:''For the Baker Plan instituted to ease Third World Debt see
Baker Plan (debt relief)''.
The 'Baker Plan' (formal name, 'Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara') is a
United Nations initiative to grant
Western Sahara self-determination. It was intended to substitute the
Settlement Plan of 1991, which had been further detailed in the
Houston Agreement of 1997.
Background
Western Sahara's administration by
Morocco since 1975 is challenged by
Polisario guerillas living in exile in neighbouring
Algeria. Since 1991 a cease-fire is in place, accepted by both parties under the assumption that the UN would organize a referendum on independence. The 1991 referendum plan was however stalled due to disagreements on voter eligibility (Morocco demanding the inclusion of all people now living in the territory, while the Polisario front insisted on including only those found in the last Spanish census, from 1974, and their descendants) and by the late nineties Morocco was openly declaring the referendum a "dead option".
Baker I & II
The first version of the plan, called 'Baker I' or the 'Framework Agreement', was delivered by UN special envoy
James Baker in 2000. It was meant to give the people of Western Sahara self-determination through a large autonomy within the Moroccan state. Except for defense and foreign policy, all other capacities would be in the responsibility of a local government. Morocco accepted the plan while Algeria and the Polisario front rejected it. Algeria even countered by proposing that the territory be divided between the parties
[1].
The second version ('Baker II') was aimed at instituting Saharan self-rule in a "
Western Sahara Authority" for a period of five years, whereafter the referendum is to be held, with all the population of Western Sahara allowed to vote. The provision that the "
Western Sahara Authority" would be elected only by a restricted voters' list alienated Morocco. After initial hesitations, Algeria and the Polisario accepted the plan, especially after Morocco rejected it. The UN Security Council then endorsed the plan in July 2003, which it had not done with Baker's first draft, and unanimously called on the parties to implement it.
The rejection of the Baker II plan by Morocco and the Baker I plan by Algeria and the Polisario front, prompted Baker to resign, the second UN envoy to Western Sahara to do so, claiming there was no longer any feasible way to implement the peace agreement provisions. He has since then stated that Morocco showed no interest in implementing the UN decisions and will not do so if it stands a chance to lose in the referendum.
Western Sahara Authority
The 'Western Sahara Authority' (WSA) would have been the theoretical governing body for the territory of
Western Sahara. Under
James Baker III's 2003 Peace Plan, the WSA would dismantle the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an aspirant
sovereign entity over the region, and replace it with an
autonomous body under
Moroccan sovereignty during a five-year transitional period.
After this time, the
Saharan population, including both native
Sahrawis,
Tindouf refugees, Sahrawis from Southern Morocco and other Moroccans, would hold a
referendum on independence: if they voted in favor, the WSA would be dismantled, and the SADR would take its place as an internationally-recognized sovereign entity. If they voted for integration, either the WSA would continue to administer the territory, or it would be fully integrated into the other
Moroccan provinces.
Status of the plan
Since early 2005, the UN
Secretary General stopped referring to the plan in his reports, and by now it seems largely dead. No replacement plan exists, however, and worries persist that the political vacuum will result in renewed fighting. Morocco has proposed autonomy for the territory as a final solution to the conflict.
External links
★
Jacob Mundy ''"Seized of the Matter". The UN and the Western Sahara Dispute'' (PDF)
★
MERIP: Toby Shelley ''Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara''
★
The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair U.S. Institute of Peace Report, July 2006