MATERIAL CONDITIONAL

(Redirected from Logical conditional)
The 'material conditional', also known as the 'material implication' or 'truth functional conditional', expresses a property of certain conditionals in logic. In propositional logic, it expresses a binary truth function ⊃ from truth-values to truth-values. In predicate logic, it can be viewed as a subset relation between the extension of (possibly complex) predicates. In symbols, a material conditional is written as one of the following:

1. $X\; supset\; Y$
2. $X\; o\; Y$

The material conditional is false when X is true and Y is false - otherwise, it is true. (Here, X and Y are variables ranging over formulæ of a formal theory.) We call X the ''antecedent'', and Y the ''consequent''. The material conditional is also commonly referred to as ''material implication'' with the understanding that the antecedent (''X'') materially implies the consequent (''Y'').
A ''distant'' approximation to the material conditional is the English construction 'if...then...', where the ellipses are to be filled with English sentences. However, this is the most common reading of the material conditional in English. A closer approximation to ''X'' → ''Y'' is 'it's false that ''X'' be true while ''Y'' false'—i.e., in symbols, $$
eg(X nd
eg Y). Arguably this is more intuitive than its logically equivalent disjunction ¬''X'' ∨ ''Y''.

Contents

Definition

Truth table

Venn diagram

Formal properties

Philosophical problems with material conditional

References

See also

Conditionals

Related topics

Definition

Logical implication and the material conditional are both associated with an operation on two logical values, typically the values of two propositions, that produces a value of ''false'' just in case the first operand is true and the second operand is false.

Truth table

The truth table associated with the material conditional 'if p then q' (symbolized as 'p → q') and the logical implication 'p implies q' (symbolized as 'p ⇒ q') is as follows:

p	q	→
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

Venn diagram

The Venn Diagram of "If A then B"

Formal properties

The ''material conditional'' is not to be confused with the entailment relation ⊨ (which is used here as a name for itself). But there is a close relationship between the two in most logics, including classical logic which we only consider here. For example, the following principles hold:

★ If $Gammamodelspsi$ then $emptysetmodelsphi\_1landdotslandphi\_nsupsetpsi$ for some $phi\_1,dots,phi\_ninGamma$. (This is a particular form of the deduction theorem.)

★ The converse of the above

★ Both ⊃ and ⊨ are monotonic; i.e., if $Gammamodelspsi$ then $DeltacupGammamodelspsi$, and if $phisupsetpsi$ then for any α, Δ. (In terms of structural rules, this is often referred to as weakening or ''thinning''.)
These principles do not hold in all logics, however. Obviously they do not hold in non-monotonic logics, nor do they hold in relevance logics.
Other properties of implication:

★ associativity: $(p$
ightarrow (q
ightarrow r))
ightarrow ((p
ightarrow q)
ightarrow r)

★ distributivity: $s$
ightarrow (p
ightarrow q)
ightarrow ((s
ightarrow p)
ightarrow (s
ightarrow q))
:::$p$
ightarrow (q equiv r) equiv ((p
ightarrow q) equiv (p
ightarrow r))

★ transitivity: ($a$
ightarrow b)
ightarrow ((b
ightarrow c)
ightarrow (a
ightarrow c))

★ commutativity: ($a$
ightarrow (b
ightarrow c))
ightarrow (b
ightarrow (a
ightarrow c))

★ idempotency: $a$
ightarrow a

★ 'truth preserving' : The interpretation under which all variables are assigned a truth value of 'true' produces a truth value of 'true' as a result of material implication.

Philosophical problems with material conditional

The truth function ⊃ does not correspond exactly to the English 'if...then...' construction. For example, any material conditional statement with a false antecedent is true. So the statement "if 2 is odd then 2 is even" is true. Similarly, any material conditional with a true consequent is true. So the statement, "if Pigs fly then Paris is in France" is true. These problems are known as the paradoxes of material implication, though they are not really paradoxes in the strict sense; that is, they do not elicit logical contradictions.
There are various kinds of conditionals in English; e.g., there is the indicative conditional and the subjunctive or counterfactual conditional. The latter do not have the same truth conditions as the material conditional. For an overview of some the various analyses, formal and informal, of conditionals, see the "References" section below.

References

★ Brown, Frank Markham (2003), ''Boolean Reasoning: The Logic of Boolean Equations'', 1st edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA. 2nd edition, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2003.

★ Edgington, Dorothy (2001), "Conditionals", in Lou Goble (ed.), ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic'', Blackwell.

★ Edgington, Dorothy (2006), "Conditionals", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Eprint.

★ Quine, W.V. (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

See also

Conditionals

★ Counterfactual conditional ★ Indicative conditional ★ Corresponding conditional (logic) ★ Strict conditional ★ Logical implication

Related topics

★ Ampheck ★ Boolean algebra ★ Boolean domain ★ Boolean function

★ Boolean logic ★ Laws of Form ★ Logic gate ★ Logical graph

★ Peirce's law ★ Propositional logic ★ Sole sufficient operator ★ Zeroth order logic ★ Conditional quantifier