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In voting systems, 'Arrow’s impossibility theorem', or 'Arrow’s paradox', demonstrates that no voting system based on ranked preferences can possibly meet a certain set of reasonable criteria when there are three or more options to choose from. These criteria are called ''unrestricted domain'', ''non-imposition'', ''non-dictatorship'', ''monotonicity'', and ''independence of irrelevant alternatives''.
The theorem is named after economist Kenneth Arrow, who demonstrated the theorem in his Ph.D. thesis and popularized it in his 1951 book ''Social Choice and Individual Values''. The original paper was entitled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare". ^[1] Arrow was a co-recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics.

Contents

Statement of the theorem

Formal statement of the theorem

Interpretations of the theorem

Other possibilities

Scalar rankings from a vector of attributes and the IIA property

References

See also

External links

Statement of the theorem

The need to aggregate preferences occurs in many different disciplines: in welfare economics, where one attempts to find an economic outcome which would be acceptable and stable; in decision making, where a person has to make a rational choice based on several criteria; and most naturally in voting systems, which are mechanisms for extracting a decision from a multitude of voters' preferences.
The framework for Arrow's theorem assumes that we need to extract a preference order on a given set of options (outcomes). Each individual in the society (or equivalently, each decision criterion) gives a particular order of preferences on the set of outcomes. We are searching for a preferential voting system, called a ''social welfare function'', which transforms the set of preferences into a single global societal preference order. The theorem considers the following properties, assumed to be reasonable requirements of a fair voting method:

★ 'non-dictatorship': the social welfare function should account for the wishes of multiple voters. It can't simply mimic the preferences of a single voter.

★ 'unrestricted domain' or 'universality': the social welfare function should account for all preferences among all voters to yield a unique and complete ranking of societal choices. Thus, the voting mechanism must account for all individual preferences, it must do so in a manner that results in a complete ranking of preferences for society, and it must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters' preferences are presented the same way.

★ 'independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA): the social welfare function should provide the same ranking of preferences among a subset of options as it would for a complete set of options. Changes in individuals' rankings of ''irrelevant'' alternatives (ones outside the subset) should have no impact on the societal ranking of the ''relevant'' subset.

★ 'positive association of social and individual values' or 'monotonicity': if any individual modifies his or her preference order by promoting a certain option, then the societal preference order should respond only by promoting that same option or not changing, never by placing it lower than before. An individual should not be able to hurt an option by ranking it ''higher''.

★ 'non-imposition' or 'citizen sovereignty': every possible societal preference order should be achievable by some set of individual preference orders. This means that the social welfare function is onto: It has an unrestricted target space.
Arrow's theorem says that if the decision-making body has at least two members and at least three options to decide among, then it is impossible to design a social welfare function that satisfies all these conditions at once.
A later (1963) version of Arrow's theorem can be obtained by replacing the monotonicity and non-imposition criteria with:

★ 'Pareto efficiency': if every individual prefers a certain option to another, then so must the resulting societal preference order. This, again, is a demand that the social welfare function will be minimally sensitive to the preference profile.
This version of the theorem is stronger—has weaker conditions—since monotonicity, non-imposition, and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply Pareto efficiency, whereas Pareto efficiency, non-imposition, and independence of irrelevant alternatives together do not imply monotonicity.

Formal statement of the theorem

Let $mathrm\{A\}$ be a set of 'outcomes', $mathrm\{N\}$ a number of 'voters' or 'decision criteria'. We shall denote the set of all full linear orderings of $mathrm\{A\}$ by $mathrm\{L(A)\}$ (this set is equivalent to the set $mathrm\{S\_$} of permutations on the elements of $mathrm\{A\}$).
A (strict) 'social welfare function' is a function
$F\; :\; mathrm\{L(A)\}^N\; o\; mathrm\{L(A)\}$
which aggregates voters' preferences into a single preference order on $mathrm\{A\}$. The $mathrm\{N\}$-tuple $(R\_1,\; ldots,\; R\_N)$ of voter's preferences is called a ''preference profile''. In its strongest and most simple form, Arrow's impossibility theorem states that whenever the set $mathrm\{A\}$ of possible alternatives has more than 2 elements, then the following three conditions become incompatible:
; 'unanimity', or 'Pareto efficiency': If alternative 'a' is ranked above 'b' for all orderings $R\_1\; ,\; ldots,\; R\_N$ , then 'a' is ranked higher than 'b' by $F(R\_1,\; R\_2,\; ldots,\; R\_N)$. (Note that unanimity implies non-imposition).
; non-dictatorship: There is no individual ''i'' whose preferences always prevail. That is, there is no $i\; in\; \{1,\; ldots,N\}$ such that .
; 'independence of irrelevant alternatives': For two preference profiles $(R\_1,\; ldots,\; R\_N)$ and $(S\_1,\; ldots,\; S\_N)$ such that for all individuals ''i'', alternatives 'a' and 'b' have the same order in $R\_i$ as in $S\_i$, alternatives 'a' and 'b' have the same order in $F(R\_1,R\_2,\; ldots,\; R\_N)$ as in $F(S\_1,S\_2,\; ldots,\; S\_N)$.

Interpretations of the theorem

Arrow's theorem is a mathematical result, but it is often expressed in a non-mathematical way with a statement such as ''"No voting method is fair"'', ''"Every ranked voting method is flawed"'', or ''"The only voting method that isn't flawed is a dictatorship"''. These statements are simplifications of Arrow's result which are not universally considered to be true. What Arrow's theorem does state is that a voting mechanism cannot comply with all of the conditions given above simultaneously.
Arrow did use the term "fair" to refer to his criteria. Indeed, Pareto efficiency, as well as the demand for non-imposition, seems trivial. As for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)—suppose Chris, Bill and Agnes are running for office, and suppose Agnes has a clear advantage. Now suppose a new candidate, Dave, enters the race, and Dave's candidacy is ranked last by every voter. In this case Dave is termed an irrelevant alternative according to Arrow's criteria. Arrow suggests that Dave's candidacy should not change the result so that now Bill, and not Agnes, would win the race. This would seem ''"unfair"'' by many. And yet it can happen in some balloting systems (often when, as in this example, Dave is similar in his political message to Agnes), and Arrow's theorem states that these "unfair" situations cannot be avoided in general, without relaxing some other criterion. Something has to give. So the important question to be asked, in light of Arrow's theorem is: which condition should be relaxed?
Various theorists have suggested weakening the IIA criterion as a way out of the paradox. Proponents of ranked voting methods contend that the IIA is an unreasonably strong criterion, which actually does not hold in most real-life situations. Indeed, the IIA criterion is the one breached in most useful voting systems.
Advocates of this position point out that failure of the standard IIAC is trivially implied by the possibility of cyclic preferences. If voters cast ballots as follows...
7 votes for A > B > C

6 votes for B > C > A

5 votes for C > A > B
...then the net preference of the group is that A wins over B, B wins over C, and C wins over A. In this circumstance, ''any'' system that picks a unique winner, and satisfies the very basic majoritarian rule that a candidate who receives a majority of all first-choice votes must win the election, will fail IIAC. Without loss of generality, consider that if a system currently picks A, and B drops out of the race, the remaining votes will be:
7 votes for A > C

11 votes for C > A
Thus, C will win, even though the change (B dropping out) concerned an "irrelevant" alternative candidate who did not win in the original circumstance.
So, what Arrow's theorem really shows is that voting is a non-trivial game, and that game theory should be used to predict the outcome of most voting mechanisms. This could be seen as a discouraging result, because a game need not have efficient equilibria, ''e.g.'', a ballot could result in an alternative nobody really wanted in the first place, yet everybody voted for.

Other possibilities

The preceding discussion assumes that the "correct" way to deal with Arrow's paradox is to eliminate (or weaken) one of the criteria. The IIA criterion is the most natural candidate. Yet there are other "ways out".
Duncan Black has shown that if there is only one agenda by which the preferences are judged, then all of Arrow's axioms are met by the majority rule. Formally, this means that if we properly restrict the domain of the social welfare function, then all is well. Black's restriction, the ''"single-peaked preference"'' principle, states that there is some predetermined linear ordering 'P' of the alternative set. Every voter has some special place he likes best along that line, and his dislike for an alternative grows larger as the alternative goes further away from that spot.
Indeed, many different social welfare functions can meet Arrow's conditions under such restrictions of the domain. It has been proved, however, that under any such restriction, if there exists any social welfare function that adheres to Arrow's criteria, then the majority rule will adhere to Arrow's criteria.^[2] Under single-peaked preferences, then, the ''majority rule'' is in some respects the most natural voting mechanism.
Another common way "around" the paradox is limiting the alternative set to two alternatives. Thus, whenever more than two alternatives should be put to the test, it seems very tempting to use a mechanism that pairs them and votes by pairs. As tempting as this mechanism seems at first glance, it is generally far from meeting even the Pareto principle, not to mention IIA. The specific order by which the pairs are decided strongly influences the outcome. This is not necessarily a bad feature of the mechanism. Many sports use the tournament mechanism—essentially a pairing mechanism—to choose a winner. This gives considerable opportunity for weaker teams to win, thus adding interest and tension throughout the tournament. In effect, the mechanism by which the choices are limited to two candidates is best considered as a part of the balloting system, and hence Arrow's theorem applies.
There has developed an entire literature following from Arrow's original work which finds other impossibilities as well as some possibility results. For example, if we weaken the requirement that the social choice rule must create a social preference ordering which satisfies transitivity and instead only require acyclicity (if a is preferred to b, and b is preferred to c, then it is not the case that c is preferred to a) there do exist social choice rules which satisfy Arrow's requirements.
Economist and Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen has suggested at least two other alternatives. He has offered both relaxation of transitivity and removal of the Pareto principle. He has shown the existence of voting mechanisms which comply with all of Arrow's criteria, but supply only semi-transitive results.
Also, he has demonstrated another interesting impossibility result, known as the "impossibility of the Paretian Liberal". (See Liberal paradox for details). Sen went on to argue that this demonstrates the futility of demanding Pareto optimality in relation to voting mechanisms.
Finally, the balloting method of approval voting avoids Arrow's theorem because it is not a ranked preference system. Even if each voter has an individual ranked preference order, the balloting system only expresses a single factor, the line between the approved and disapproved candidates.

Scalar rankings from a vector of attributes and the IIA property

The reason that the IIA property might not be realistically satisfied in human decision-making of any complexity is twofold: 1) the ''scalar'' preference ranking is derived from the weighting—not usually explicit—of a ''vector'' of attributes (one book dealing with the Arrow theorem invites the reader to consider the related problem of creating a scalar measure for the track and field decathlon event—e.g. how does one make scoring 600 points in the discus event "commensurable" with scoring 600 points in the 1500 m race) and 2) a ''new'' option can "focus the attention" on a ''different'' attribute or set of attributes, changing the tacit weighting and thus the resultant scalar ranking for the ''previous'' options. For example, suppose one were offered jobs in Montreal and Vancouver, B.C. and decided that (the jobs being considered equal) one preferred Montreal based on a more lively night life; but then one was also offered a job in Winnipeg and this reminded one — the winters in Winnipeg being harsh — that the winters in Montreal are far more severe than in Vancouver, causing one to choose Vancouver on the basis of a milder climate. (Edward MacNeal discusses the instability of a scalar ranking of "most livable city" with regard to different weighting of a vector of criteria in the chapter "Surveys" of his book ''Mathsemantics: making numbers talk sense'', 1994.) Herbert Simon has noted that studies which appear to show that political campaigns are relatively ineffective in indoctrinating voters with ''new'' ideas may be missing the point — political campaigns can be quite effective in focusing voter's attention on a certain set of issues of which they already have some awareness, and hence convincing the voter that these are ''the'' issues on which the election should be decided.

References

1. Arrow, K.J., "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", ''Journal of Political Economy'' '58'(4) (August, 1950), pp. 328–346.
2. Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S., "A simple characterization of majority rule", ''Economic Theory'' '15' (2000), pp. 689–700.


★ ''Why flip a coin? : the art and science of good decisions'' by Harold W. Lewis, John Wiley, 1997. Very readable. Gives explicit examples of preference rankings and apparently anomalous results under different voting systems. States but does not prove Arrow's theorem. ISBN 0-471-29645-7

See also

★ Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

★ Holmstrom's theorem

★ Majority alternative

★ Voting paradox

★ May's theorem

★ Liberal paradox

External links

★ Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

★ [ftp://weber.ucsd.edu/pub/econlib/dpapers/ucsd9925.pdf A Pedagogical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem]

★ The connection between Arrow’s theorem and the Condorcet paradox

★ Arrovian juntas