(Redirected from Biological weapon)
:''For the use of biological agents by terrorists, see
bioterrorism.''
'Biological warfare' (BW), also known as 'germ warfare', 'biological weapons', 'bioweapons' and 'bioweaponeering', is the use of any
pathogen (
bacterium,
virus or other disease-causing organism) as a
weapon of
war. Note that using nonliving toxic products, even if produced by living organisms (e.g., toxins), is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. A biological weapon may be intended to kill, incapacitate or seriously impede an adversary. It may also be defined as the material or defense against such employment.
The creation and stockpiling of biological weapons ("offensive BW") was outlawed by the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), signed by over 100 countries. The BWC remains in force. The rationale behind the agreement is to avoid the devastating impact of a successful biological attack which could conceivably result in thousands, possibly even millions, of deaths and cause severe disruptions to societies and economies. Oddly enough, the convention prohibits only creation and storage, but not usage, of these weapons. However, the consensus among military analysts is that, except in the context of
bioterrorism, BW is of little military use. Many countries pursue "defensive BW" research (defensive or protective applications) which are not prohibited by the BWC. As a tactical weapon, the main military problem with a BW attack is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore, unlike a
nuclear or
chemical attack, would not immediately stop an opposing force. As a strategic weapon, BW is again militarily problematic, because it is difficult to prevent the attack from spreading, either to allies or to the attacker, and while an attack is taking effect, the opponent can undertake massive retaliation.
History
Biological warfare has been practiced repeatedly throughout history. Before the 20th century, the use of
biological agents took three major forms:
★ Deliberate
poisoning of
food and
water with infectious material
★ Use of microorganisms, toxins or animals, living or dead, in a weapon system
★ Use of biologically inoculated fabrics
The Ancient World
During the 6th Century B.C, the
Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a
fungus that would make the enemy delusional, and
Solon of
Athens used the poisonous herb
Veratrum to poison the water supply of
Phocaea during his siege of the city. During the 4th century B.C.
Scythian archers used arrows with tips covered with animal
feces to cause the wounds of the enemies to get
infected.
[ Essential Militaria, , Nicholas, Hobbes, Atlantic Books, 2003, ] In 204 B.C,
Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with
venomous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of
Pergamene ships
[1].
Medieval Biological Warfare
The
Mongol Empire established commercial and political connections between the Eastern and Western areas of the world. It is probable that the Mongol armies and merchant caravans inadvertently brought the
plague from central Asia to the Middle East and Europe. The
Black Death swept through
Eurasia, killing approximately one third to one half of the population and changing the course of Asian and European history.
During the
Middle Ages, victims of the
bubonic plague were used for biological attacks, often by flinging their corpses and excrement over castle walls using
catapults. In 1346, the bodies of
Tatar warriors of the
Golden Horde who had died of
plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of
Kaffa (now
Theodosia). It has been speculated that this operation may have been responsible for the advent of the
Black Death in Europe, though this is very unlikely (the disease-carrying fleas do not linger on a cold corpse).
[2]
In 1422, during the siege of the
Bohemian castle of Karlstein,
Hussite attackers used catapults to throw in dead bodies (albeit not plague-infested) and 2000 carriage-loads of
dung over the walls.
[ ] The last known incident of using plague corpses for biological warfare occurred in 1710, when
Russian forces attacked the
Swedes by flinging plague-infected corpses over the city walls of
Reval(Tallinn).
[3] However, during the 1785 siege of
La Calle,
Tunisian forces flung diseased clothing into the city.
[ ]
Modern Times
The 17th Century
Though not germ warfare, which implies the deliberate use of germs against an enemy, the inadvertent spread of diseases across the Atlantic during the European age of exploration did tremendous damage to the indigenous populations of North and South America. The effects of the "
Columbian exchange" of diseases upon the Native Americans was catastrophic, reducing the population of affected tribes by as much as 50-90%. When the
Pilgrims arrived in the New World in 1620, the native population of the Plymouth area had already been virtually eliminated by diseases that traveled with European fishing expeditions to the waters of the Northeast. The Spanish conquest of the Aztecs in Mexico and the English predominance in North America might not have occurred if not for the devastating effect of diseases that had been previously unknown in the Americas and against which the local populations had not built up any immunities.
The 18th Century

Amherst's suggestion
The
Native American population was decimated after contact with the
Old World due to the introduction of many different fatal diseases. There is, however, only one documented case of alleged germ warfare, involving British commander Lord
Jeffrey Amherst and a Swiss-British officer, Colonel
Henry Bouquet, whose correspondence included a reference to the idea of giving
smallpox-infected blankets to Indians as part of an incident known as
Pontiac's Rebellion which occurred during the
Siege of Fort Pitt late in the
French and Indian War (1756-1763). Historians have been unable to establish whether or not this plan was implemented, particularly in light of the fact that smallpox was already present in the region. (Attempts by missionaries to provide inoculation to local tribespeople were usually met with suspicion, thus leaving the native population completely vulnerable to epidemics. ) Despite the lack of historical evidence, the claim that British and American soldiers used germ warfare against North American tribes has remained fairly strong in certain oral traditions and in popular culture. Such oral histories of smallpox infested blankets being used are especially strong in the oral traditions of native nations along the west coast of Canada.
The 19th Century
It can be difficult to separate malice from ignorance. In 1834 Cambridge Diarist
Richard Henry Dana (Two Years Before the Mast; available in Project Gutenberg) visited
San Francisco on a merchant ship. His ship traded many items including blankets with Mexicans and Russians who had established outposts on the northern side of the San Francisco Bay. Local histories document that the California smallpox epidemic began at the Russian fort soon after they left. Blankets were a popular trading item, and the cheapest source of them was second-hand blankets which were often contaminated.
Native peoples in
Aptos gave
Spaniards gifts of freshly cut flowers wrapped in leaves of
poison oak. The natives themselves were immune to poison oak, and they also used it for other purposes such as dying their baskets.
During the
American Civil War,
General Sherman reported that
Confederate forces shot farm animals in ponds upon which the Union depended for drinking water.
The 20th Century
'Before and during World War II'
The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned the use of biological weapons under international law. During the
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and
World War II,
Unit 731 of the
Imperial Japanese Army conducted
human experimentation on thousands, mostly
Chinese and
Korean. In military campaigns, the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment was ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, new information has surfaced within the last decade, which alleges a more active Japanese usage. For example, firsthand accounts testify the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs, such as dumplings and vegetables. There are also reports of contaminated water supplies. Such estimates report over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In addition, repeated seasonal outbreaks after the conclusion of the war bring the death toll much higher.
In response to biological weapons development in Germany and Japan, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada initiated a BW development program in 1941 that resulted in the weaponization of
anthrax,
brucellosis, and
botulism toxin. The center for U.S. military BW research was
Fort Detrick, Maryland, where
USAMRIID is currently based; the first director was pharmaceutical executive
George W. Merck. Some biological and chemical weapons research and testing was also conducted at "
Dugway Proving Grounds" in Utah, at a munition manufacturing complex in
Terre Haute, Indiana, and at a tract on
Horn Island, Mississippi . Research carried out in the
United Kingdom during
World War II left
Gruinard island in
Scotland contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years.
'From 1946 to 1972'
During the
Cold War, US
conscientious objectors were used as consenting test subjects for biological agents in a program known as
Operation Whitecoat.
[4] There were also many unpublicized tests carried out on the public during the
Cold War.
[5]

E120 biological bomblet, developed before the U.S. signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
Considerable research on the topic was performed by the
United States (see
US Biological Weapon Testing), the
Soviet Union, and probably other major nations throughout the
Cold War era, though it is generally believed that such weapons were never used after
World War II. This view was challenged by China and
North Korea, who accused the United States of large-scale field testing of biological weapons, including the use of disease-carrying insects against them during the Korean War (1950-1953).
[6] [7] According to
[8], recently revealed documents indicate that this was
disinformation produced by Soviet intelligence. The relevance of these documents to this question has been disputed
[9].
Richard Nixon signed an executive order on November 1969, which stopped production of biological weapons in the U.S. and allowed only scientific research of lethal biological agents and defensive measures, as
immunization and
biosafety. The biological munition stockpiles were destroyed, and approximately 2,200 researchers lost their jobs
.
In 1972, the U.S. signed the
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, which banned the "development, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research." By 1996, 137 countries had signed the treaty. It is, however, believed that since the signing of the Convention the number of countries capable of producing such weapons has increased.
'After signing the Biological Weapons Convention'
Main articles: Soviet program of biological weapons
Soviet Union continued research and production of offensive biological weapons in a program called
biopreparat, despite having signed the convention. The United States was unaware of the program until Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik defected in
1989, and
Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, the first deputy director of
Biopreparat defected in
1992.
Beginning on
September 18,
2001, several letters were received by members of the U.S. Congress and media outlets containing anthrax. The attack killed five people. The identity of the perpetrator remains unknown as of 2007. See
2001 anthrax attacks.
''References for this section include (''Eitzen & Takafuji, 1997'')''
Biological weapons characteristics

The international biological hazard symbol. It represents a mature cellular organism in the background which has produced three partially formed offspring in the foreground
Ideal characteristics of biological weapons are high infectivity, high potency, availability of vaccines, and delivery as an aerosol.
Diseases most likely to be considered for use as biological weapons are contenders because of their lethality (if delivered efficiently), and robustness (making
aerosol
delivery feasible).
The biological agents used in biological weapons can often be manufactured quickly and easily. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent but delivery in an effective form to a vulnerable target.
For example, anthrax is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, pneumonic (lung) infections of anthrax usually do not cause secondary infections in other people. Thus, the effect of the agent is usually confined to the target. A pneumonic anthrax infection starts with ordinary "cold" symptoms and quickly becomes lethal, with a fatality rate that is 80% or higher. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics.
A mass attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 micrometres. Too large and the aerosol would be filtered out by the respiratory system. Too small and the aerosol would be inhaled and exhaled. Also, at this size, nonconductive powders tend to clump and cling because of electrostatic charges. This hinders dispersion. So, the material must be treated with silica to insulate and discharge the charges. The aerosol must be delivered so that rain and sun does not rot it, and yet the human lung can be infected. There are other technological difficulties as well.
Diseases considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized include
anthrax,
ebola,
Marburg virus,
bubonic plague,
cholera,
tularemia,
brucellosis,
Q fever,
machupo,
Coccidioides mycosis,
Glanders,
Melioidosis,
Shigella,
Rocky Mountain spotted fever,
typhus,
Psittacosis,
yellow fever,
Japanese B encephalitis,
Rift Valley fever, and
smallpox Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include
ricin,
SEB,
botulism toxin,
saxitoxin, and many
mycotoxins. The organisms causing these diseases are known as
select agents. Their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program.
Attacking crops and animals
Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e.,
herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated a
Herbicidal Warfare program that was eventually used in
Malaya and
Vietnam in counter insurgency. Though
herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare as
bioregulators in a similar manner as
biotoxins.Scorched earth tactics or destroying livestock and farmland were carried out in the Vietnam war and
Eelam War in Sri Lanka.
The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (
bioherbicides, or
mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart
Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as
wheat blast and
rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy water sheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics among plants). When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases.
In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of
foot-and-mouth disease and
rinderpest against
cows,
African swine fever for
pigs, and
psittacosis to kill
chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".
[10]
Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources for transportation and food. In the First World War German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for outbreaks of
glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s the United States had a field trial with
hog cholera.
The role of public health departments and disease surveillance
It is important to note that all of the classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident known -- the anthrax outbreak in
Sverdlovsk (now
Yekaterinburg) in the
Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as
Compound 19 and still off limits to visitors today, see
Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak).
Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24 - 36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique
chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease.
Identification of bioweapons
Biodefense fully integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Biological weapons agents as part of a long-term campaign of aggression and terror. Health care providers and public health officers are among our first lines of defense. Private, local, and state capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with Federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water, focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive.
The growing threat of biowarfare agents and
bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.
[11] Researchers at
Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the
ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics.
[12]
See also
BW institutions & programs by country
According to the United States
Office of Technology Assessment, seventeen countries believed to possess biological weapons in 1995:
Libya,
North Korea,
South Korea,
Iraq,
Taiwan,
Syria,
Israel,
Iran,
China,
Egypt,
Vietnam,
Laos,
Cuba,
Bulgaria,
India,
South Africa, and
Russia.
[13][14]
United States
★
US Biological Weapon Testing
★
Fort Detrick, Maryland
★
★
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
★
★
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
★
★
Building 470
★
★
One-Million-Liter Test Sphere
★
★
Project Bacchus
★
★
Project Clear Vision
★
Operation Whitecoat
★
Project SHAD
United Kingdom
★
Porton Down
★
Gruinard Island
Soviet and Russian
★
Biopreparat
★
Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak
★
Vector State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology
★
Vozrozhdeniya Island
Empire of Japan (before
1945)
★
Unit 731
★
Zhongma Fortress
★
Unit 100
★
Unit 2646
★
Unit 8604
★
Unit Ei 1644
Iraqi
★
Al Hakum
★
Salman Pak facility
Treaties banning or restricting BW
★
Geneva Protocol
★
Biological Weapons Convention
People
''Bioweaponeers''
★
Anton Dilger
★
Rihab Rashid Taha
★
William C. Patrick III
★
Kenneth Alibek
''Writers and activists''
★
Matthew Meselson
★
Jeanne Guillemin
★
Richard Preston
Other
★
Chemical warfare
★
Asymmetric warfare
★
Biosecurity
★
Biological agent
★
Biological hazard
★
Antibiotic resistance
★
Causes of hypothetical future disasters
★
Ethnic bioweapon
★
AIDS conspiracy theories
★ ''
Just a Couple of Days,'' a satirical novel involving biological weaponry
References
1. History-world.org:''Hannibal''
2. Wheelis M. Biological warfare at the 1346 siege of Caffa. Emerg Infect Dis, Center for Disease Control, 2002 Sep;8. On line serial.
3. Biological Warfare
4. BBC News, 13 February 2006, 15:31 GMT Hidden history of US germ testing
5. American Experience biological weapons timeline, 15 December 2006
6. Ed Regis, "Wartime Lies? Two historians contend that the United States engaged in germ warfare nearly 50 years ago", ''New York Times,'' (June 27, 1999)
7. The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (first chapter on line).
8. Unmasking an Old Lie. A Korean War charge is exposed as a hoax By Bruce B. Auster,
8 November 1998, U.S. News & World Report
9. [1] Twelve Newly Released Soviet-era Documents and allegations of U. S. germ warfare during the Korean War
by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman
10. Kenneth Alibek and S. Handelman. ''Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it.'' 1999. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 [2].
11. Physorg.com, "Encoded Metallic Nanowires Reveal Bioweapons", 12:50 EST, August 10, 2006.
12. Iddo Genuth and Lucille Fresco-Cohen, "BioPen Senses BioThreats", ''The Future of Things,'' November 13, 2006
13. Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World -- Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6
14.
Further reading
★
Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. ''Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World -- Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it''. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6
★ Crosby, Alfred W., ''Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe'', 900-1900 (New York, 1986).
★ Eitzen, Edward M., Jr., M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAAP; and Takafuji, Ernest T., M.D., M.P.H.; Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, MC, U.S. Army. (ed.) (1997).
Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. In ''
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare'', pp. 415-423. Office of The Surgeon General, Washington, DC.
★ Endicott, Stephen and Edward Hagerman, ''The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea,'' Indiana University Press (1998). ISBN 0253334721
★
Biowarfare In America, Keith, Jim, , , Illuminet Press, 1999, ISBN 1-881532-21-6
★ Knollenberg, Bernhard, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (1954-1955), 489-494.
★
Plague Wars: a true story of biological warfare, Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Jeff, , , Macmillan, London, 1999, ISBN 0-333-71614-0
★
Plague, The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, Orent, Wendy, , , Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY, 2004, ISBN 0-7432-3685-8
★ Woods, Lt Col Jon B. (ed.),
''USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook'', 6th edition,
U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland (April 2005).
★
Microbe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?, Zelicoff, Alan and Bellomo, Michael, , , AMACOM Books, New York, NY, 2005, ISBN 0-8144-0865-6
External links
★
The Sunshine Project
★
WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons
★
Green Goo - Life In The Era Of Humane Genocide by Nick Szabo
★
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
★
Council for Responsible Genetics
★
Info on chemical and biological weapons for emergency and security personnel
★
Potomac Institute Course Notes
★
The Terrorist Threat, Parts I, II & III
★
US Army Treatment Summary Sheet
★
Failed establishment of an international Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons
★
Monterey Institute of International Studies article on the Yellow Rain controversy
★ Lewis, Susan K.
History of Biowarfare, ''NOVA Online'', 2001 (2003–04–24)
★
DECONference: Yearly conference on decontamination, including a decontamination drill
★
Drug Preparedness and Response to Terrorism
★
alt.war.biological Usenet - Google
★
Rapport counter measures of Coalition in War of Gulf
★
Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons, a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a lot of links to information from
CRS, the
GAO and NGOs.
★
Biological Weapons Lists all known biological weapons
★
Hidden history of US germ testing,
BBC, 13 February 2006
★
Uncovering bioterrorism Bert Weinstein on bioweapons on LLNL
★
BioPen Senses BioThreats - Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are working on a new tool for identifying BioThreats - November 2006 TFOT article