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'Iran Air Flight 655' ('IR655') was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai, UAE. On Sunday July 3, 1988, towards the end of the Iran Iraq War, the aircraft flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser USS ''Vincennes'' between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 38 non-Iranians and 66 children. The ''Vincennes'' was inside Iranian territorial waters at the time.
According to the US government, the Iranian airbus was mistakenly identified as an attacking F14 fighter. The Iranian government, however, maintains that the ''Vincennes'' knowingly shot down a civilian aircraft.
The flight number IR655 is still used by Iran Air on the Tehran-Bandar Abbas-Dubai route.^[1]

Contents

The incident

US government accounts

Iranian government account

Independent sources

Radio communication

Potential factors

Medals awarded

Compensation

References

Cited

Others

See also

External links

Further reading

The incident

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by Mohsen Rezaian, a veteran captain with 7,000 hours of flight time, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.
At that same time, the ''Vincennes,'' under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Ticonderoga class cruiser ''Vincennes'' had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'' by Iranian forces. Iran had purchased Silkworm missiles from China, and an AEGIS cruiser was the only type of vessel that could counter the threat. The ''Roberts'' had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.
On the morning of July 3, the ''Vincennes'' crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. Earlier in the day, the ''Vincennes'' — along with Iranian gunboats — had similarly violated Omani waters until challenged by an Omani warship. The USS ''Sides'' (FFG-14) and USS ''Elmer Montgomery'' (FF-1082) were nearby.
The event triggered an intense controversy, with Iran condemning the shootdown as a "barbaric act." On the other hand, George H.W. Bush, at the time Vice President of the United States in the Reagan Administration, defended his country at the United Nations by declaring that the shootdown had been a wartime incident and that the crew of the ''Vincennes'' had acted appropriately to the situation at the time. At a news conference on 2 August, 1988 he said "I will never apologize for the United States of America—I don’t care what the facts are" in reference to the incident.^[2]

US government accounts

According to the US government, the ''Vincennes'' mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the Airbus A300B2 as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run;^[3] the commercial flight had originated at Bandar Abbas, which served dual roles as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial, civilian flights.^[4] According to the same reports, the ''Vincennes'' tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement.
At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the ''Vincennes'' fired two SM-2MR Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the ''Vincennes''’ crew realized that the plane had been a civilian airliner.
This version was finalized in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled ''Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988''.^[5] Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988 and part II in 1993), which has drawn criticism from many observers.
The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty reports that the USS ''Vincennes'' was in international waters, contrary to the claims of the Iranian government.
When questioned by BBC journalists in a 2002 documentary, the US government stated in a written answer that they believed the incident may have been caused by a simultaneous psychological condition amongst the 18 bridge crew of the Vincennes called 'scenario fulfillment’, which is said to occur when persons are under pressure. In such a situation, the men will carry out a training scenario, believing it to be reality while ignoring sensory information that contradicts the scenario. In the case of this incident, the scenario was an attack by a lone military aircraft. This hypothesis, if true, could explain why the records of the ''Vincennes''’ instruments never indicated a craft resembling an F-14 being detected, while a civilian IFF signal was detected.

Iranian government account

According to the Iranian government, the shooting down of IR 655 by the ''Vincennes'' was an intentionally performed and unlawful and inhumane act. Even if there was a mistaken identification, which Iran has not accepted, it argues that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, not an accident.^[6] In April 1988, the US Navy carried out Operation Praying Mantis against Iran and directly attacked Iranian Naval vessels and installations and Iranian off-shore oil facilities. The battle was launched in retaliation for the 14 April mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58). U.S. forces sank two Iranian warships and as many as six armed speedboats in the engagement.

Independent sources

''Newsweek'' reporters John Barry and Roger Charles wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.^[7] An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire.^[8] The ''Vincennes'' had been nicknamed 'Robocruiser' by crew members and other US Navy shops, both in reference to its AEGIS system, and to the supposed aggressive tendencies of its captain.[1] The US fighter base in Bahrain had refused to provide supporting aircraft to cover the ''Vincennes'' — the commander of the base stated that his decision was based on a fear that the ''Vincennes'' would accidentally shoot down one of his aircraft.
On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice ruled that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America."^[9] However, the case relating to the Airbus downing, "the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)", was dropped 22 February, 1996 following settlement and reparations by the United States.^[10]
Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on American television show ''Nightline'' that the ''Vincennes'' was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.^[11] This contradicted earlier Navy statements.
Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS ''Sides'', the warship stationed near to the ''Vincennes'' at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers’ aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago." His comment referred to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the ''Vincennes'' too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn’t a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers’ announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He’s climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the ''Vincennes'' might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.
According to the BBC documentary of 2002, Carlson identified IR655 as a civilian craft based on its radar signature, its 'squawk' (IFF) code, and the fact that it was ascending at low speed — an attacking military aircraft would be descending towards the ''Vincennes'' at high speed. At first Carlson thought that the 'Iranian Tomcat' identified by the ''Vincennes'' was actually another craft that he could not identify, as it was surprising to Carlson that the ''Vincennes'' crew would mistake a Tomcat with a civilian aircraft. The ''Vincennes''’ warnings were on a military channel, addressed to 'Iranian Tomcat'. When Carlson concluded that the ''Vincennes'' was referring to IR655 in its warning to turn away or receive fire, he urgently warned IR655 on a civilian freqency that it was in danger, having been mistaken for a military craft and should turn away. IR655 immediately complied and changed course onto a trajectory away from the ''Vincennes''. The ''Vincennes'' fired regardless. Carlson expressed the view that the incident was a mistake brought about by an overly aggressive approach by the captain of the ''Vincennes''.
Craig, Morales & Oliver, in a slide presentation published in M.I.T.'s Spring 2004 ''Aeronautics & Astronautics'', as the ''"USS Vincennes Incident,"'' commented that Captain Rogers had "an undeniable and unequivocal tendency towards what I call 'picking a fight.'" On his own initiative, Rogers moved the Vincennes 50 miles northeast to join the USS Montgomery. An angry Captain McKenna ordered Rogers back to Abu Musa, but the Vincennes helicopter pilot, Lt Mark Collier, followed the Iranian speedboats as they retreated north, eventually taking some fire:

"…the Vincennes jumps back into the fray. Heading towards the majority of the speedboats, he is unable to get a clear target. Also, the speedboats are now just slowly milling about in their own territorial waters. Despite clear information to the contrary, Rogers informs command that the gunboats are gathering speed and showing hostile intent and gains approval to fire upon them at 0939. Finally, in another fateful decision, he crosses the 12-mile limit off the coast and enters illegally into Iranian waters." USS Vincennes Incident, Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004, MIT, MA, USA.

The Fogarty report concluded, "The data from USS Vincennes tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that [Iran Air Flight 655] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from takeoff at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down." The fault in the USS Vincennes lying directly in the airplane’s pathway is Captain Rogers’.

Radio communication

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the ''Vincennes'' launched its missiles. According to the U.S. Navy investigation the ''Vincennes'' at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency, despite being a sophisticated anti-aircraft warship operating two helicopters. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.
The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air flight 655: seven on military frequencies and three on commercial frequencies, addressed to the supposed "unidentified Iranian aircraft" and giving its speed as 350 knots.
However IR655 was arguably not "unidentified" as its commercial Mode III Transponder was active and squawking its assigned 6760 identifier code. It was traveling at an airspeed of 300 knots. The reference to "350 knots" was its speed over ground, as observed by radar. IR655's flight instruments would have recorded the airspeed.
International investigations concluded that the crew of IR655 assumed that the three calls that they received before the missiles struck must have been directed at an Iranian P3 (see below).

Potential factors

★ The ship’s crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules, due to confusion over which time zone the schedules referred to. The airliner’s departure was 27 minutes later than scheduled. "The CIC was also very dark, and the few lights that it did have flickered every time the ''Vincennes'' fired at the speedboats. This was of special concern to Petty Officer Andrew Anderson, who first picked up Flight 655 on radar and thought that it might be a commercial aircraft. As he was searching in the Navy’s listing of commercial flights, he apparently missed Flight 655 because it was so dark."

★ An Iranian P-3 was in the area some time before the attack, providing a potential (albeit unlikely) explanation for the lack of target acquisition radar interrogation^[12]

★ It was first claimed that Flight 655 deviated from the centre of its air corridor — an unusual occurrence with commercial flights — namely that it was 3.35 NM off the 20 NM-wide corridor at the time of being shot down. It is further claimed that this deviation had it bearing straight at the ''Vincennes''. It is unclear how much of this deviation was true, and how much was claimed to obscure the ''Vincennes''’ position within Iranian territorial waters.

★ It is claimed that a Mode II IFF signal of '2'1100 was attributed to the Airbus track, identifying it as an Iranian military aircraft (commercial aircraft respond with Mode III signals). According to the official military report, the flight was in fact using the correct 'squawk' mode. The ''Vincennes'' either heard it incorrectly or believed it to be a military aircraft using Mode III '3'6760 to deceive them. It has since been assumed that the tracking device used to identify IFF squawks was left in the original position of Flight 655 when first sighted (at take-off), confusing the Flight 655 squawk with that of an Iranian F-14 fighter within the area. The Bandar Abbas airport was shared between commercial and military aircraft at that time.

★ The crew of the ''Vincennes''’ Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus’ original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the ''Sides''’ track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.

★ This incident took place just over a year after the USS ''Stark'' was attacked in the Persian Gulf by an Iraqi Mirage F-1, killing 37.

★ The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboats. There are claims that ''Vincennes'' was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogary in ''"Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992".'' Also, the initial claims of ''Vincennes'' being called for help by a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around.Iran Air 655, House Armed Services Hearing, July 21, 1992 This might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the ''Vincennes''’ engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.

★ Software development expert Steve McConnell claimed:

★

★ A lack of training contributed to the disaster.

Medals awarded

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life but never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologised for the incident. Officially, it continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. The men of the ''Vincennes'' were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, won the navy’s Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," noting his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" that enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure"^[13] The Legion of Merit was presented to Rogers and Lustig on 3 July 1988, according to a 23 April 1990 article in ''The Washington Post''. The citations did not mention the Iran Air flight. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.
The incident overshadowed U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655. The cause of the crash was later determined to be a bomb associated with the Libyan intelligence service.
The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to the downing of Korean Air Flight 007 by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Compensation

On February 22, 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner) for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown, but not for the aircraft, which was estimated to be worth approximately US$30 million. This was an agreed settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice.^[14] The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ''ex gratia'' basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for the incident.

References

Cited

1. Iran Air flight timetable http://www.iranair.com/util/img/index.do;jsessionid=a0303461311181370009687?imgPath=%5Cfiles%5CabtIrnAir%5Cdownload%5C520_file_en.pdf
2. Perspectives
3. An Airbus A300B2 is 177 feet long (54.08 m), nearly three times as long as an F-14, which is 61 ft 9 in long (18.6 m). Analysis of the radar return’s strength can tell them apart, but this is not done in a busy environment because of the time that it requires.

4. Military Blunders, History.com.
5. Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988
6. International Court of Justice. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) — Iranian submission: Part IV B, The shooting down of flight IR 655, para. 4.52-4.53. Accessed 2007-01-20.
7. Newsweek
8. A Look at the Naval Lessons Available to the US from the Iraq War
9. International Court of Justice. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). Accessed December 12, 2006.
10. International Court of Justice. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). Accessed December 12, 2006.
11. The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War
12. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, ''Chapter 6'', , Gary, Klein, The MIT Press, 1999, ISBN 0-262-61146-5
13. History.com, ''Military Blunders'' Retrieved September 13, 2006
14. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)

Others

#''Nunn Wants to Reopen Inquiry into Vincennes’ Gulf Location''. Washington Times, July 4, 1992. Abstract: Senator Sam Nunn called on the Pentagon to probe allegations that the Navy "deliberately misled Congress" about the location of the USS ''Vincennes'' when it shot down an Iranian civilian airliner four years ago.
#Fisk, Robert. ''The Great War for Civilisation — The Conquest of the Middle East''. London: Fourth Estate, 2005. 318–328. ISBN 1-84115-007-X
# Marian Nash Leich, "Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis" American Journal of International Law Vol. 83 p. 319 (1989)
# USS Vincennes Incident; Dan Craig, Dan Morales, Mike Oliver; M.I.T. Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004

See also

★ Operation Praying Mantis (earlier naval action in the area)

★ Lists of accidents and incidents on commercial airliners

★

★ Korean Air Flight 007, shot down by Soviet Su-15 aircraft September 1, 1983 west of Sakhalin island.

★ El Al Flight 402, shot down by two Bulgarian Mig-15s and crashed near Petrich, Bulgaria July 27, 1955.

★ Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114, shot down by an Israeli Air Force F-4 aircraft February 21, 1973.

★ Korean Air Lines Flight 902, shot down by Soviet Su-15 aircraft April 20, 1978 near Murmansk.

External links

★ ABC Nightline interview with Admiral William Crowe aired 1 July 1992, in which Crowe admits that the Vincennes was inside Iranian waters at the time of the shooting, despite what the Navy had been claiming.

★ US Senate, Armed Services Committee hearing, 8 September 1988

★ A collection of US government statements on Iran Air Flight 655

★ Tragedy over the Persian Gulf, from Chapter 9 of Trapped in the Net:The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization by Gene I. Rochlin

★ ''Vincennes'' A Case Study, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

★ Iran Air shot down, The History Channel

★ Iran Air 655 Shootdown, Iran Chamber

★ Mehr News, Mehr News Agency

★ ICJ case — Written Pleadings, Iran and U.S. cases to the International Court of Justice

★ U.S. Department of State Bulletin Sept. 1988 Transcripts: July 3, 1998, President’s Statement; July 4, 1988, Letter To Congress; July 6, 1988, U.S. Letter To The UN Security Council; July 11, 1988, Herbert S. Okun, White House Statement; July 13, 1988, Assistant Secretary Richard S. Williamson, ICAO Council, Montreal; July 14, 1988, Vice-President Bush, UN Security Council

★ ''Sea of Lies'', Newsweek, July 13, 1992

Further reading

★ Trapped in the Net: The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization, Rochlin, Gene I., , , Princeton University Press, 1997,

★ Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-88, Wise, Harold Lee, , , Naval Institute Press, 2007, ISBN 1-59114-970-3