(Redirected from Hafiz al-Asad)
'Hafez al-Assad' ( '') (
October 6,
1930 –
June 10,
2000) was
president of
Syria for three decades. Assad's rule stabilized and consolidated the power of the country's central government after decades of coups and counter-coups. He was succeeded by his son and current president
Bashar al-Assad in 2000.
Early life
Hafez al-Assad was born in the town of
Qardaha in the
Latakia province of western
Syria into a minority
Alawite family. He was the first member of his family to attend
high school. He attended Jules Jammal High School in Lattakia from which he graduated. He joined the
Baath Party in
1946 at the age of 16. Because his family had no money to send him to
university, Assad went to the
Syrian Military Academy (where he met
Mustafa Tlass) and received a free higher education. He showed considerable talent and the military sent him for additional training in the
Soviet Union. As a pilot during the 1950s, he flew the
Gloster Meteor jet fighter, amongst other types. He rose through the ranks and became an important figure in the military.
He opposed the
1958 union between Syria and
Egypt which created the
United Arab Republic (UAR). Stationed in
Cairo, he worked with other officers to end the union, sticking to his
pan-Arab ideals while arguing that the UAR concentrated too much power in the hands of the
Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime. As a result, Assad was briefly imprisoned by the
Egyptian authorities at the breakup of the union in
1961. Tlass escorted his family to Syria, where he later rejoined them.
In the chaos that followed the dissolution of the UAR, a coalition of left-wing groups led by the Baath Party seized power in Syria. Assad was appointed head of the
airforce in
1964. The state was officially ruled by
Amin Hafiz, a
Sunni Muslim, but was in practice dominated by a coterie of young Alawite Baathists.
In government
In
1966, the Baath launched a
coup d'etat within the regime and cleared out the other parties from the government. Assad became
Minister of Defence and wielded considerable influence over government policy. However, there was much tension between the dominant radical wing of the Baath Party, which promoted an aggressive foreign policy and rapid social reform, and Assad's more pragmatic, military-based faction. After being discredited by the failure of the Syrian military in the
Six-Day War in
1967, and enraged by the aborted Syrian intervention in the Jordanian-Palestinian
Black September war, the government faced conflict within its ranks. By the time President
Nureddin al-Atassi and the de facto leader, deputy secretary general of the Baath Party
Salah Jadid, realized the threat and ordered Assad and Tlass be stripped of all party and government power, it was too late. Assad swiftly launched a bloodless intra-party coup,
The Corrective Revolution of
1970. The party was purged, Atassi and Jadid jailed, and Assad loyalists installed in key posts throughout the government.
Presidency
Police state
Al-Assad inherited a dictatorial regime shaped by years of unstable military rule, and lately organized along one-party lines after the Baathist coup. He increased repression and attempted to secure his domination of every sector of society through a vast web of police informers and agents. Under his rule, Syria turned genuinely
authoritarian. He was made the object of a state-sponsored
cult of personality, which depicted as a wise, just, and strong leader of Syria and of the
Arab world in general.
Syria under Assad never quite reached the levels of repression practiced in neighboring
Iraq, ruled by a rivaling Baathist faction. Where
Saddam Hussein's policies of perpetual
state terrorism aimed to secure his rule through fear, Hafez al-Assad took a more sophisticated approach: rather than immediately brutalizing restive communities, his regime often bribed or threatened dissidents. Only after milder forms of persuasion had failed would swords come out. Then, the regime could be counted on to act with unflinching cruelty in order to intimidate all would-be dissidents.
Stability and reforms
Whilst dictatorial, the government of al-Assad initially achieved some popularity for bringing stability to the country, which had experienced dozens of attempted coups since
1948. He also implemented many social reforms and infrastructure projects, notably the Thawra (Revolution) dam on the
Euphrates River. It was built with
Soviet assistance, and still supplies much of Syria's electricity. Public schooling and other reforms were extended to larger segments of the population, and a notable rise in living standards occurred. The government's
secularism meant that many members of religious minorities, such as the
Alawites,
Druze, and
Christians, naturally supported Assad, fearing a return to historic persecution under a Sunni Islamist successor government to Assad.
Assad also continued previous Baath policies by overseeing massive increases in Syria's military strength (again with Soviet support) and by maintaining a strong
Arab nationalist position. School curricula and the state-controlled media gave much attention to the glorious past of Syria and the Arabs, and portrayed al-Assad's government as the lone uncorrupted champion of the Arab nation against
Western imperialism and aggression. This
propaganda aimed to legitimize the government, but also to unify the diverse and fractured Syrian society, and instill a sense of national pride among the populace.
Ethnic and religious opposition
These policies were popular with the majority of the population, but the emphasis on 'uruba'' (Arabism), also meant that the non-
Arab populations faced discrimination. The biggest such population was the
Kurds of northern Syria. Campaigns of
Arabization led to tens of thousands of Kurds losing their Syrian
citizenship, and only through military repression was the central government able to keep the lid on tensions in Syrian
Kurdistan.
Assad worked continuously to ensure the preeminence of his own Alawite sect within the government, and Alawites were appointed to fill virtually all important government posts (a notable exception being Sunni Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass). This was probably less a case of religious or ethnic solidarity than an attempt to confine power to people close to Assad himself, but it simultaneously meant that the historically repressed Alawites became increasingly dependent on Assad. Many feared (and still fear) renewed marginalization and retribution from the majority Sunnis, Syria's historical rulers, should the Baath regime fall from power.
The concentration of power in the hands of a religious group comprising no more than 10% of the population meant that other groups felt increasingly excluded from power. Since political clout was also a valuable asset in trade and the economy, due to the
corruption of the state apparatus and the government-dominated economy (which was formally
socialist, but in reality a mixed system), the rising fortunes of the Alawites paid off in government spending in their areas of western Syria. As the lack of balance became more and more well-known, discontent grew among Sunnis.
Muslim Brotherhood uprising
Growing economic hardship among Sunni middle-class merchants in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s fueled an increasing demand for economic and political reform. Many of these economically displaced and disenfranchised Sunni merchants found sympathy and support within the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, many conservative Sunnis considered the Alawites a heretical breakaway sect from Islam, and resented being ruled by such politicians; the top five members of Assad's regime were either Alawite or from his tribal clan. Assad's embrace of secularism and his alliance with the Soviet Union (intensely unpopular after its
invasion of
Afghanistan in
1979) increased tension between the government and the Sunni religious leadership. In the late
1970s, religious dissent became more and more pronounced, and the state's repressive policies pushed non-
Islamist dissidents to join forces with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Religious fundamentalists portrayed the Syrian ruler as an enemy of
Allah, an
atheist, and even a
Maronite (the latter being a
Catholic rite whose militias were at that time fighting Sunnis in
Lebanon). Step by step, the underground opposition turned violent, into a low-level insurrection, and the harsh military reprisals further escalated violence.
Throughout the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood staged a series of bomb attacks against the government and its officials, including a nearly successful attempt to assassinate Assad on
June 26,
1980, during an official state reception for the
president of
Mali. As a
machine gun salvo missed him, Assad ran to kick a
hand grenade aside, and his
bodyguard sacrificed himself to smother the explosion of another one. Surviving with only light injuries, Assad's revenge was swift and ruthless; only hours later, his brother
Rifaat al-Assad led a massacre of hundreds of imprisoned Islamists in
Tadmor Prison [1]. Calls for vengeance grew within the Brotherhood, and bomb attacks increased in frequency. Events culminated with a general insurrection in the conservative Sunni town of
Hama in February
1982. Islamists and other opposition activists proclaimed Hama a "liberated city" and urged Syria to rise up against the "infidel" ruler. Brotherhood fighters swept the city of Baathists, breaking into the homes of government employees and suspected supporters of the regime, killing about 50.
In the eyes of Assad, this was total war. The army was mobilized, and Hafez again sent Rifaat's special forces and
Mukhabarat agents to the city. After encountering fierce resistance, they used
artillery to blast Hama into submission. After a two-week battle, the town was securely in government hands. Then followed several weeks of
torture and mass
executions of suspected rebel sympathizers, killing many thousands, known as the
Hama Massacre.
Robert Fisk, who was in Hama shortly after the massacre, estimated that between 10,000 to 20,000 people were killed, but according to
Thomas Friedman Rifaat later boasted of killing 38,000 people. Most of the old city was completely destroyed, including its palaces,
mosques, ancient ruins, and the famous
Azem Palace mansion.
The Islamist insurrection had been broken in Hama, and the Brotherhood has since then operated in exile. Government repression in Syria hardened considerably; Assad spent in Hama any goodwill he previously had left with the Sunni majority, and now was compelled to rely on brute force to remain in power.
Challenge from Rifaat
In
1983, Assad suffered a
heart attack and was confined to hospital. He named a six-man governing council to run the country in his absence, among them long-time Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. Curiously, all of the six were Sunnis, possibly because that meant they had no independent power over his Alawite-dominated government, and were thus less likely to try to seize power. Despite this, rumors spread that Assad was dead or nearly so, and indeed his condition was very serious. In
1984, Rifaat al-Assad attempted to use the security forces under his control to seize power. His ''Defence Company'' troops of some 50,000 men, complete with tanks and helicopters, began putting up roadblocks throughout
Damascus, and tensions between Hafez loyalists and Rifaat supporters came close to all-out war. The stand-off was not ended until Hafez, still severely ill, rose from his bed to reassume power and speak to the nation. He then transferred command of the ''Defence Company'' and, without formal accusations, sent Rifaat on an indefinite "work visit" to
France.
Foreign policy
Israel
Al-Assad's foreign policy was shaped by the relation of Syria to
Israel, although this conflict both preceded him and persists after his death. During his presidency, Syria played a major role in the
1973 Arab-Israeli war. The war is, despite heavy losses and Israeli advances, presented by the Syrian government as a victory, as Syria regained some territory that had been occupied in 1967 through peace negotiations headed by
Henry Kissinger. Since then Assad-led Syria has carefully respected the
UN-monitored ceasefire line in the occupied
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