The 'Annan Plan' was a
United Nations proposal to settle the
Cyprus dispute of the divided island nation of
Cyprus as the 'United Cyprus Republic'. It was named in recognition of the then
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who largely devised the proposal in conjunction with
Didier Pfirter.
Proposal
Proposed flag of the United Cyprus Republic
The
5th revision of the Annan Plan proposed the creation of the
United Cyprus Republic, covering the island of Cyprus in its entirety except for the British
Sovereign Base Areas. This new
country was to be a loose
confederation of two
component states — the
Greek Cypriot State and the
Turkish Cypriot State — joined together by a minimal federal government apparatus.
This federal level, loosely based on the
Swiss confederal model, would have incorporated the following elements:
★ A collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated according to population (per present levels, four
Greek Cypriots and two
Turkish Cypriots), and selected and voted in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1.
★ A President and Vice President, chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members, one from each community, to alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council's five-year term of office.
★ A
bicameral legislature:
★
★ A
Senate (upper house), with 48 members, divided 24:24 between the two communities.
★
★ A
Chamber of Deputies (lower house), with 48 members, divided in proportion to the two communities' populations (with no fewer than 12 for the smaller community).
★ A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges; to be appointed by the Presidential Council.
The plan included a
federal constitution, constitutions for each constituent state, a string of constitutional and federal laws, and a proposal for a United Cyprus Republic flag and a
national anthem. It also provided for a Reconciliation Commission to bring the two communities closer together and resolve outstanding disputes from the past.
It would also have established a limited
right to return between the territories of the two communities, and it would have allowed both
Greece and
Turkey to maintain a permanent military presence on the island, albeit with large, phased reductions in troop numbers.
Negotiations
In
January 2002, direct talks under the auspices of Kofi Annan began between the
Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Leader
Rauf Denktaş.
In
November 2002, Kofi Annan released a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It was revised in early December. In the lead up to the
European Union (EU)'s
December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, intensive efforts were made to gain both sides' signatures to the document prior to a decision on the island's EU membership. Neither side agreed to sign. The EU invited the Republic of Cyprus to join on
16 December 2002.
Following the Copenhagen Summit, the UN continued dialogue with the two sides with the goal of reaching a settlement prior to Cyprus's signature of the EU accession treaty on
16 April 2003. A third version of the Annan plan was put to the parties in
February 2003. That same month the Annan again visited the island and asked that both leaders agree to put the plan to referendum in their respective communities. Also in February 2003,
Tassos Papadopoulos was
elected as the fifth president of the Republic of Cyprus. On
10 March 2003, this most recent phase of talks collapsed in
The Hague,
Netherlands, when Denktaş told the Secretary-General he would not put the Annan Plan to
referendum. "The plan was unacceptable for us. This was not a plan we would ask our people to vote for," Mr Denktaş said. The UN plan had undergone several revisions in an attempt to win support. It was the Turkish Cypriot side which refused to even talk further, and which was blamed for the failure of the peace
process
In
February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktaş accepted Kofi Annan's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on
19 February 2004. The two community leaders, Rauf Denktaş and Tassos Papadopoulos, met nearly every day for negotiations facilitated by
Álvaro de Soto, Secretary General's Special Adviser for Cyprus. In addition, numerous technical committees and subcommittees met in parallel in an effort to resolve outstanding issues. When this stage of the talks failed to reach an agreed settlement Rauf Denktaş refused to attend the next stage of meetings which were scheduled to take place in Bόrgenstock on
March 24,
2004 and sent the then prime minister
Mehmet Ali Talat (who later became Denktaş' successor as President) and his son
Serdar Denktaş (who later served as deputy prime minister). The talks collapsed and no negotiated agreement was reached by the two communities. Annan then stepped in as arbitrator and on
31 March presented to the two sides a proposed final settlement. Rauf Denktaş rejected Annan's proposal immediately and Tassos Papadopoulos rejected the plan a week later while Mehmet Ali Talat supported it.
Referendum
Main articles: 2004 Annan Plan Referendum
The plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum of
24 April 2004. Whilst the proposal received a 65% favorable vote from the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it by over 75%. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, reunification did not take place. Had there been a positive vote on both sides, a unified Cyprus would have acceded to the
European Union on
1 May 2004.
Reasons for approval by the Turkish Cypriots
★ Reunification was desired for economic reasons.
★ Many Turkish Cypriots no longer perceived the Greek Cypriots as a threat, especially in the light of the strictly bi-zonal proposition of the Annan plan.
★ Turkish Cypriots would receive considerable constitutional power in the United Cyprus Republic that the Annan plan proposed, over-proportional to their percentage of the population.
★ The Turkish Cypriot component state would still, even after territorial cession of some areas to the Greek Cypriot component state, make up 28.5 percent of the total area of Cyprus, including large economically important areas that were inhabited exclusively by Greek Cypriots prior to the division of Cyprus in 1974.
★ The right of return of Greek Cypriots to their homes in the areas coming under the control of the Turkish Cypriot component state would be strictly limited if not, in some cases, forbidden, thus the possibility of Turkish Cypriots becoming a minority in their respective component state would not exist.
★ The guarantor states for the Constitution of Cyprus would retain their powers as such, thus Turkey would still arguably have the right to intervene in Cypriot affairs, most definitely on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots and vice versa.
★ Due to the embargoes against the north of Cyprus, many Turkish Cypriots have emigrated and depopulation of the Turkish areas has occurred. Allowing Turkish citizens who had settled in Cyprus to remain would help balance the perceived injustice. The issue of settlers is a high emotive issue in Greek Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriot government quoting figures of over 100,000 settlers. The Oslo peace center studied the number of Turkish citizens in the north, and after removing transients (i.e Turkish troops, support staff, migrant workers, students), and Turks with legitimate links to Cyprus (i.e. those with Cypriot family) they estimated 37,000 Turks reside on the island.
http://www.prio.no/page/Project_detail/Staff_alpha_ALL/9244/46918.html
★ The Annan plan did not attribute blame, Turkey was not blamed or punished for the invasion in 1974 nor was the Greek side blamed and punished for 74 when the Greek side broke the constitution.
★ The Annan plan was backed by Turkey, Greece, the EU, the US, and the UN.
Reasons for rejection by the Greek Cypriots
★ The
Ethnic groups in Cyprus are Greek 77%, Turkish 18%, other 5% of the population. (2001) The Annan plan equates the representation of the two major ethnic groups in the proposed
Senate and in the
Supreme Court giving 50-50 representation to the two communities. The majority becomes a minority in important decision centres.
[1]
★ The plan created a
confederation even though it utilized the term "
federation" because there was no hierarchy of laws, while central authority emanated from the so-called component states. Note that the
United States abandoned its original
confederal structure because it was unworkable, whereas this structure is successfully implemented in Switzerland. In 1789, a
federal constitution was established containing a clear federal supremacy clause. The
Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot (77% of population) and Turkish Cypriot judges(18% of population), plus three
foreign judges; thus foreign actors would cast deciding votes.
[2]
★ The Plan did not include a settlement regarding the repatriation of
Turkish settlers living on Greek Cypriot owned land in the '
Northern Cyprus', while after 19 years, the possibility of abolishing the derogation of 5% of
Greeks and Turkish citizens who could settle in Cyprus, is obvious, and the danger of a permanent mass settling of Cyprus by Turkey is visible.
★ Nearly all the Turkish
settlers would be granted
citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. The central government would have limited control towards future Turkish
Immigration. Those
settlers opting to return to Turkey would be compensated by
Cyprus and
Greek Cypriots. Even though
Turkey systematically brought in the
settlers to alter the demography of the
island, it had no responsibility for their
Repatriation.
★ The Plan simply disregarded the plain language and clear meaning of the
Geneva Convention of 1949, section III, article 49, which prohibits
colonization by an
occupying power. Article 49 states in its last paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."
★ The Plan did not deal in full with the issue of
demilitarisation of the legally invalid 'TRNC', and
Greek Cypriots felt they had no reason to believe Turkish promises concerning the withdrawal of
troops.
★
Cyprus would be excluded from the
European Common Defense and Foreign Policy, while
Turkish troops would remain in
Cyprus even after the accession of
Turkey to the
EU with intervention rights, (a military
invasion - occasionally used
euphemistically), in the future Greek Cypriot component state.
★ Many
Greek Cypriots interpreted the Right of Return policy as seriously flawed, meaning only 20% of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return over a time frame of 25 years, whereas
Turkish Cypriots would have had full right of return. The plan denied to all Cypriots rights enjoyed by all other
EU citizens (right of free movement and residence, the right to apply to work in any position (including national
civil services, the
right to vote).
[3]
★
Turkish Cypriots would have gained all the basic demands it made, from the first day of the implementation of the solution. To be exact, 24 hours after the holding of the
referendum. In contrast, everything that the
Greek Cypriots were aspiring to achieve, would have postponed without guarantees and depend upon the
good will of
Turkey to fulfil the obligations it undertakes. They are also subject to the precondition that all would have gone well.
★ The return of the
Turkish occupied land will take place in the period between three and a half months and three and a half years from the moment the solution is signed with no guarantees whatsoever that this shall be implemented. The Cypriot-Greek proposal of placing these areas under the control of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and not the
Turkish army has been rejected.
★ The Plan did not address the issue of the
British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) on the island, although parts of the SBAs would be transferred to the governments of the two constituent states.
★ The British were granted rights to
unilaterally define the
continental shelf and
territorial waters along two base areas and to claim potential
mineral rights. Under the 1959-1960 London Zurich agreements,
Britain did not have such rights (see the 2nd annex to the Additional Protocol to the 1959 Treaty of Establishment).
★ The plan absolved
Turkey of all responsibility for its
invasion of Cyprus and its
murders rapes,
destruction of property and
churches,
looting and forcing approximately 200,000
Greek Cypriots from their homes and property. The
Cyprus government filed applications to the
European Commission on
Human Rights on September 17, 1974 and on March 21, 1975. The Commission issued its report on the charges made in the two applications on July 10, 1976. In it the Commission found
Turkey guilty of violating the following articles of the European Convention on Human Rights:
:# Article 2 - by the killing of innocent civilians committed on a substantial scale;
:# Article 3 - by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71;
:# Article 3 - by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons detained;
:# Article 5 - by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees and missing persons - a continuing violation;
:# Article 8 - by displacement of persons creating more than 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and be refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes.
★ The plan failed to provide payment by Turkey:
:# for the lives of innocent civilians killed by the Turkish army;
:# for the victims of rape by the Turkish army;
:# for the vast destruction of property and churches by the Turkish army; and
:# for the substantial looting by the Turkish army.
★ The Plan subverted the property rights of the Greek Cypriots and other legal owners of property in the occupied area:
★
★ by prohibiting recourse to European courts on property issues;
★
★ by withdrawing all pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights and transferring them to local courts;
★
★ by allowing Turkish Cypriots and illegal mainland
Turk settlers/colonists to keep
Greek Cypriot homes and property they were illegally given following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and not having to
reimburse the rightful owners of the property for 30 years of illegal
use;
★
★ by a highly complicated,
ambiguous and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and which is based on the principle that real property owners can ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the
European Convention on Human Rights and
international law. The
Greek Cypriot property owners would have to be reimbursed by the to be federal treasury which would be
funded overwhelmingly by the Greek Cypriots, meaning that Greek Cypriots would be reimbursing themselves.
★ The Plan would have the effect of protecting those
British citizens who illegally bought
Greek Cypriot property from
settlers or persons who are not owners; in the occupied north of
Cyprus. They would, in effect, not be held responsible for their illegal action.
★ The cost of economic reunification would be borne by the
Greek Cypriots. The reunification cost has been estimated close to $20b
[3]
★ Following Annan 5 plan the
Greek Cypriots would not have been allowed to make up more than 6% of the population in any single village in the Turkish controlled areas in the north thus they would have been prevented from setting up their own schools for their children and would not have even been able to give birth once this
quota was reached.
According to UN 260 resolution
Genocide is:
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
★ The agreement places time restrictions in the right of free, permanent installation of Greek Cypriots back to their homes and properties in the to be Turkish Cypriot state, which constitutes a deviation from the
European Union practices. Those
Greek Cypriot refugees that would return to their homes in regions under Turkish Cypriot administration would have no local
civil rights, because the political representatives of
Turkish Cypriot state would be elected only from
Turkish Cypriots.
[5]
★ The functional weaknesses of the Plan endanger,
inter alia, the smooth activity and participation of
Cyprus, with one voice, in the
European Union. While the
Greek Cypriots have with many sacrifices achieved
Cyprus accession to the
European Union, the
Greek Cypriots could very easily be led to the ''neutralization'' of the accession until the adoption of all necessary
federal and regional legal measures or the loss of the benefits of the accession or the facing of obstacles in
Cyprus participation in the
Economic and Monetary Union and other European institutions.
★ The
Economy of Cyprus would have been separate with the plan. There will be no common
Monetary policy,
fiscal policy and no investments by
Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
★ Many Greek-Cypriots felt that the demand that the Cyprus issue be resolved before Cyprus' entry to the EU was so that the reunification would not have to contain elements of European law which were incompatible with certain provisions in the Annan Plan. This was further backed up by many who demanded the EU accept all derogations even if they violate European Court Decisions, European Law and UN Security Council Resolutions. Both
Romano Prodi and
Günter Verheugen repeatedly indicated that any such derogations should only be for a short period of time and should not violate any European Laws.
[6]
Recent developments
(1) On
6 April 2005 the
European Court of Human Rights decided that,
"even the adoption of the plan would not have afforded immediate redress" of the Greek Cypriots property rights.
Admissibility of Application no. 46347/99 by Myra XENIDES-ARESTIS against Turkey
Loukis Loukaides the Cypriot judge on the European Court of Human Rights, has since called on the Greek Cypriot political leaders to stop backing the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations, because its basic philosophy violates fundamental human rights and the EU acquis. (Cyprus Weekly 15 April 2005)
He recommends the following action be taken:
1 - The drafting of an official information bulletin on the violation of the EU acquis by the Annan Plan.
2 - To declare clearly that the Plan is incompatible with the European Human Rights Charter and other International Human Rights Treaties, which are already binding on us and also as a result of our EU accession.
3 - To cease at last to refer to the Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement, or negotiations. So long as this continues, foreign officials and organisations that could assist us achieve a good settlement, will not do so.
Also, a constitutional advisor to the
Cyprus Government, Claire Palley, revealed in a book she had written (''An International Relations Debacle: The Un Secretary-general's Mission Of Good Offices In Cyprus 1999-2004''), that Kofi Annan and his staff misled the public in regards to the plan and that in her opinion, the plan represented nothing more than a one sided bow to Turkish wishes while sidelining legitimate Greek-Cypriot concerns over the plan. For example, she points out that the now famous 11 points by Turkish Ambassador Ziyal that ''were virtually incorporated in Annan 5'', and that the US and the UK promoted the plan ''by threat, disinformation, by violating cardinal rules of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and European law.''
[7]
See also
★
2004 Annan Plan Referendum
★
Cypriot refugees
References
1. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 25)
2. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 11)
3. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 13)
4. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 13)
5. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 10)
6. ''The Case Against the Annan Plan'', Coufoudakis and Kyriakides (page 9)
7. ''An International Relations Debacle: The Un Secretary-general's Mission Of Good Offices In Cyprus 1999-2004'', Claire Palley
Sources
★ "Negotiations" section adapted from
public domain U.S. State Department background note on Cyprus, April 2004
★ Supplementary material based on:
★
★
Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, dated 7 June, which circulated as an official document of the U.N. Security Council
★
★
Legal Issues arising from certain population transfers and displacements on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus in the period since 20 July 1974
★
★
Address to Cypriots by President Papadopoulos (FULL TEXT)
★
★
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Cyprus
External links
★
The Annan Plan: full text and additional information from the United Nations
★
Cyprus Decides: a bipartisan information resource about the Plan
★
The Republic of Cyprus: press and information offce
★
The BBC report on the plan
★
Annan Plan: The "known-unknown" behind the scenes facts: Very well documented site with information for and against the Annan Plan with many rare and unknown documents
★
The “Yes” and the “No” Votes: An Explanation.
★
Cypriots split over UN plan.
★
Still torn
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