BATTLE OF BRITAIN

'Battle of Britain' is the name commonly given to the effort by the German ''Luftwaffe'' to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), before a planned sea and airborne invasion of Britain (Operation Sealion) during the Second World War. The Battle of Britain was the first major battle to be fought entirely by air forces. It was the largest and most sustained bombing campaign yet attempted, and the first real test of the strategic bombing theories developed since the previous World War. The failure of Nazi Germany to destroy Britain's air force, or to break the spirit of the British government or people, is considered the Third Reich's first major defeat.
Neither Hitler nor the ''Wehrmacht'' believed it possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the British Isles until the RAF had been neutralized. Secondary objectives were to destroy aircraft production and ground infrastructure, to attack areas of political significance, and to terrorize the British people with the intent of intimidating them into seeking an armistice or surrender. Some historians have argued no invasion could have succeeded; given the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the ''Kriegsmarine'', ''Sealion'' would have been a disaster. They argue the ''Luftwaffe'' would have been unable to prevent decisive intervention by RN cruisers and destroyers, even with air superiority.^[9][10]
British historians date the battle from 10 July to 31 October 1940, which represented the most intense period of daylight bombing. German historians usually place the beginning of the battle in mid-August 1940 and end it in May 1941, on the withdrawal of the bomber units in preparation for the attack on the USSR.

Contents

Background

Opposing forces

Aircraft

Men

Tactics in the air

''Luftwaffe'' strategy

Tactics

Intelligence

Navigational aids

RAF Strategy

The Dowding System

Groups

Sectors

Limitations

Efficiency

Effect of signals intelligence

Tactics

Bomber and Coastal Command contributions

Phases of the Battle

Channel battles

Main assault

''Luftwaffe'' targets RAF airfields

Raids on British Cities

Aftermath

Foreign contribution

See also

Notes

References

External links

Background

''Luftwaffe'' attacks on Britain began with raids on naval targets, with bombers being shot down over the Firth of Forth on 16 October 1939 and over Scapa Flow on the following day, but there were no major attacks during the Phony War period, a lull in fighting that Hitler ended on 10 May 1940.^[11]
Following the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk (Operation DYNAMO) and the French surrender on 22 June 1940, Hitler believed the war was practically over and that the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly be forced to come to terms with Germany.^[12] Although there was an element of British public and political sentiment favouring negotiated peace with a clearly ascendant Germany, among them the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, the recently-installed Prime Minister Winston Churchill nonetheless refused to consider an armistice with Hitler's Germany.^[13] Churchill's skillful use of rhetoric hardened public opinion against a peaceful resolution and prepared the British for a long war. Coining the general term for the upcoming battle, Churchill stated in his 'This was their finest hour' speech to the House of Commons on 18 June 1940: "I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.".
In an effort to finish the war in the west, Hitler ordered the rapid preparation of an invasion of Britain on 16 July. Hitler hoped to frighten Britain into peace before an actual invasion was launched, and he used the invasion preparations as a means to apply pressure. The plan was prepared by the ''Oberkommando der Wehrmacht'' (Armed Forces High Command). The operation, code-named ''Seelöwe'' (Sealion), was planned for mid-September 1940 and called for landings on the south coast of Great Britain, backed by an airborne assault. All preparations were to be made by mid-August.
The ''Kriegsmarine'' was reluctant to launch an invasion, and on 11 July, Admiral Raeder told Hitler invasion could only be contemplated as a last resort, and only then with full air superiority. The ''Kriegsmarine'' had a limited number of ships, while the Royal Navy had over 50 destroyers and dozens of cruisers and battleships in home waters. In the event of a seaborne invasion, the British Home Fleet would sortie from their nearby bases and attack the invasion force, something the ''Kriegsmarine'' could do little to counter. The only way Germany would be able to prevent Royal Navy interference would be through the ''Luftwaffe'', primarily with their dive bombers, but employing these effectively would require complete air superiority because the bombers were so vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, Hitler was determined the invasion go ahead and ordered all services to make preparations for an amphibious assault once air superiority had been achieved.

Opposing forces

The ''Luftwaffe'' was facing a more capable opponent than it had met before: a sizable, highly-coordinated, well-supplied air force, fielding aircraft that could match the German Messerschmitt Bf 109E and v Bf 110. The majority of the RAF's fighting would rest upon the workhorse Hurricane Mk I. More shocking to the German pilots was the newer Spitfire Mk I, which was quickly recognised as a nimble, world-class fighter. The fighters they had encountered thus far in the war did not, despite strong showings by their pilots, measure up to the performance of the Bf 109.

Aircraft

The Germans found the Bf 109E only marginally superior to the Hurricane, and the Spitfire was fully its equal, if not its superior in certain key areas. The Bf 109 had a slightly higher speed at high altitude, better dive speed and a fuel injected engine (the Daimler-Benz DB 601) that allowed it to perform negative-G manoeuvres without the engine stalling. The Spitfire could manoeuvre slightly better and was faster at medium heights, although neither the Hurricane nor the Spitfire had the ability to perform negative-G manoeuvres without the engine cutting out. The German fighter had a heavier armament with its two 20 mm MG FF cannon. This gave it a greater punch than the eight machine guns of the British fighters, but the low muzzle velocity of the cannon, where the shells dropped quite quickly after firing, meant that only good pilots could use them effectively in combat.
The Junkers Ju 87 was slow, had to operate at low altitude to make its bombing runs and possessed inadequate defences. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters, because of its low speed and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks.^[14] The ''Stuka'' depended on air superiority, the very thing that was contested over Britain. It was therefore withdrawn from attacks on Britain early in the campaign, leaving the ''Luftwaffe'' short of precision attack aircraft.
The Bf 110 underperformed because it was deployed in a role for which it was never intended.^[15] It was an excellent fighter-bomber and interceptor, having (at least at altitudes greater than 15,000 ft) a maximum speed better than that of the Hurricane and not much inferior to the Spitfire, and a heavy armament capable of dealing with any enemy bomber. When used as a light bomber it proved very effective.^[16] It was still formidable as a high escort for bombers, when it could dive down upon the enemy, fire and then break contact.^[17] But as a fighter escort overall, its lack of manoeuvrability made it an easy target for British fighters. It was forced into this role, however, because the Bf 109 lacked the range necessary to escort bombers to targets beyond the south-east corner of England.
For the British, the main disappointment was the performance of the Boulton-Paul Defiant two-seat turret fighters and Fairey Battle bombers. These aircraft, which before the war were expected to fill the bomber-killer and precision strike roles respectively, were found to be too vulnerable. The Battles suffered horrendous losses in France and were eventually put into reserve to take on the invasion fleet if it were ever launched. The Defiants were too cumbersome to tangle with the Bf 109s, and after suffering heavy losses in the early part of the battle they were reassigned as night-fighters. There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these aircraft operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlin engines to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.^[18]

Men

The British had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of trained pilots, rather than the lack of machines, that became the greatest concern for Dowding. Drawing from regular RAF forces as well as the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. The selection processes of potential RAF candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude leading up to the war.^[19] Replacement pilots, with little actual flight training and no gunnery training whatsoever, suffered high casualty rates.^[20]
The ''Luftwaffe'' could muster more fighter pilots—1,450—and they were more experienced overall. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery, as well as instructions in tactics that were suited for fighter versus fighter combat.^[21] The ''Luftwaffe'' fighter pilot manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favour. This rule could not be followed in close bomber escort duties though, since the fighter gave up tactical flexibility and the advantage of height.

Tactics in the air

In the early phases of the battle, the RAF was hindered by its reliance on obsolete formations. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of three-aircraft "sections" in tight "V's" ('vics'). With four sections flying together in tight formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to actually watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on him and each other, to keep station.^[22] RAF fighter training also emphasized by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognized the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics in the midst of the battle, because replacement pilots, often with only minimal actual flying time, could not be readily retrained^[23] and that the inexperienced pilots of RAF needed firm leadership in the air that only rigid formations provided.^[24] German pilots dubbed the RAF formations ''"Idiotenreihen"'' ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack. Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two aircraft flying independently above and behind (dubbed 'weavers') to provide increased observation and rear protection; these, often the least experienced men, were also often the first to die.^[25] After the battle, RAF pilots adopted a variant on the German formations with some success.
The ''Luftwaffe'' employed the looser and flexible four-ship ''Schwarm'' (two pairs, each consisting of a leader and a wingman) in an open formation. Each ''Schwarm'' in a ''Staffel'' flew staggered and with plenty of room in between them, making the formation difficult to spot at longer ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility.^[21] This formation was developed during the Spanish Civil War by Werner Mölders and other ''Luftwaffe'' pilots, based on principles dating to Oswald Boelcke in 1916. In the ''Luftwaffe'' formations, the basic pair, or ''Rotte'', allowed the ''Rottenführer'' to concentrate on getting kills, while his wingman protected him and scanned for threats.

''Luftwaffe'' strategy

The ''Luftwaffe'' was designed as a tactical weapon to support the Army on the battlefield. In Poland and France, the ''Luftwaffe'' had operated jointly with the ''Wehrmacht'' in its ''Blitzkrieg''. In the Battle of Britain, however, the ''Luftwaffe'' had to operate alone, not as support for an advancing army but as a decisive weapon in its own right. This new role was something the ''Luftwaffe'' was unsuited for, lacking the strategic bombers and long-range fighters it needed to take up a strategic bombing role. Its main task was to ensure air supremacy over southeast England, to pave the way for an invasion fleet.
The ''Luftwaffe'' regrouped after the Battle of France into three ''Luftflotten'' (Air Fleets) on the Britain's southern and northern flanks. ''Luftflotte 2'', commanded by ''Generalfeldmarschall'' Albert Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. ''Luftflotte 3'', under ''Generalfeldmarschall'' Hugo Sperrle, targeted the West Country, Midlands, and northwest England. ''Luftflotte 5'', led by ''Generaloberst'' Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, targeted the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with ''Luftflotte 3'' taking more responsibility for the nighttime Blitz attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon ''Luftflotte 2's shoulders.
Initial ''Luftwaffe'' estimates allotted four days to defeat Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks for the bombers and long-range fighters to mop up the rest of the country and destroy the British aircraft industry. The plan was to begin with attacks on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland toward London and the ring of sector airfields defending it. Later reassessments gave the ''Luftwaffe'' five weeks to establish temporary air superiority over England within the period from 8 August to 15 September.^[27] To achieve this goal, the RAF had to be destroyed on the ground or in the air with the ''Luftwaffe'' maintaining a high enough kill ratio to avoid depleting its own forces to such a level that it could not support an invasion. The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population, but this alternative was considered unfeasible and was expressly forbidden by Hitler.^[27]
The ''Luftwaffe'' kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. The commander of ''Luftflotte 3'', Hugo Sperrle, wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing it. His counterpart in ''Luftflotte 2'', Albert Kesselring, championed attacking London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon which strategy to pursue.^[29] He seemed at times obsessed with maintaining his own power base in the Luftwaffe and indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.

Tactics

The ''Luftwaffe'' varied its tactics considerably to try to find a way through the RAF defences. It launched many free-roving fighter sweeps, known as ''Freie Jagd'' ("Free Hunts"), to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The ''Luftwaffe'' also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable. Casualties were greatest among the escort units.
Standard tactics for raids soon became an amalgam of techniques. A free hunt would precede a raid to try to sweep any defenders out of the raid's path. The bombers would then fly in at altitudes between 10,000 and , sometimes closely escorted by fighters. A 'detached' escort, or 'top cover,' would fly above the bombers and maintain a distant watch.
''Luftwaffe'' tactics were influenced by their fighters, which were divided into single-engined Bf 109s and twin-engine Bf 110s. The Bf 110 ''Zerstörer'' (destroyer) proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. Soon, they had to be given escorts of their own and were eventually restricted in their employment. This meant the bulk of fighter duties fell on the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection against the RAF. Because they had his ear after the hard-fought battles of 15 August and 18 August, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This shackled many Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bombing forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted. Tactical flexibility was further hampered by ''Luftwaffe'' rejecting drop tanks for the 109s, despite their availability; unquestionably, many German fighter pilots drowned for lack of fuel who would otherwise have survived.^[25]

Intelligence

The ''Luftwaffe'' was ill-served by its lack of intelligence about the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured and plagued by rivalries; their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940, there were few if any German agents operating in the UK and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant the ''Luftwaffe'' had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences, in particular of the crucial command and control system built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as 5th ''Abteilung's November 1939 assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.
Throughout the battle, the ''Luftwaffe'' had to launch numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence. Reconnaissance aircraft (at first mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf 110s) proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the ''Luftwaffe'' operated 'blind' for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities and deployment. Many times the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently exaggerated, due to over-enthusiatic claims and the difficulty of effective confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric atmosphere of perceived victory, the ''Luftwaffe'' leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on any one type of target (airbases, radar station, aircraft factories), so the already haphazard effort was further diluted.^[31]

Navigational aids

While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively than the Germans realised, the ''Luftwaffe'' attempted to press its own offensive advantage with advanced radio navigation systems the British were initially not aware of. One of these was ''Knickebein'' ("crooked leg"), a system where carefully positioned radio transmitters in friendly territory broadcast specially targeted navigational beams that intersected over specific bombing targets in enemy territory. Bombers equipped to detect these beams could be guided towards a target and receive a signal to drop their bombs when they were (roughly) overhead. This allowed for somewhat more accurate bombing at night, when British air defence was at its weakest.
Although British intelligence had heard of proposals for this system, they were not taken seriously until a British science advisor to MI6, Dr. Reginald Jones, gathered evidence of its existence and the threat it posed. He then convinced the high command of the menace and confirmed it with special reconnaissance flights. Jones was put in charge of developing countermeasures, which often involved interfering with the beams to make attacking aircraft go widely off course. Although the Germans resorted to other navigational systems, Jones and the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) were able to neutralise each in turn. This so-called Battle of the beams resulted in a markedly reduced German bombing accuracy. With the beams no longer accurate, however, many civilian areas that would not normally have been targeted were bombed.

RAF Strategy

The Dowding System

The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the 'Dowding System', after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command.

Groups

The UK's airspace was divided up into four Groups.

★ 10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Christopher Quintin-Brand.

★ 11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical approaches to London and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park.

★ 12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.

★ 13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.
At the HQ of each Group (e.g. for 11 Group RAF Uxbridge), information from Fighter Command headquarters would be noted on plotting tables, large maps on which counters marking the incoming raids would be moved, and RAF officers known as Fighter Controllers could then order a response.
Despite appearances, the Groups were not mutually supporting; Park, for instance, could only request, and not demand assistance from Quintin-Brand (from whom he often got it), nor from Leigh-Mallory (from whom he more often did not). This was because Dowding had never issued standing orders to assist, nor created a method to co-ordinate it.^[32]

Sectors

The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors; each commanding officer was assigned between two and four squadrons. Sector stations, comprising an aerodrome with a command post, were the heart of this organisation, though they also had satellite airfields to disperse squadrons to. When ordered by their Group HQ, the sector stations would 'scramble' their squadrons into the air. Once airborne, the squadrons would be directed by radio-telephone (R/T) from their sector station. Squadrons could be ordered to patrol airfields or vital targets, or be 'vectored' to intercept incoming raids.

Limitations

Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at that time, the Dowding System had many limitations, including, but not often stressed, its emphatic need for qualified ground maintenance personnel, many of whom had received their training under the Aircraft Apprentice scheme instituted by Hugh Trenchard. RDF (radar) was subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T communications with airborne fighters were restricted because of the RAF's use of High-Frequency (HF) radio sets. HF radio was limited in range and even with a network of relay stations, the squadrons could not roam more than one or two sectors from their airfields. It was also restricted to a single frequency ''per'' squadron, making inter-squadron communication impossible. Finally, the system for tracking RAF fighters, known as HF/DF or "Huff-Duff", restricted sectors to a maximum of four squadrons in the air.
This is, in part, a reflection of the novelty of the type of combat, as well as the control system. It was perfectly possible for Sector Control to have been assigned one frequency for all fighters to "listen out" on (or "guard", in modern parlance), with "roving" intercept guidance, rather than the close positive control used in the event, which limited controllers' ability to handle large numbers of interceptors.^[33]

Efficiency

In spite of this, RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets, which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range, and provided multiple channels. For all of its faults, RAF's system of ground control directed its fighters to be where they were needed. The ''Luftwaffe'', with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.

Effect of signals intelligence

It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher, used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of the UK's command a view of German intentions but it seems little of this material filtered down to Hugh Dowding's desk. (It would have had little tactical value in any case.) However, the 'Y' radio listening service, monitoring the patterns of ''Luftwaffe'' radio traffic, contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.

Tactics

The weight of the battle fell upon the RAF's 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was to subject attackers to continual attacks by relatively small numbers of aircraft and try to break up the tight formations of bombers. Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always achieved, however, and sometimes the Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles.

During the battle, some commanders, notably Trafford Leigh-Mallory of 12 Group, proposed squadrons be formed into Big Wings, consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy ''en masse'', a method pioneered by Douglas Bader. Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to over-claim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle-zone. This led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they actually were.
The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However, the delay in forming up Big Wings meant this air cover often did not arrive until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields. Post-war analysis agrees Dowding's and Park's approach was best for 11 Group. However, the controversy affected Park's career after the battle and contributed to Dowding's dismissal from Fighter Command.

Bomber and Coastal Command contributions

Bomber Command and Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. After the initial disasters of the war, with Vickers Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking Wilhelmshafen and the high losses of the Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France, it became clear Bomber Command would have to operate mainly at night to achieve any results without very high losses.^[34] From 15 May 1940 a night-time bomber campaign was launched against German oil industry, communication, and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr area.
As the threat of the Luftwaffe mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry and to attack harbours and shipping able to support an invasion of Great Britain. From early August the assembling invasion fleet in French ports got a high priority target as well. The large barges intended by the Germans to transport troops across the Channel were targeted by bombers. In addition the Germans had few Freya radar stations set up in France, meaning air defence of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany. In September 1940, Bomber Command was directing some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.
Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy held coastline. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Compared to the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters it is relatively little, but bombers suffered about 50% the number of casualties as their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was therefore much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.^[35]

Phases of the Battle

The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:

★ 10 July – 11 August: ''Kanalkampf'', the Channel battles.

★ 12 August – 23 August: ''Adlerangriff'', the early assault against the coastal airfields.

★ 24 August – 6 September: the ''Luftwaffe'' targets the airfields. The critical phase of the battle.

★ 7 September onwards: the day attacks switch to British towns and cities.

Channel battles

The ''Kanalkampf'' comprised a series of running fights over convoys in the English Channel. It was launched partly because Kesselring and Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it gave German aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British defenders.^[29] In general, these battles off the coast tended to favour the Germans, whose bomber escorts massively outnumbered the convoy patrols. The need for constant patrols over the convoys put a severe strain on RAF pilots and machines, wasting fuel, engine hours and exhausting the pilots, but eventually the number of ship-sinkings became so great the British Admiralty cancelled all further convoys through the Channel. However, these early fights provided both sides with experience. They also gave the first indications that some of the aircraft, such as the RAF's Defiant turret-fighter and the ''Luftwaffe's Bf 110, were not up to the intense dog-fighting that would characterise the battle.

Main assault

The main attack upon the RAF's defences was code-named ''Adlerangriff'' (''Eagle Attack'').
The weather, which proved an important feature of the campaign, delayed ''Adlertag'', (''Eagle Day'') until 13 August 1940. On 12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit ''Erprobungsgruppe 210'' attacked four radar stations. Three were briefly taken off the air but were back working within six hours. The raids appeared to show British radars were difficult to knock out for any length of time. The ''Luftwaffe's failure to mount repeated attacks on them allowed the RAF to get the radar stations back on the air.
''Adlertag'' opened with a series of attacks on coastal airfields, used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters. As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August was "The Greatest Day" when the ''Luftwaffe'' mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. The ''Luftflotte'' 5 attacked the north of England. Believing the strength of Fighter Command to be concentrated away in the south, raiding forces from Denmark and Norway ran into strong resistance. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, bombers were shot down in large numbers. As a result of the casualties, ''Luftflotte'' 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.

18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following the grinding battles of 18 August, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the ''Luftwaffe'' to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 Stuka in the campaign. This veteran of ''blitzkrieg'' was too vulnerable to fighter attack over Britain, and to preserve the Stuka force Göring withdrew it from the fighting. This removed the ''Luftwaffe's main precision-bombing weapon and shifted the burden of pin-point attacks on the already-stretched ''Erprobungsgruppe 210''. Also, the Bf 110 had proven too clumsy for dog-fighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would only be used when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could be provided.
Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this the weight of the attack now fell on ''Luftflotte'' 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in ''Luftflotte'' 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the Pas de Calais. Stripped of its fighters, ''Luftflotte'' 3 would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made a large change in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many Geschwaderkommodore with younger, more aggressive pilots like Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders.^[37]
Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the ''Reichsmarschall'' nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence. It was known radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was, anything bringing up the 'Tommies' to fight was to be encouraged.

''Luftwaffe'' targets RAF airfields

From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a fight between Kesselring's ''Luftflotte'' 2 and Park's 11 Group. The ''Luftwaffe'' concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each; Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. At least seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the Germans. At times these raids knocked out the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system. Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.
The RAF was taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft, but replacement pilots were barely keeping pace with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down at an alarming rate. To offset losses some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former Fairey Battle pilots, familiar with the Merlin engine, were utilized. Most replacements from OTU had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. At this point the multinational nature of Fighter Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and individual personnel from the air forces of the Dominions were already attached to the RAF — Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These squadrons had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought the non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian Jewish pilot serving amongst the squadrons.
Polish flyers proved especially effective — the pre-war Polish Air Force had lengthy, extensive and high standards of training and — with Poland conquered and under German occupation — the Polish pilots of 303 Squadron were strongly motivated. Joseph Frantisek, a Czech regular airman who had flown from the occupation of his own country and joined the Polish and then French air forces before arriving in Britain, proved effective but undisciplined and flew as a guest of 303 Squadron chasing Germans. He shot down 17, now accepted as the highest "RAF score".^[38]
The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For ''Luftwaffe'' aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer, and ''Kanalkrankheit'' ("Channel Sickness") — a form of combat fatigue — began to appear among the German pilots. Their replacement problem was even worse than the British. Though the ''Luftwaffe'' maintained its numerical superiority, the slow appearance of replacement aircraft and pilots put increasing strain on the resources of the remaining attackers. Because of the shared hardships of the battle, the constant strain on both the attacking Germans and defending British, a strange sort of camaraderie occasionally appeared between the opposing sides. One British pilot, who bailed out after being shot down, recalled how a German fighter began circling him menacingly. He braced himself expecting to be machine-gunned, but the German eventually simply flew off, sparing him. After a savage dogfight, where an RAF pilot and a German both ran out of ammunition at the same time, both pilots looked at each other, threw their hands up, and laughed.
And yet, the ''Luftwaffe'' was winning this battle of the airfields. Another fortnight of this pounding and the RAF might have been forced to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. This was not clear to the ''Luftwaffe'' command, which had watched its bomber force start to waste away and had grown desperate to deliver on the original timetable. They could not understand why Fighter Command had not collapsed, or how they were always able to get fighters to the places needed, no matter how many raids were sent. Something needed to be done to force a decisive battle.
On 4 September, Hitler ordered the ''Luftwaffe'' to bomb London, following RAF raids on Berlin on the night of 25 August–26 August, themselves in reprisal after London and its suburbs had been unintentionally damaged by bombs on several occasions in late August. The Berlin raid had hurt Göring's pride, because he had previously claimed the British would never be allowed to bomb the city. Kesselring seized his chance and proposed a strategy change. In the face of Sperrle's arguments that attacks on airfields should continue, Kesselring persuaded the ''Reichsmarschall'' to attack London. The raids would either panic the British population into submission, or force the "last fifty Spitfires" into the sky where they could be annihilated. This attack was no longer seen as a prerequisite for ''Seelöwe'' but was meant to be decisive in itself.

Raids on British Cities

For several months prior to 7 September 1940, when the first major London raid was launched, the ''Luftwaffe'' had bombed a series of British cities, killing more than 1,250 civilians in July and August. The 7 September raid targeted docks in the East End of the city, and over the coming days large raids were launched, some targeting the docks but others bombing indiscriminately. The RAF did come up, in greater numbers than the ''Luftwaffe'' expected. The Big Wing was deployed for the first time, giving the German pilots a fright. Over the coming days, attacks on London continued. The break from bombing the airfields gave the RAF critical breathing space. It was the turning point.
The most damaging aspect of the switch to London was the longer range. The Bf 109 escorts had a limited fuel capacity, and by the time they arrived over the city, they had only ten minutes of flying time before they had to turn for home. This left many raids undefended by fighter escorts. On 11 September, Hitler postponed Operation Sealion until 24 September. RAF Bomber Command contributed to the problems facing the German naval forces by sinking eighty barges in the Port of Ostend alone ^[39].
On 15 September, two massive waves of German attacks were decisively repulsed by the RAF. The total casualties on this critical day were 60 German aircraft shot down versus only 26 RAF. The German defeat caused Hitler to order, two days later, the ''postponement'' of preparations for the invasion of Britain.
Henceforth, in the face of mounting losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the ''Luftwaffe'' switched from daylight to night-time bombing.
On 13 October, Hitler again postponed the invasion until the spring of 1941^[39]. It was not until Hitler's Directive 21 was ordered on 18 December 1940, that the threat of invasion finally dissipated^[39].

Aftermath

The Battle of Britain marked the first defeat of Hitler's military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory. Pre-war theories led to exaggerated fears of strategic bombing, and British public opinion was invigorated by having come through the ordeal. To Hitler it did not seem a serious setback as Britain was still not in a position to cause real damage to his plans, and the last minute invasion plan had been an unimportant addition to German strategy. However, for the British the fighter pilots had achieved a great victory in successfully carrying out Sir Thomas Inskip's 1937 air policy of preventing the Germans from knocking Britain out of the war. It also signalled a significant shift in U.S. opinion. During the battle many people from the U.S. accepted the view promoted by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, and believed that the UK could not survive. However, Roosevelt wanted a second opinion, and sent 'Wild Bill' Donovan on a brief visit to Britain which convinced Donovan that Britain would survive and should be supported in every possible way. ^[42]
Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the actual numbers, because of the confusion of fighting in dynamic three-dimensional air battles. Postwar analysis of records has shown that between July and September, the RAF claimed over 2,698 kills for 1,023 fighter aircraft lost to all causes, where 147 Polish pilots claimed 201 out of that number, while the ''Luftwaffe'' fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed for losses of 1,887, of which 873 were fighters. To the RAF figure should be added an additional 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command aircraft conducting bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defence of the country.^[7]
Some modern military historians have suggested the battle was unwinnable for the ''Luftwaffe'' because their numerical majority was not sufficient to achieve air superiority. Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was vindicated. Three historians, who teach at Joint Services Command and Staff College, have suggested the existence of the Royal Navy was enough of a deterrent to the Germans^[44]; even had the ''Luftwaffe'' won, the Germans had limited means with which to combat the Royal Navy, that would have intervened to prevent a landing. Some veterans of the battle point out that the Royal Navy would have been vulnerable to air attack by the ''Luftwaffe'' if Germany had achieved air superiority^[45], quoting the fate of ''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'' in December 1941, overwhelmed only by air power.^[46] This assertion ignores the fact that Germany at the time had no armour piercing bomb capable of doing to a British cruiser (let alone a battleship) what Japanese torpedo bombers did to HMS ''Prince of Wales''.
The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day and night Blitzes. The switch to a terror bombing strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have withdrawn to the Midlands, out range of German fighters, and continued the battle from there. Postwar records show British aircraft were being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its strength even as the ''Luftwaffe's declined. In losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew the battle was a blow from which the ''Luftwaffe'' never fully recovered.
The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial potential. Hindsight does not disguise the fact the threat to Fighter Command was very real and for the participants, it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and defeat. The victory was as much psychological as physical.
The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was not without heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids occurring on 19 December 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died.
Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the contribution of Fighter Command with the words, ''"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few"''.^[47] However, the brilliant leadership of Dowding and Keith Park in successfully proving their theories of air defence had created enemies amongst the RAF air marshals, and in a shabby episode both were sacked from their posts in the immediate aftermath of the battle.^[48] Pilots who fought in the Battle have been known as ''The Few'' ever since. 15 September is celebrated in the United Kingdom as "Battle of Britain Day", marking the battle.
The end of the battle allowed the UK to rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied stronghold. Britain later served as a base from which the Liberation of Europe was launched.

Foreign contribution

Main articles: Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain, Corpo Aereo Italiano

The RAF roll of honour for the Battle of Britain recognises 510 overseas pilots as flying at least one authorised operational sortie with an eligible unit of the Royal Air Force or Fleet Air Arm between 10 July and 31 October 1940.^[49] This included pilots from Poland, New Zealand, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Australia, South Africa, France, Ireland, United States of America, Jamaica, Palestine, and Southern Rhodesia. The highest scoring unit during the Battle of Britain was the No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron.^[50]
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini insisted on providing an element of the Italian Royal Air Force (''Regia Aeronautica'') to assist his German ally during the Battle of Britain. This expeditionary force was called the Italian Air Corps (''Corpo Aereo Italiano'', or CAI) and first saw action in late October 1940. It took part in the latter stages of the battle but achieved limited success and was redeployed in early 1941.

See also

★ Battle of Britain RAF squadrons

★ Battle of Britain Memorial Flight

★ Battle of Britain Monument in London

★ Bombing of Coventry

★ British military history of World War II

★ Evacuations of civilians in Britain during World War II

★ Kent Battle of Britain Museum

★ The Darkest Hour

★ The Few

★ ''Battle of Britain'', theatrical release documenting the battle starring Sir Laurence Olivier, Trevor Howard, Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer and Robert Shaw

★ '', a PC flight simulator about the battle

Notes

1. Note: Most notable British historians including A.J.P. Taylor and former Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby use 31 October as the date in which decisive fighting came to an end (Taylor 1974, p. 72.).
2. These were:

★ Poland

★ New Zealand

★ Canada

★ Czechoslovakia

★ Belgium

★ Australia

★ South Africa

★ Free France

★ Ireland

★ United States

★ Jamaica

★ Palestine

★ Rhodesia
3. Bungay 2000, p.107.
4. Note, the RAF fighter strength given is for 0900 1 July 1940, while bomber strength is for 11 July 1940.
5. Bungay 2000, p. 107.
6. Note, the Luftwaffe aircraft strength given is from the Quartermaster General 6th Abteilung numbers for 29 June 1940
7. Bungay 2000, p. 368.
8. Bungay 2000, p. 368.
9. Robinson 2005
10. Taylor 1974, p. 72
11. The Spitfire, an operational history - 2. Into action
 Junkers Ju88 4D+EK
12. .
13. Bungay 2000, p. 11.
14. Bungay 2000, p. 256.
15. Bungay 2000, p. 257.
16. Bungay 2000, p. 258.
17. Deighton 1996
18. Ansell 2005, p. 712-714.
19. Bungay 2000, p. 86.
20. Bungay 2000, p. 260.
21. Bungay 2000, p. 259.
22. Bungay 2000, p. 249.
23. Price 1996
24. Bungay 2000, p. 250.
25. Deighton 1996
26. Bungay 2000, p. 259.
27. Bungay 2000, p. 119.
28. Bungay 2000, p. 119.
29. Bungay 2000, p. 122.
30. Deighton 1996
31. Allen 1974
32. Allen 1974
33. Allen 1974
34. Bungay 2000, p. 90.
35. Bungay 2000, p. 92.
36. Bungay 2000, p. 122.
37. Deighton 1996, p. 182.
38. Deighton 1996, p. 188, 275.
39. Taylor and Saundby, 1974, p74
40. Taylor and Saundby, 1974, p74
41. Taylor and Saundby, 1974, p74
42. Deighton 1996, introduction by A. J. P. Taylor p 12-17, also 172, 285.
43. Bungay 2000, p. 368.
44. Evans 2006
45. Harding 2006a
46. Harding 2006b
47. Speech to the House of Commons on 20 August 1940
48. Deighton 1996, introduction by A. J. P. Taylor p 266-268.
49. ''Battle of Britain Roll of Honour''. RAF website, Ministry of Defence, 20 March 2006. [1] Access date: 4 April 2007.
50. Olson and Cloud, 2003

References

★ Allen, Hubert Raymond. ''Who Won the Battle of Britain?'' London: Arthur Barker, 1974. ISBN 0-213-16489-2.

★ Ansell, Mark. ''Boulton Paul Defiant: Technical Details and History of the Famous British Night Fighter''. Redbourn, Herts, UK: Mushroom Model Publications, 2005. p. 712-714. ISBN 8-389-45019-4.

★ Bishop, Patrick. ''Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940''. New York: Viking, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03230-1); Penguin Books, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-200466-9). As ''Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940''. London: Harper Perennial, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-00-653204-7).

★ Brittain, Vera. ''England's Hour''. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-8264-8031-4); Obscure Press (paperback, ISBN 1-84664-834-3).

★ Bungay, Stephen. ''The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain''. London: Aurum Press 2000. ISBN 1-85410-721-6(hardcover), ISBN 1-85410-801-8(paperback 2002).

★ Churchill, Winston S''. The Second World War - Their Finest Hour (Volume 2)''. London: Cassell, 1949.

★ Craig, Phil and Clayton, Tim. ''Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain''. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-684-86930-6); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-684-86931-4).

★ Deighton, Len. ''. London: Pimlico, 1996. Originally published: London : Jonathan Cape, 1977.) ISBN 0-71267-423-3.

★ Evans, Michael. (2006) "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to... the Navy." ''The Times'', 24 August 2006. [2] Access date: 3 March 2007.

★ Fisher, David E. ''A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain''. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59376-047-7); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 1-59376-116-3).

★ Foreman, John. ''Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And December 1940''. Wythenshawe, Lancashire, UK: Crécy Publishing, 1989. ISBN 1-871187-02-8.

★ Gaskin, Margaret. ''Blitz: The Story of December 29, 1940''. New York: Harcourt, 2006. ISBN 0-15-101404-3.

★ Haining, Peter. ''Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940''. London: Robson Books, 2004. ISBN 1-86105-750-4.

★ Harding, Thomas. (2006a)"It's baloney, say RAF aces". ''The Telegraph'', 24 August 2006. [3] Access date: 3 March 2007.

★ Harding, Thomas. (2006b)"Battle of Britain was won at sea." '' The Telegraph'', 25 August 2006. [4] Access date: 25 August 2006.

★ Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Fight for the Sky: Stories of Wartime Fighter Pilots.'' Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1986. ISBN 0-85059-749-8.

★ Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Fighter Pilots in World War II: True Stories of Frontline Air Combat (paperback)''. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2004. ISBN 1-84415-065-8.

★ Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Action Stations: Military Airfields of Greater London v. 8 (hardcover)''. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1984. ISBN 0-85039-885-1.

★ Hough, Richard. ''The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II''. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02766-X); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-30734-4).

★ James, T.C.G. ''The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 2)''. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5123-0; paperback, ISBN 0-7146-8149-0).

★ James, T.C.G. ''Growth of Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 1)''. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5118-4).

★ James, T.C.G. ''Night Air Defence During the Blitz''. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5166-4).

★ Olson, Lynne and Cloud, Stanley. ''A Question of Honor. The Kosciuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II''. New York: Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0-37541-197-6.

★ Overy, Richard. ''The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality''. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02008-8); 2002 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-32297-1).

★ Parry, Simon W. ''Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's Night Intruder Force, the Fernnachtjager''. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1989. ISBN 0-904811-07-7.

★ Price, Alfred. ''Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of the Aces 12)''. London: Osprey Books, 1996, (paperback, ISBN 1-85532-627-2) [5].

★ Ray, John Philip. ''The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory 1940''. London: Cassel & Co., 2001. ISBN 0-304-35677-8.

★ Ray, John Philip. ''The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War''. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85409-229-4); London: Orion Publishing, 1996 (paperback, ISBN 1-85409-345-2).

★ Robinson, Derek. ''Invasion, 1940: Did the Battle of Britain Alone Stop Hitler?'' New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005. ISBN 0-7867-1618-5.

★ Taylor, A.J.P. and Mayer, S.L., eds. ''A History Of World War Two''. London: Octopus Books, 1974. ISBN 0-70640-399-1.

★ Townsend, Peter. ''Duel of Eagles (new edition)''. London: Phoenix, 2000. ISBN 1-84212-211-8.

★ Wellum, Geoffrey. ''First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man in the War-Torn Skies Above Britain''. New York: Viking Books, 2002 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-91248-4); Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-471-42627-X); London: Penguin Books, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-100814-8).

External links

★ Battle Of Britain

★ Royal Air Force history

★ British Invasion Defences

★ Map of UK Airfields and squadrons.

★ RAF Battle of Britain Roll of Honour

★ Battle-Of-Britain Website.

★ Battle-Of-Britain Website in Dutch.

★ Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (airfield repair)

★ Battle of Britain Memorial