwhile Bolsheviks pushed forward.
Gay Dimitrievich Gay's Cavalry Corps together with the 4th Army crossed
Wkra river and advanced towards the town of
Włocławek. The 15th and 3rd Armies were approaching
Modlin fortress and the 16th Army moved towards Warsaw.
The final Soviet assault on Warsaw began on
August 12 with the Soviet 16th Army
the attack at the town of Radzymin (only 23 kilometres east of the city). Its initial success prompted Piłsudski to move up his plans by 24 hours.
Positions prior to the battle.
The first phase of the battle started on
August 13, with a
Red Army frontal assault on the
Praga bridgehead. In heavy fighting,
Radzymin changed hands several times and foreign
diplomats, with the exception of British and
Vatican ambassadors, hastily left Warsaw.
On
August 14, Radzymin fell to the
Red Army, and the lines of Gen.
Władysław Sikorski's Polish 5th Army were broken. The 5th Army had to fight three Soviet armies at once: the 3rd, 4th and 15th. The
Modlin sector was reinforced with reserves (the ''
Siberian Brigade,'' and Gen.
Franciszek Krajowski's fresh ''18th Infantry Division''—both elite, battle-tested units), and the 5th Army held out until dawn.
The situation was saved around midnight when the ''203rd
Uhlan Regiment'' managed to break through the Bolshevik lines and destroy the
radio station of
A.D. Shuvayev's Soviet 4th Army. The latter unit had only one remaining radio station fixed on one frequency which was known to the Polish intelligence. Since the Polish code-breakers did not want the Bolsheviks to find out that their codes were broken, but still neutralize the other radio station, the radio station in Warsaw recited the book of
Genesis in Polish and Latin on the frequency used by the 4th Army, which thus lost contact with its
headquarters and continued marching toward
Toruń and
Płock, unaware of
Tukhachevski's order to turn south. The raid by the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to as ''the Miracle of
Ciechanów''.
At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under Gen.
Franciszek Latinik resisted a Red Army direct assault on Warsaw by six
rifle divisions. The struggle for control of Radzymin forced Gen. Józef Haller, commander of the Polish ''Northern Front'', to start the 5th Army's counterattack earlier than planned.
During this time, Piłsudski was finishing his plans for the counter-offensive. He decided to personally supervise the attack and, because of the enormous risks involved, he handed in a letter with his resignation from all state functions. Thereafter, between
August 13 and 15, he visited all units of the 4th Army concentrating near
Puławy, about 100 kilometres south of Warsaw. He tried to raise morale, since many soldiers were tired and demoralized and numerous recently incorporated replacements showed everyone the extent of Polish losses. Logistics were a nightmare, as the Polish army was equipped with guns made in five countries and rifles manufactured in six, each of them using different ammunition. Adding to the problem was the fact that the equipment was in poor shape. Piłsudski remembers: "In 21 Division, almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me barefoot." Nevertheless, in only three days, Piłsudski was able to raise the morale of his troops and motivate them for one of their greatest efforts.
Second phase, August 14
The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to reach the village of
Izabelin, 13 kilometres from the capital, but this was the closest that Russian forces would come. Soon the tides of battle would change.
Positions around Warsaw, early morning on
August 15.
Tukhachevski, certain that all was going according to plan, was actually falling into Piłsudski's trap. The Russian march across the Vistula in the north was striking into an operational vacuum, where there was no sizeable group of Polish troops. On the other hand, south of Warsaw, Tukhachevski left only token forces to guard the vital link between the North-Western and South-Western Fronts. The
Mozyr Group, which was assigned this task, numbered only 8,000 soldiers. Another error neutralized the 1st Cavalry Army of
Semyon Budyonny, a unit much feared by Piłsudski and other Polish commanders. Soviet High Command, at Tukhachevski's insistence, ordered the 1st Cavalry Army to march toward Warsaw from the south. Semyon Budyonny did not obey this order due to a grudge between commanding South-Western Front generals
Aleksandr Yegorov and Tukhachevski.
In addition, the political games of
Joseph Stalin, at the time the chief political
commissar of the South-Western Front, further contributed to Yegorov's and Budyonny's disobedience.
[15] Stalin, in search of personal glory, wanted to capture the besieged important industrial center of
Lwów. Ultimately, Budyonny's forces marched on Lwow instead of Warsaw and thus missed the battle.
Second phase of the battle: Polish counterattack.
The Polish 5th Army counter-attacked on
August 14, crossing the
Wkra River. It faced the combined forces of the Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies (both numerically and technically superior). The struggle at
Nasielsk lasted until
August 15 and resulted in the almost complete destruction of the town. However, the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin was halted at the end of August 15 and on that day Polish forces recaptured Radzymin, which boosted the Polish morale.
[16]
From that moment on, Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army pushed exhausted Soviet units away from Warsaw, in an almost
blitzkrieg-like operation. Sikorski's units, supported by the majority of the small number of Polish
tanks,
armoured cars and
artillery of the two
armoured trains, advanced at the speed of 30 kilometres a day, soon destroying any Soviet hopes for completing their "enveloping" manoeuvre in the north.
Third phase, August 16
On
August 16, the Polish ''Reserve Army'' commanded by Józef Piłsudski began its march north from the
Wieprz River. It faced the ''
Mozyr Group'', a Soviet corps that had defeated the Poles during the
Kyiv operation several months earlier. However, during its pursuit of the retreating Polish armies, the ''Mozyr Group'' had lost most of its forces and been reduced to a mere two divisions covering a 150-kilometre front-line on the left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On the first day of the counter-offensive, only one of the five Polish divisions reported any sort of opposition, while the remaining four, supported by a
cavalry brigade, managed to push north 45 kilometres unopposed. When evening fell, the town of
Włodawa had been liberated, and the communication and supply lines of the Soviet 16th Army had been cut. Even Piłsudski was surprised by the extent of these early successes. ''Reserve Army'' units covered about 70 kilometres in 36 hours, splitting the Soviet offensive and meeting virtually no resistance. The Mozyr Group consisted solely of the 57th Infantry Division, which had been beaten in the first day of the operation. Consequently, the Polish armies found a huge gap between the Russian fronts and exploited it, continuing their northward offensive with two armies following and falling on the surprised and confused enemy.
On
August 18,
Mikhail Tukhachevski, in his headquarters in
Minsk some
300 miles (500 km) east of Warsaw, became fully aware of the extent of his defeat and ordered the remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup. His intention was to straighten the front line, stop the Polish attack and to regain the initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all. Soviet General Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps continued to advance toward
Pomerania, its lines endangered by the Polish 5th Army, which had finally managed to push back the Bolshevik armies and gone over in pursuit. The Polish 1st Division of the Legion, in order to cut the enemy's retreat, made a remarkable march from
Lubartów to
Białystok -
163 miles (262 km) in 6 days. The soldiers fought in two battles, slept only a few hours and marched for up to 21 hours a day. Their sacrifice and endurance was rewarded when the entire 16th Soviet Army was cut off at Białystok and most of its troops taken prisoner.
The Soviet armies in the centre of the front fell into chaos. Some divisions continued to fight their way toward
Warsaw, while others turned to retreat, lost their cohesion and panicked.
[17] The Russian
commander-in-chief lost contact with most of his forces, and all Soviet plans were thrown into disorder. Only the 15th Army remained an organised force and tried to obey Tukhachevski's orders, shielding the withdrawal of the westernmost extended 4th Army. But it was defeated twice on
August 19 and 20th and joined the general rout of the Red Army's North-Western Front. Tukhachevski had no choice but to order a full
retreat toward the Western
Bug River. By
August 21, all organized resistance ceased to exist and by
August 31, the Soviet South-Western Front was completely routed.
Aftermath
Although Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians, Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not succeed completely. Four Soviet armies began to march toward Warsaw on
July 4 in the framework of the North-Western Front. By the end of August, the 4th and 15th Armies were defeated in the field, their remnants crossed the Prussian border and were disarmed. Nevertheless, these troops were soon released and fought against Poland again. The 3rd Army retreated east so quickly that Polish troops could not catch up with them; consequently, this army sustained the fewest losses. The 16th Army disintegrated at
Białystok and most of its soldiers became prisoners of war. The majority of Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps were forced across the German border and were temporarily interned in
East Prussia.
Polish soldiers displaying captured Soviet battle standards.
Soviet losses were about 15,000 dead, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 65,000 captured, compared to Polish losses of approximately 4,500 killed, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing. Between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet troops managed to reach the borders of
Germany. After crossing into East Prussia, they were briefly
interned, then allowed to leave with their arms and equipment. Poland captured about 231 pieces of artillery and 1,023
machine-guns.
The southern arm of the
Red Army's forces had been routed and no longer posed a threat to the Poles. Semyon Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army besieging
Lwów had been defeated at the
Battle of Komarów (
August 31,
1920) and the
Battle of Hrubieszów. By mid-October, the Polish Army had reached the
Tarnopol-
Dubno-
Minsk-
Drisa line.
Tukhachevski managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and in September established a new defensive line near
Grodno. In order to break it, the Polish Army fought the
Battle of the Niemen River (September 15-September 21), once again defeating the Bolshevik armies. After the
Battle of the Szczara River, both sides were exhausted and on
October 12, under heavy pressure from
France and
Britain, a
cease-fire was signed. By
October 18, the fighting was over, and on
March 18,
1921, the
Treaty of Riga was signed, ending hostilities.
Soviet
propaganda before the Battle of Warsaw had described the fall of Poland's capital as imminent, and the anticipated fall of Warsaw was to be a signal for the start of a large-scale communist revolutions in Poland, Germany and other European countries, economically devastated by the
First World War. The Soviet defeat was therefore considered a setback for some Soviet officials (particularly
Vladimir Lenin).
A
National Democrat Sejm deputy,
Stanisław Stroński, coined the phrase, "Miracle at the Wisła" (
Polish: ''"Cud nad Wisłą"''), to underline his disapproval of
Piłsudski's "Ukrainian adventure." Stroński's phrase was adopted with approval by some patriotically- or piously-minded Poles unaware of Stroński's ironic intent.
Breaking of Soviet ciphers
According to documents found in 2005 at Poland's Central Military Archives,
Polish cryptologists broke intercepted Russian ciphers as early as September 1919. At least some of the Polish victories, not only the Battle of Warsaw but throughout the campaign, are attributable to this. Lieutenant
Jan Kowalewski, credited with the original breakthrough, received the order of
Virtuti Militari in 1921.
Orders of battle
Polish
3 Fronts (''Northern, Central, Southern''), 7 Armies, a total of 32 divisions: 46,000 infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 730 machine guns; 192 artillery batteries; and several units of (mostly
FT-17) tanks.
Fronts:
★ Northern Front: 250 km., from
East Prussia, along the
Vistula River, to
Modlin:
★
★ 5th Army
★
★ 1st Army -
Warsaw
★
★ 2nd Army -
Warsaw
★ Central Front:
★
★ 4th Army - between
Dęblin and
Kock
★
★ 3rd Army - between south of
Kock and
Brody
★ Southern Front - between
Brody and the
Dniestr River
Soviet
See also
★
Battle of Warsaw (1939)
★
Blue Army
Notes and references
1. Janusz Szczepański, KONTROWERSJE WOKÓŁ BITWY WARSZAWSKIEJ 1920 ROKU (Controversies surrounding the Battle of Warsaw in 1920). ''Mówią Wieki'', online version.
2. Soviet casualties refer to all the Warsaw-related operations, from the fighting on the approaches to Warsaw, through the counteroffensive, to the battles of Białystok and Osowiec, while the estimate of Bolshevik strength may be only for the units that were close to Warsaw, not counting the units held in reserve that took part in the later battles.
3. David Parker, ''The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'', W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, ISBN 0-393-02025-8, Google Print, p.194
4. Davies, Norman, ''White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20'', Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0-7126-0694-7. (First edition: New York, St. Martin's Press, inc., 1972.) Page 29
5. Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki, ''A Concise History of Poland'', Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-55917-0, Google Print, p.203
6. Battle Of Warsaw 1920 by Witold Lawrynowicz; A detailed write-up, with bibliography. Last accessed on 5 November 2006.
7. Ścieżyński, Mieczysław, Colonel of the (Polish) General Staff, ''Radjotelegrafja jako źrodło wiadomości o nieprzyjacielu'' (Radiotelegraphy as a Source of Intelligence on the Enemy), Przemyśl, Printing and Binding Establishment of (Military) Corps District No. X HQ, 1928, 49 pp.
8. Paweł Wroński, ''"Sensacyjne odkrycie: Nie było cudu nad Wisłą"'' ("A Remarkable Discovery: There Was No Miracle at the Vistula"), ''Gazeta Wyborcza'', online.
9. Jan Bury, POLISH CODEBREAKING DURING THE RUSSO-POLISH WAR OF 1919-1920, online
10. "Wojna Polski z Rosją Sowiecką, 1919-1920" ("Poland's War with Soviet Russia, 1919-1920"), Janusz Odziemkowski, , , Mówią Wieki (The Ages Speak), 2005
11. General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw of 1920, Piotr Wandycz, , , Journal of Central European Affairs, 1960
12. General Weygand and the Battle of the Vistula 1920, Zdzisław Musialik, , , Piłsudski Institute, 1987,
13. THE REBIRTH OF POLAND. University of Kansas, lecture notes by professor Anna M. Cienciala, 2004. Last accessed on 2 June 2006.
14. The Soviet High Command: a military-political history 1918-1941, , , , Frank Cass, 2001, ISBN 0-7146-5178-8
15. ''Stalin: The Man and His Era'', Beacon Press, 1987, ISBN 0-8070-7005-X, Google Print, p.189
16. Wojna polsko-bolszewicka. Entry at Internetowa encyklopedia PWN. Last accessed on 27 October 2006.
17. Kosciuszko, We Are Here!: American Pilots of the Kosciuszko Squadron in Defense of Poland, 1919-1921, Janusz Cisek, , , McFarland & Company, , ISBN 0-7864-1240-2
Further reading
★
Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, ''The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920'', Hyperion Press, 1977, ISBN 0-88355-429-1.
★
Norman Davies, ''White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20'', Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0-7126-0694-7.
★
J.F.C. Fuller, ''The Decisive Battles of the Western World'', Hunter Publishing, ISBN 0-586-08036-8.
★
Richard M. Watt, ''Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate, 1918-1939'', Hippocrene Books, 1998, ISBN 0-7818-0673-9.
★
M. Tarczyński, ''Cud nad Wisłą'', Warszawa, 1990.
★ Józef Piłsudski, ''Pisma zbiorowe'', Warszawa, 1937, reprinted by Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1991, ISBN 83-03-03059-0.
★ Mikhail Tukhachevski, Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7-10, 1923, reprinted in ''Pochód za Wisłę'' (March across the Vistula), Łódź, 1989.
External links
★
3 scans Polish maps
★
"Bolszewik złamany Gazeta Wyborcza article about breaking of Soviet ciphers.
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