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'Moral nihilism' (also known as 'error theory') is the meta-ethical view that there are no moral facts, where facts are (roughly) true propositions. Moral nihilists hold that there are no objective moral facts---that nothing is morally good, bad, wrong, right, etc.---because there are no moral truths. For example, an error theorist would say that murder is not wrong, but it's not right either. Some prominent, recent moral nihilists (or error theorists) are J. L. Mackie (1977) and Richard Joyce (2001).
Moral nihilism should be distinguished from non-cognitivism, ethical subjectivism, and moral relativism, which do not assign any static truth-values to moral statements. Insofar as no false statement is known, moral nihilists are moral skeptics (but not necessarily ''vice versa'').

Contents

Forms of moral nihilism

Criticisms

References and further reading

Forms of moral nihilism

There are two main forms of moral nihilism (see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006, pp. 32-37). The first, which one might call the ''global falsity'' form of moral nihilism, claims that moral beliefs and assertions are false in that they ''claim'' that certain moral facts exists that do not exist. J. L. Mackie (1977) argues for this form of moral nihilism. Mackie, for example, argues that moral assertions are only true if there are moral properties that are intrinsically motivating, but there is good reason to believe that there are no such intrinsically motivating properties (see the argument from queerness and motivational internalism).
The second form, which one might call the ''presupposition failure'' form of moral nihilism, claims that moral beliefs and assertions are not true because they are neither true nor false. This is not a form of non-cognitivism, since moral assertions are still thought to be truth-apt. Rather, this form of moral nihilism claims that moral beliefs and assertions ''presuppose'' the existence of moral facts that do not exists. This is analogous to presupposition failure in cases of non-moral assertions. Take, for example, the claim that the present king of France is bald. Some argue that this claim is truth-apt in that is has the logical form of an assertion, but it is neither true nor false because it presupposes that there is currently a king of France, but there is not. The claim suffers from "presupposition failure." Richard Joyce (2001) argues for this form of moral nihilism.
The philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli is sometimes presented as a model of moral nihilism, but that is highly questionable. His book ''Il Principe'' (''The Prince'') was silent on moral matters, which shocked a European tradition that throughout the Middle Ages had inculcated moral lessons in its political philosophies. But silence about morality is not tantamount to outright nihilism. Machiavelli does say that the Prince must override moral reasons in favour of power-maintaining reasons of State, but he also says, particularly in his other works, that the successful ruler should be guided by Pagan, rather than Christian, virtues. Hence, Machiavelli presents an alternative to the ethical theories of his day, rather than an all-out rejection of all morality.
Closer to being an example of moral nihilism is Thrasymachus, as portrayed in Plato's ''Republic''. Thrasymachus can, however, be interpreted as offering a revisionary ''account'' of justice, rather than a total rejection of morality and normative discourse.
Nihilism is perhaps most strikingly defended by the fictional character Bazarov, in Ivan Turgenev's novel ''Fathers and Sons''.

Criticisms

Criticisms of moral nihilism come primarily from moral realists, which argue that there are positive moral truths. However, there are also critics of moral nihilism that are moral anti-realists, such as non-cognitivists, which claim contrary to moral nihilists that moral sentences do not express truth-apt propositions.

References and further reading

★ Joyce, Richard (2001). ''The Myth of Morality'', Cambridge University Press.

★ Mackie, J. L. (1977). ''Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong'', Penguin.

★ Shafer-Landau, Russ & Terence Cuneo (eds.) (2007). ''Foundations of Ethics'', Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

★ Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006). ''Moral Skepticisms'', Oxford University Press.