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The 'Battle of Chippawa' (sometimes incorrectly spelled ''Chippewa'') was a decisive victory for the American army in the War of 1812, during an invasion of Upper Canada along the Niagara River. It was the first victory for American soldiers against an equal British force in the field.

Contents

Background

Scott's "Camp of Instruction"

Niagara campaign

Battle

Aftermath

Legacy

Notes

Sources

Background

By July 1814, Napoleon had been defeated in Europe, and the arrival of seasoned British veterans to Canada was imminent. The American Secretary of War John Armstrong was eager to win a decisive victory in Canada before British reinforcements arrived there.
Major General Jacob Brown was ordered to form the Left Division of the Army of the North. Armstrong intended him to mount an attack on Kingston, the main British base on Lake Ontario, with a diversion by militia across the Niagara River to distract the British. Because Armstrong's orders were initially unclear, a brigade of regulars under Brigadier General Winfield Scott proceeded to Buffalo on the Niagara.
It proved impossible for Brown to gain any cooperation from Commodore Isaac Chauncey—who was commanding the American naval squadron based at Sackett's Harbor—which was essential for any attack on Kingston. Chauncey was waiting for new ships to be completed and refused to make any move before the middle of July. Brown decided therefore to make the attack across the Niagara the main effort.

Scott's "Camp of Instruction"

While waiting at Buffalo, Scott had instituted a major training programme. He drilled his troops ten hours every day, using the 1791 Manual of the French Revolutionary Army. (Prior to this, various American regiments had been using a variety of different manuals, making it difficult to manoevre any large American force).
Scott also purged his units of any remaining inefficient officers who had gained their appointments through political influence rather than experience or merit, and he insisted on proper camp discipline including sanitary arrangements. This reduced the wastage from dysentery and other enteric diseases which had been heavy in previous campaigns.
In only one matter was he thwarted: he could not find enough blue uniforms for his men. They had been shipped in plenty of time for once but had been diverted to Plattsburgh and Sackets Harbor, although enough were found from one source or another to clothe the 21st US Infantry. Eventually Commissary General Callender Irvine had to have 2,000 uniforms hastily run up and sent to Buffalo, but there being insufficient blue cloth, short gray jackets were substituted.

Niagara campaign

On July 3, Brown's army (the regular brigades under Scott and Eleazar Wheelock Ripley) captured Fort Erie. After reinforcements of volunteers from the militia arrived under Peter B. Porter on July 4, Scott began advancing north along the portage road alongside the Niagara River. A British covering force under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson was easily driven back before they could destroy any of the bridges or block the road with fallen trees.
Late in the day, Scott encountered British defences on the far bank of the Chippawa River, near the town of Chippawa, Ontario. After a brief exchange of artillery fire, Scott withdrew a few miles to Street's Creek. Here he planned to give his troops a belated Fourth of July parade the next day, while Brown manoeuvred other units to cross the Chippawa upstream.
Opposed to him was the Right Division of the British Army in Canada, under Major General Phineas Riall. Riall believed that Scott's brigade were militia, and he also believed that Fort Erie was still holding out. He determined to cross the Chippawa River and mount an attack to drive the Americans back across the Niagara and relieve Fort Erie.

Battle

Early on July 5, British light infantry, militia and Indians crossed the Chippawa ahead of Riall's main body and began sniping at Scott's outposts from the woods to their west. (Some of them nearly captured Scott, who was having breakfast in a farmhouse). Brown ordered Porter's brigade (volunteers from the Pennsylvania militia, with some Iroquois warriors) to clear the woods. They did so, but they met Riall's advancing brigade and hastily retreated.
Scott was already advancing from Street's Creek. His artillery (Captain Nathaniel Towson's company, with three 12-pounder guns) deployed on the portage road and opened fire. Riall's own guns (two light 24-pounders and a 5.5 inch howitzer) attempted to reply, but Towson's guns destroyed an ammunition wagon and put most of the British guns out of action.
Meanwhile, Scott's troops deployed into line with the 25th U.S. Infantry on the left near the woods, the 11th U.S. Infantry and 9th U.S. Infantry in the centre and the 22nd U.S. Infantry on the right with Towson's guns. At first, Riall was under the impression that the American line was comprised of grey-clad militia troops, whom the professional British soldiers held in much contempt. He expected the poorly trained soldiers to fall back in disarray after the first few volleys. As the American line continued to hold steady under British artillery fire, Riall realized his error and supposedly exclaimed his famous phrase "Those are regulars, by God!" (Scott appears to be the only source for Riall’s famous phrase; there is no record of it in any British source.)
The British infantry, with the 1st Battalion of the 1st Royal Regiment of Foot and the 100th Foot leading and the 1st Battalion of the 8th (King's) Foot in reserve, were advancing very awkwardly and becoming bunched and disordered. This was because Riall had formed them into line for an advance over uneven ground with some very long grass instead of keeping them in column, in which they could have advanced more rapidly. Advancing in line meant that Riall's troops moved more slowly and were under fire from the American artillery for longer. The only advantage of using the line formation was that it increased firepower - yet Riall sacrificed even this advantage by ordering his infantry to fire only one volley before closing with the bayonet. As the 950 redcoats of the 1/1st and 100th Regiments lumbered forward, their own artillery had to stop firing in order to avoid hitting them. Meanwhile, the American gunners switched from firing roundshot to firing canister - with lethal consequences for the British infantry. Once the opposing lines had closed to less than 100 yards apart, Scott advanced his wings, forming his brigade into a "U" shape. The well-drilled Americans executed this manoeuvre flawlessly, allowing them to pour a devastating crossfire into Riall's advancing troops.
Both lines stood and fired repeated volleys; after 25 minutes of this pounding Riall, his own coat pierced by a bullet, was forced to order a withdrawal which was completed in good order without American pursuit. Losses had been heavy; the 100th Regiment, which held the center, was reduced to ''"one Captain & 3 subalterns doing duty, with 250 effective men"''. ^[1] Nevertheless, 20th Century research by Canadian archivist Douglas Hendry ^[2] has demonstrated that the British casualty return for Chippawa marked down many men as "killed" who had in fact been captured. Of 136 British regulars who were supposed to be killed, only 74 actually died. The actual British loss at Chippawa appears to have been 74 regulars, 18 Canadian Militiamen and 16 Indian warriors killed; 299 British regulars, 16 Canadian Militiamen and an unknown number of Indian warriors wounded; 75 British regulars wounded and captured by the Americans; 9 British regulars, 1 officer of the British Indian Department and 5 Indian warriors taken prisoner without being wounded ^[3]. A further 9 British soldiers and 9 Canadian Militiamen appear to have deserted. A curious feature of the British casualty list is that the 1st Battalion, 1st (Royal Scots) Regiment was officially a Scottish unit: yet out of the 41 enlisted men of the battalion who were killed at Chippawa, 22 were Irish, 10 were English, 1 had "the Army" as his assigned nationality and only 8 were Scottish ^[4].

Aftermath

Two days after the battle, Brown completed his intended manoevre and crossed the Chippawa upstream of Riall's defences, forcing the British back to Fort George. It was not possible to attack this fortified British position because Commodore Chauncey was still failing to support the American army on the Niagara peninsula. No reinforcements or siege artillery could be brought to Brown's army.
At the same time, the British were able to rush reinforcements to the Niagara front and soon became too strong for Brown to risk a direct attack. Eventually, a series of feints and manoevres led to the Battle of Lundy's Lane a few weeks later.
The battle, and the subsequent Battle of Lundy's Lane, proved that American regular units could hold their own against British regulars if properly trained and well led. The American army, modeled and drilled according to French Revolutionary standards, was becoming a respectable fighting force with new and capable leaders such as Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott who were to emerge from the war as national heroes.
Riall, although misled in several respects (on the improved standards of the U.S. Army, the size and composition of the force opposing him, and the time for which Fort Erie could be held), nevertheless made the same mistake as several French commanders of the period and assumed that a forceful rush by infantry could overwhelm a disciplined and well-handled line. He may also have been unwise to keep the 1/8th in reserve and pit only 950 men directly against Scott's brigade. His decision to make such a long advance over rough ground in line instead of column, which robbed the attack of the momentum necessary for it to have succeeded, has never been explained: neither has his order to attack without firing, which wasted the only advantage that would have been gained by attacking in line. Compared with Scott (and indeed with most of his own subordinates), Riall had little experience of action, having fought only briefly in Martinique (1809), Guadaloupe (1810) and at the Battle of Buffalo (December 1813). Nevertheless, he behaved with conspicuous bravery during the British retreat.

Legacy

The Corps of Cadets of the United States Military Academy at West Point wear gray parade uniforms, but the assertion that they were adopted in commemoration of Scott’s troops at Chippawa appears to be a legend. The reasons given in 1816 for its selection were simply that it wore well and was considerably cheaper than the blue one. However, its origin is not important as it perpetuates the memory of the Left Division.
The unofficial motto of all U.S. Infantry Regiments is ''"Regulars by God"''. This motto was first adopted by the 6th U.S. Infantry.

Notes

1. Letter from Sir Gordon Drummond to Sir George Prevost, July 13, 1814
2. Hendry, Douglas, ''British Casualties Suffered at Chippawa, 5 July 1814''. Ottawa: unpublished research report, Directorate of History, Department of National Defense, Canada, December 1991. Hendry's findings appear in Graves, ''Red Coats and Grey Jackets'', referred to on Page 135-136 and given in detail in Appendix E
3. Graves, ''Red Coats and Grey Jackets'', Appendix E. Graves lists 19 names for Canadian Militia: but three names, John Thompson, Timothy Skinner and Stephen Peer, appear twice on the list
4. Graves, ''Red Coats and Grey Jackets'', Appendix E

Sources

★ Donald E. Graves, ''Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa'', Dundurn Press, Toronto & Oxford, ISBN 1-55002-210-5

★ John R. Elting, ''Amateurs to Arms'', Da Capo Press, New York, ISBN 0-306-80653-3

★ J. Mackay Hitsman & Donald E. Graves, ''The Incredible War of 1812'', Robin Brass Studio, Toronto, ISBN 1-896941-13-3

★ Jon Latimer, ''1812: War with America'', Belknap/Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-02584-9