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In the 'Soviet Union, collectivization' was a policy, pursued between 1928 and 1933, to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms (, ''kolkhoz'') and into state farms (, ''sovkhoz'').

Contents

Background

The crisis of 1928

Strategies of implementation

"Dizzy with Success"

Peasant reaction

Results

Siberia

Central Asia and Kazakhstan

Ukraine

Latvia

Decollectivization

Notes

References and further reading

See also

External links

Further reading

Background

Following Emancipation reform of 1861 and the end of Russian serfdom, peasants gained control of about half of the land they had previously cultivated, and instantly began to ask for the redistribution of all land.A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to End. Kenez, Peter. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Their dreams of land for all the peasants, however, would be difficult to achieve; given the simple cultivation technology of Russian peasants at the time, there wasn't enough land to sustain everyone who wanted their own farm. The Stolypin Reform gave incentives for the creation of large farms, but these ended during World War I. The Russian Provisional Government response to such a difficult situation (particularly during wartime) was to do very little, but continue to promise redistribution. The peasants began to turn against the Provisional Government and organized themselves into land committees, which together with the traditional peasant communes became a powerful force of opposition. When Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia on April 3, 1917, he promised the people "Peace, Bread, and Land," the latter appearing as a promise to the peasants for the redistribution of confiscated land.
During the period of War communism, however, the policy of ''Prodrazvyorstka'' meant peasantry were obligated to surrender the surpluses of almost any kind of agricultural produce for a fixed price. When the Russian Civil War ended, the economy changed with the New Economic Policy (NEP) and specifically, the policy of ''Prodrazvyorstka'' or "food tax." This new policy was designed to re-build morale among embittered farmers, and lead to increased production, while as a progressive tax, those with more money paid more.

Peasants having lunch in a commune.

Until this time, the Bolsheviks had little choice but to allow the peasants to take the land and farm it privately. In the 1920s, however, they began to lean toward the idea of collective agriculture. The pre-existing communes, which redistributed land periodically, did little to encourage improvements in the land, and formed a source of power beyond the control of the Soviet government. Although the income gap between wealthy and poor farmers did grow under the NEP, it remained quite small, but the Bolsheviks began to take aim at the wealthy ''kulaks.'' Clearly identifying this group was difficult, though, since only about 1% of the peasantry employed labourers (the basic Marxist definition of a capitalist), and 80% of the country's population were peasants.The equal land shares among the peasants gave rise to food shortages in the cities. Although grain had nearly returned to pre-war production levels, the large estates who had produced it for urban markets had been divided up. Not interested in acquiring money to purchase over priced goods, the peasants chose to eat their produce rather than sell it, so city dwellers only saw half the grain that had been available before the war. Before the revolution, peasants controlled only 2,100,000 km² in 16 million holdings, producing 50% of the food grown in Russia and consuming 60%. After the revolution, the peasants controlled 3,140,000 km² in 25 million holdings producing 85% of the food, but consuming 80% of what they grew. .^[1]
The Soviet Communist Party had never been happy with private agriculture and saw collectivization as the best remedy for the problem. Lenin claimed "Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions."^[2] Apart from ideological goals, Stalin also wished to embark on a program of rapid heavy industrialisation which required larger surpluses to be extracted from the agricultural sector in order to feed a growing industrial work force and to pay for imports of machinery.^[3] The state also hoped to export grain, a source of foreign currency needed to import technologies necessary for heavy industrialisation. Social and ideological goals would also be served though mobilisation of the peasants in a co-operative economic enterprise which would produce higher returns for the State and could serve a secondary purpose of providing social services to the people.

The crisis of 1928

This demand for more grain resulted in the reintroduction of requisitioning which was resisted in rural areas. In 1928 there was a 2 million ton shortfall in grains purchased by the state. Stalin claimed the grain had been produced but was being horded by "kulaks." Rather than raise the price, the Politburo adopted an emergency measure to requisition 2.5 million tons of grain.
The seizures of grain discouraged the peasants and less grain was produced during 1928 and again the government restorted to requisitions. Much of the grain being requisitioned from middle peasants as sufficient quantities were not in the hands of the "kulaks." In 1929, resistance to the seizures became widespread with some violent incidents of resistance but also massive hording (burial was the common method) and illegal transfers of grain. If they could not hide or otherwise dispose their entire crops, some peasants harvested it as hay, burned it, or threw it into the rivers.
Faced with the refusal to hand grain over, a decision was made at a plenum of the Central Committee in November 1929 to embark on a nationwide program of collectivisation.
Several forms of collective farming were suggested by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem), ranging in the level of common property: ^[4]

★ Association for Joint Cultivation of Land (Товарищество по совместной обработке земли, 'ТОЗ'/'TOZ'), where only land was in common ownership

★ agricultural ''artel'' (initially in a loose meaning, later formalized to become an oranizational basis of kolkhozes, via ''"The Recommended Statute of an Agricultural Artel"''),

★ agricultural commune, with the highest level of common ownership.
For comparison, in sovkhozes the land was the property of the state and employed waged labor. Also, various cooperatives for processing of agricultural products were installed.
In November 1929, the Central Committee decided to implement accelerated collectivisation in the form of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which had allowed peasants to sell their surpluses on the open market. Stalin had many so-called "kulaks" transported to collective farms in distant places to work in agricultural labor camps. It has been calculated that one in five of these deportees, many of them women and children, died. In all, 6 million peasants lost their lives to the conditions of the transportation or the conditions of the work camps. In response to this, many peasants initiated an armed resistance. As a form of protest, many peasants preferred to slaughter their animals for food rather than give them over to collective farms, which produced a major reduction in livestock.
Collectivisation had been encouraged since the revolution, but in 1928, only about one percent of farm land was collectivized, and despite efforts to encourage and coerce collectivization, the rather optimistic First Five Year Plan only forecast 15 percent of farms to be run collectively.
This situation changed incredibly quickly in the fall of 1929 and winter of 1930. Between September and December 1929, collectivization increased from 7.4% to 15%, but in the first two months of 1930, 11 million households joined collectivized farms, pushing the total to nearly 60% almost overnight.

Strategies of implementation

To assist collectivisation, the Party decided to send 25,000 "socially conscious" industry workers to the countryside. This was accomplished during 1929–1933, and these workers have become known as twenty-five-thousanders ("dvadtsatipyatitysyachniki"). Shock brigades were used to force reluctant peasants into joining the collective farms and remove those who were declared kulaks and "kulaks' helpers".

''The First Tractor'' by Vladimir Krikhatsky (Socialist realism)

Collectivisation sought to modernise Soviet agriculture, consolidating the land into parcels that could be farmed by modern equipment using the latest scientific methods of agriculture. It was often claimed that an American Fordson tractor (called "Фордзон" in Russian) was the best propaganda in favor of collectivisation. The Communist Party, which adopted the plan in 1929, predicted an increase of 330% in industrial production, and an increase of 50% in agricultural production.

"Dizzy with Success"

The price of collectivisation was so high that the March 2, 1930, issue of ''Pravda'' contained Stalin's article ''Dizzy with success'', in which he called for a temporary halt to the process:
:"It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had overfulfilled the five-year plan of collectivisation by more than 100 per cent... some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision."
The failures of collectivisation are also revealed in official documents of the time (see in English and original [1])
After the publication of the article, the pressure for collectivisation temporarily decreased and peasants started leaving collective farms. According to Martin Kitchen, the number of members of collective farms dropped by 50% in 1930. But soon collectivisation was intensified again, and by 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture was collectivised.

Peasant reaction

Theoretically, landless peasants were to be the biggest beneficiaries from collectivisation, because it promised them an opportunity to take an equal share in labour and its rewards. However the rural areas did not have many landless peasants, given the wholesale redistribution of land following the Revolution, and so most of those without any land were widely seen as drunks, idlers and incompetent. For those with property, however, collectivisation meant giving it up to the collective farms and selling most of the food that they produced to the state at minimal prices set by the state itself, so they were opposed to the idea. Furthermore, collectivisation involved significant changes in the traditional village life of Russian peasants within a very short timeframe, despite the long Russian rural tradition of collectivism in obshchinas. The changes were even more dramatic in other places, such as in Ukraine, with its tradition of individual farming, in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, and in the trans-Volga steppes, where for a family to have a herd of livestock was not only a matter of sustenance, but of pride as well.
Many peasants opposed collectivization, and often responded with acts of sabotage, included burning of crops and slaughtering draught animals. According to Party sources, there were also some cases of destruction of property, and attacks on officials and members of the collectives. Isaac Mazepa, former prime minister (1919-1920) of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), claimed "[t]he catastrophe of 1932" was the result of "passive resistance … which aimed at the systematic frustration of the Bolsheviks' plans for the sowing and gathering of the harvest". In his words, "[w]hole tracts were left unsown, [and as much as] 50 per cent [of the crop] was left in the fields, and was either not collected at all or was ruined in the threshing".

Results

Due to high government quotas peasants got, as a rule, less for their labor than they did before collectivisation, and some refused to work. Indeed Merle Fainsod estimated that, in 1952, collective farm earnings were only one fourth of the cash income from private plots on Soviet collective farms.^[5] In many cases, the immediate effect of collectivisation was to reduce grain output and almost halve livestock. The subsequent recovery of the agricultural production was also impeded by the losses suffered by the Soviet Union during the World War II and the severe drought of 1946. However the largest loss of live stock was caused by collectivization for all animals except pigs.^[6] The numbers of cows in the USSR fell from 33.2 million in 1928, to 27.8 million in 1941 and to 24.6 million in 1950. The number of pigs fell from 27.7 million in 1928, to 27.5 million in 1941 and then to 22.2 million in 1950. The number of sheep fell from 114.6 million in 1928, to 91.6 million in 1941, and to 93.6 million in 1950. The number of horses fell from 36.1 million in 1928 to 21.0 million in 1941 and to 12.7 million in 1950. By the late 1950s Soviet farm animals approached their 1928 levels.^[6]
Despite the initial plans, collectivisation, accompanied by the bad harvest of 1932–1933, did not rise to expectations. The CPSU blamed these problems in food production on kulaks (Russian: ''fist''; prosperous peasants), who were organising resistance to collectivisation. Allegedly, many kulaks had been hoarding grain in order to speculate on higher prices.
The Soviet government responded to these acts by cutting off food rations to peasants and areas where there was opposition to collectivization, especially in the Ukrainian region. Hundreds of thousands of those who opposed collectivization were executed or sent to forced-labour camps. Many peasant families were forcibly resettled in Siberia and Kazakhstan into exile settlements and a significant number died on the way.
On August 7, 1932, the ''Decree about the Protection of Socialist Property'' proclaimed that the punishment for theft of kolkhoz or cooperative property was death sentence, which "under extenuating circumstances" could be replaced by at least ten years of incarceration. With what some called the ''Law of Spikelets'' ("Закон о колосках"): peasants (including children) who hand-collected grains in the collective fields after the harvest were arrested for damaging the state grain production. Martin Amis writes in ''Koba the Dread'' that the number of sentences for this particular offence in the bad harvest period from August 1932 to December 1933 was 125,000.
Between 1929 and 1932 there were massive drops in agricultural production and famine in the countryside. Stalin blamed the well-to-do peasants, referred to as 'kulaks', who he said had sabotaged grain collection and resolved to eliminate them as a class. Estimates suggest that about a million so-called 'kulak' families, or perhaps some five million people, were sent to forced labor camps.^[2][9] Estimates of the dead from starvation or disease directly caused by collectivization have been estimated as between four and ten million. According to official Soviet figures some 24 million peasants disappeared from rural areas with only an extra 12.6 million moving to State jobs. The implication is that the total death toll (both direct and indirect) for Stalin's collectivization program was on the order of twelve million people.^[10]

Siberia

Main articles: History of Siberia

Long before the twentieth century, Siberia had been a major agricultural supplier for Russia, in particular its southern territories (nowadays Altai Krai, Omsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Khakassia, Irkutsk Oblast). Stolypin's program of resettlement granted a lot of land for immigrants from elsewhere in the empire, creating a large portion of well-off peasants and boosting the rapid agricultural development in 1910s. Local merchants, for example, were able to export labelled grain, flour and butter into the central Russia and Western Europe^[11]
After the October Revolution, a special resolution of the Western-Siberian regional executive committee ordered the expropriation of property and the deportation of kulaks to sparsely-populated areas in northern Siberia, such as the Evenk and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs, and the northern parts of the Tomsk Oblast.^[12]

Central Asia and Kazakhstan

A photograph of a man sowing in Uzbekistan.

In areas where the major agricultural activity was nomadic herding, collectivisation met with massive resistance and major losses and confiscation of livestock. Livestock in Kazakhstan fell from 7 million cattle to 1.6 million and from 22 million sheep to 1.7 million. Restrictions on migration proved ineffective and half a million migrated to other regions of Central Asia and 1.5 million to China. Of those who remained as many as a million died in the resulting famine. In Mongolia, a Soviet dependency, attempted collectivisation was abandoned in 1932 after the loss of 8 million head of livestock.

Ukraine

Most historians agree that the disruption caused by collectivisation and the resistance of the peasants significantly contributed to the Great Famine of 1932–1933, especially in Ukraine, a region famous for its rich soil (chernozem). This particular period is called the Holodomor in Ukrainian. During the similar famine of 1921–1923, numerous campaigns, inside the country, as well as internationally were held to raise money and food in support of the population of the affected regions. Nothing similar was done during the drought of 1932–1933, mainly because the information about the disaster was suppressed by the Soviet Union's government.^[13] Moreover, migration of population from the affected areas was restricted.^[14]
About 40 million people were affected by the food shortages including areas near Moscow where mortality rates increased by 50%. The center of the famine, however, was Ukraine and surrounding regions, including the Don, the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan where the toll was one million dead. The countryside was affected more than cities, but 120,000 died in Kharkiv, 40,000 in Krasnodar and 20,000 in Stavropol.^[15]
The declassified Soviet archives show that there were 1.54 million officially registered deaths in Ukraine from famine.^[16]
Alec Nove claims that registration of deaths largely ceased in many areas during the famine.^[17] However, it's been pointed out that the registered deaths in the archives were substantially revised by the demographics officials. The older version of the data showed 600 thousand fewer deaths in Ukraine than the current, revised statistics.^[18] In The Black Book of Communism, authors claim the number of dead was at least 4 million, and characterize the Great Famine as "a genocide of the Ukrainian people".^[19]
Blame for the underfulfilment of plans of grain acquisition was put on "kulaks" and "bourgeois nationalist elements", which was followed by purges of Ukrainian management, communist party cadre, and intelligentsia.
The Soviet press did not report the famine and its lead was generally followed. But British journalists Malcolm Muggeridge #1 and Gareth Jones #2 separately traveled to North Caucasus and Ukraine where they witnessed terror and mass starvations first hand. Muggeridge wrote in his diary: "Whatever else I may do or think in the future, I must never pretend that I haven't seen this. Ideas will come and go, but this is more than an idea. It is peasants kneeling down in the snow and asking for bread." Their reports were heavily criticised by Soviet government and western journalists sitting in Moscow who wrote their articles based on Soviet propaganda (notably, the New York Times' Moscow correspondent, Walter Duranty). The Italian government received accurate information regarding the famine via diplomatic reports from Kharkiv, Odessa and Novorossiisk, but did not publicize the information.
Such estimates include those who died in the resulting famine, 6 million according to Nicolas Werth, Robert Conquest, and the 1988 United States Congress Commission on the Ukraine Famine. In 1983 Sergei Maksudov, a Russian demographer, having compared results of censuses and taken migration into account, estimated that there were no less than 4.5 million unnatural deaths in Ukraine between 1927 and 1938 (due to collectivization, dekulakization and purges). ^[20]
Robert Conquest, however, has been criticized for an over-reliance on one book (''Black Deeds of the Kremlin'' by S. O. Pidhainy) as a source for descriptions of the death toll in Ukraine without questioning the validity of the source, first published by Ukrainian emigrants to Canada and the United States. Starving the Hands that Feed Them, Craig R. Whitney, New York Times, October 26, 1986."In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: A 55-Year-Old Famine Feeds the Right", Jeff Coplon, Village Voice, January 12, 1988.. Subsequent estimations by Werth and the congressional committee have relied heavily on Conquest's work. The suggestion thatthat the famine was consciously created as a genocide against the Ukrainian people, as well as the estimated number of deaths are disputed by those who claim much of the evidence is politically-motivated anti-Soviet propaganda.. Some left-wing writers such as Jeff Coplon and Ludo Martens have recently claimed a much more modest figure of between several hundred thousand and two million deaths. American Historian John Arch Getty suggested in the London Review of Books that responsibility for the famine "must be shared by the tens of thousands of activists and officials who carried out the policy and by the peasants who chose to slaughter animals, burn fields, and boycott cultivation in protest [against collectivization]." Claims that the famine was deliberately engineered by Stalin have been rejected by notable sovietologist such as Alexander Dallin of Stanford, Moshe Lewin of the University of Pennsylvania, Lynne Viola of SUNY at Binghamton.
This uncertainty as to the death toll of collectivization is reflected in the words of Nikita Khrushchev: "Perhaps we'll never know how many people perished directly as a result of collectivisation, or indirectly as a result of Stalin's eagerness to blame his failure on others". ^[21]

Latvia

After the Soviet Occupation of Latvia in June 1940, the country's new rulers were faced with a problem: the agricultural reforms of the interwar period had created more individual farm owners than ever before. Landed properties of "Enemies of the people" and refugees, who had left their homes, as well as those above 30 hectares was nationalised in 1940-'44, but those who were still landless were then given parcels of 15 hectares. Thus, Latvian agriculture remained individualistic in character after 1945, making central planning difficult. In 1940-'41 the Communist Party repeatedly said that collectivisation would not occur forcibly, but rather voluntarily and by example. To encourage collectivisation high taxes were enfourced and new farms weren't given any support what so ever. But after 1945 the Party dropped its restraint as the voluntary approach was not yielding results. Latvians were accustomed to their separate and individual farmsteads (''viensētas''), which had even continued during the centuries of serfdom, and for many farmers, the plots awarded to them by the interwar reforms were the first their families had ever owned. Furthermore, the countryside was filled with rumours regarding the harshness of collective farm life.
Since pressure from Moscow to collectivise continued, the authorities of the Latvian SSR sought to reduce the number of individual farmers (increasingly labelled ''kulaki'' or ''budži'') through higher taxes and requisitioning of agricultural products for state use. The first kolkhoz was established only in November of 1946 and by 1948, just 617 kolkhozy, integrating 13,814 individual farmsteads (12.6% of the total), had been established. The process was still judged too slow, and in March 1949 slightly less than 13,000 kulak families as well as a large number of individuals were targeted: between March 24 and March 30, 1949, about 40,000 people were deported and resettled at various points throughout the USSR.
After these deportations, the pace of collectivisation sped up as a flood of farmers rushed into kolkhozy. Within two weeks 1740 new kolkhozs were established and by the end of 1950, just 4.5% of Latvian farmsteads remained outside the collectivised units; about 226,900 farmsteads belonged to collectives, of which there were now around 14,700. Rural life changed: farmers' daily movements were now dictated by plans, decisions and quotas formulated elsewhere and delivered through an intermediate non-farming hierarchy. The new kolkhozy, especially smaller ones, were ill equipped and poor - at first farmers were paid once a year in kind, later in money, but seleries were very small and sometimes farmers weren't paid at all or even owed money to kholhoz. Farmers still had small pieces of land (not larger than 0.5 ha) around their houses were they grew food for themselves. Along with collectivisation the government tried to uproot custom of living in individual farmsteads by moving people to villages. However this process failed due to lack of money since the Soviets planed to move houses as well.^[22][23]

Decollectivization

During the Great Patriotic War, Alfred Rosenberg, in his capacity as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, issued a series of posters announcing the end of the Soviet collective farms. He also issued an Agrarian Law in February 1942, annulling all Soviet legislation on farming, restoring family farms for those willing to collaborate with the occupiers. But decollectivisation conflicted with the wider demands of wartime food production, and Hermann Goering demanded that the ''kolkhoz'' be retained, save for a change of name. Hitler himself denounced the redistribution of land as 'stupid.'

Notes

1. page 87, Harvest of Sorrow ISBN 0-19-504054-6, Conquest cites Lewin pages 36-37 and 176
2. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 526
3. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 529
4. James W. Henzen, "Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917-1929", University of Pittsburgh Press (2004) ISBN 0-8229-4215-1, Chapter 1, "A Ralse Start: The Birth and Early Activities of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, 1917-1920"
5. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 542
6. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 541
7. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 541
8. ''How Russia is Ruled'' by Merle Fainsod, p. 526
9. ''The Economics of Soviet Agriculture'' by Leonard E. Hubbard, p. 117
10. ''The Economics of Soviet Agriculture'' by Leonard E. Hubbard, pp. 117-18
11. [2]
12. [3]
13. page 159, >Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Panne, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stéphane Courtois, ''The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression'', Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7
14. page 164, ''The Black Book of Communism'', ISBN 0-674-07608-7
15. page 167, ''The Black Book of Communism'', ISBN 0-674-07608-7
16. Stephen Wheatcroft and RW Davies, ''The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave MacMillan'', 2004
17. page 266, Alec Nove, ''Victims of Stalinism: How Many?'', in ''Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives'' (edited by J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning), Cambridge University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-521-44670-8.
18. Davies and Wheatcroft
19. page 168, ''The Black Book of Communism'', ISBN 0-674-07608-7, , S. Merl, "Golod 1932-1933--Genotsid Ukraintsev dlya osushchestvleniya politiki russifikatsii?" (The famine of 1932-1933: Genocide of the Ukrainians for the realization of the policy of Russification?, ''Otechestvennaya istoriya, no. 1 (1995), 49-61
20. B. Krawchenko, "Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine", St. Martin's Press, New York 1985, p. 114
21. N. S. Khrushchev, "Khrushchev Remembers", Little, Brown, Boston & Toronto 1970
22. Plakans, Andrejs. ''The Latvians: A Short History'', 155-6. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995.
23. Freibergs J. (1998, 2001) ''Jaunako laiku vesture 20. gadsimts'' Zvaigzne ABC ISBN 9984-17-049-7

References and further reading

★ Ammende, Ewald, "Human life in Russia", (Cleveland: J.T. Zubal, 1984), Reprint, Originally published: London, England: Allen & Unwin, 1936, ISBN 0-939738-54-6

★ Robert Conquest ''The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine'', Oxford University Press, October 1986, hardcover, ISBN 0-88864-110-9; trade paperback, Oxford University Press, November, 1987, ISBN 0-19-505180-7; hardcover, ISBN 0-19-504054-6

★ R. W. Davies, ''The Socialist Offensive'' (Volume 1 of The Industrialization of Soviet Russia), Harvard University Press (1980), hardcover, ISBN 0-674-81480-0

★ R. W. Davies, ''The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930'' (Volume 2 of the Industrialization of Soviet Russia), Harvard University Press (1980), hardcover, ISBN 0-674-82600-0

★ R. W. Davies, ''Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930'' (volume 3 of The Industrialization of Soviet Russia), Harvard University Press (1989), ISBN 0-674-82655-8

★ R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, ''Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933'', (volume 4 of The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia), Palgrave Macmillan (April, 2004), hardcover, ISBN 0-333-31107-8

★ R. W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft, ''Materials for a Balance of the Soviet National Economy, 1928-1930'', Cambridge University Press (1985), hardcover, 467 pages, ISBN 0-521-26125-2

★ Miron Dolot, ''Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust'', W. W. Norton (1987), trade paperback, 231 pages, ISBN 0-393-30416-7; hardcover (1985), ISBN 0-393-01886-5

★ Maurice Hindus, ''Red Bread: Collectivization in a Russian Village'', Indiana University Press, 1988, hardcover, ISBN 0-253-34953-2; trade paperback, Indiana University Press, 1988, 372 pages, ISBN 0-253-20485-2; earlier editions dating from 1931 are available at used book sellers.

★ International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine. "Final report", [Jacob W.F. Sundberg, President], 1990. [Proceedings of the International Commission of Inquiry and its Final report are in typescript, contained in 6 vols. Copies available from the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Toronto].

★ Moshe Lewin, ''Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivisation'', W.W. Norton (1975), trade paperback, ISBN 0-393-00752-9

★ Library of Congress Revelations from the Russian Archives: Collectivization and Industrialization (primary documents from the period)

★ Ludo Martens, ''Un autre regard sur Staline'', Éditions EPO, 1994, 347 pages, ISBN 2-87262-081-8. See the section "External links" for an English translation.

★ Nancy Nimitz. "Farm Development 1928–62", in ''Soviet and East European Agricultures'', Jerry F. Karcz, ed. Berkeley, California (US): University of California, 1967.

★ "Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932-1933: a memorial exhibition", Widener Library, Harvard University, prepared by Oksana Procyk, Leonid Heretz, James E. Mace. -- (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard College Library, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1986), ISBN 0-674-29426-2

★ David Satter, ''Age of Delirium : The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union'', Yale University Press (1996), hardcover, 424 pages, ISBN 0-394-52934-0

★ ''The Russians'' Hedrick Smith (1976) ISBN 0-8129-0521-0

★ Douglas Tottle. ''Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian genocide myth from Hitler to Harvard''. Toronto: Progress Books, 1987. ISBN 0-919396-51-8.

★ ''The Second Socialist Revolution'', Tatyana Zaslavskaya, ISBN 0-253-20614-6 (a survey by a Soviet sociologist written in the late 1980s which advocated restructuring of the economy)

★ Sally J. Taylor, ''Stalin's Apologist: Walter Duranty : The New York Times Man in Moscow'', Oxford University Press (1990), hardcover, ISBN 0-19-505700-7

★ Leon Trosky "A Sharp Turn: “The Five Year Plan in Four Years” and “Complete Collectivization”" in ''The Revolution Betrayed'' 1936

★ United States, "Commission on the Ukraine Famine. Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: report to Congress / Commission on the Ukraine Famine", [Daniel E. Mica, Chairman; James E. Mace, Staff Director]. -- (Washington D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs, U.S. G.P.O., 1988), (Shipping list: 88-521-P).

★ United States, "Commission on the Ukrainian Famine. Oral history project of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine", James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs, U.S. G.P.O., 1990), ISBN 0-16-026256-9

★ InfoUkes Famine resource page

See also

★ History of the Soviet Union (1927-1953)

★ Collectivisation in Hungary

★ OZET

External links

★ "The Collectivization 'Genocide'", in ''Another View of Stalin'', by Ludo Martens. Translated from the French book ''Un autre regard sur Staline'', listed above under "References and further reading".

★ "Reply to Collective Farm Comrades" by Stalin

★ Ukrainian Famine: Excerpts from the Original Electronic Text at the web site of Revelations from the Russian Archives

★ "Soviet Agriculture: A critique of the myths constructed by Western critics", by Joseph E. Medley, Department of Economics, University of Southern Maine (US).

★ "The Ninth Circle", by Olexa Woropay

★ Prize-winning essay on FamineGenocide.com

★ 1932-34 Great Famine: documented view by Dr. Dana Dalrymple

★ COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION Revelations from the Russian Archives at the Library of Congress

Further reading

★ Roy D. Laird, "Collective Farming in Russia: A Political Study of the Soviet Kolkhozy", University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS (1958), 176pp.

★ Robert G. Wesson, "Soviet Communes", Rutgers University Press, 1963