ÁLVARO URIBE

'Álvaro Uribe Vélez' (born July 4, 1952) is the 56th President of Colombia, whose first term ran from 2002 to 2006 and is currently serving his second term from 2006 to 2010. He is a lawyer, educated at the University of Antioquia, with a specialization in administration and management from Harvard University.
He is married to Lina Moreno de Uribe and has two sons, Tomás and Jerónimo.

Early life and education

Álvaro Uribe is the first of five children born to Alberto Uribe Sierra, a wealthy landowner and cattle rancher, and Laura Vélez, a former councilwoman. The Vélez family was related to the Ochoa family clan, some of whose members were part of the Medellin cartel. When Uribe was ten, his family moved to Medellín from their Salgar ranch. He studied in Jesuit and Benedictine schools, graduating in 1970 from the Jorge Robledo Institute, where his academic performance exempted him from all final exams during the last two years of school.
Uribe studied at the University of Antioquia, earning a law degree in 1977, and became a member of the Colombian Liberal Party's "Liberal Youth" wing there. He was awarded a scholarship for excellence during his time at university.
In 1993 he finished a specialization in administration and management at Harvard University, where he also attended a conflict negotiation course. From 1998 to 2000, he studied at at St Antony's College, Oxford University in England, on a British Council Simón Bolívar scholarship.

Political career

In 1976 Uribe was Chief of Assets for the Public Enterprises of Medellín (''Empresas Públicas de Medellín''). He served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Labor under Alfonso López Michelsen from 1977 to 1978. During this time he married Lina Moreno, a philosopher from Medellín. President Julio César Turbay named him Director of Civil Aviation from 1980 to 1982. He left this position to become Mayor of Medellín in 1982, serving for five months.
Uribe's father was assassinated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas during a 1983 kidnapping attempt.^[1]^[2] Álvaro Uribe sold most of his inherited rural properties and concentrated on his political career as a member of the Colombian Liberal Party. He served on the city council between 1984 and 1986.

Senator of Antioquia

Uribe was elected one of Antioquia's senators from 1986 to 1990 and again from 1990 to 1994. As senator, he served as president of the Seventh Commission and he supported laws dealing with reform of pensions, labor and social security, as well as promotion of administrative careers, cooperative banking, black sugar, and protection for women. Some of the legislation later drew criticism, in particular that which reduced the state's responsibility for social security. During his later term he received official and unofficial awards as one of the "best senators" (1990, 1992 and 1993) and as the senator with the "best legislative initiatives" (1992).^[3]

Governor of Antioquia

He was elected governor of the department of Antioquia for the 1995 to 1997 term. During his term, Uribe put in practice what he termed the model for a communitarian state, where in theory citizens would participate in the administration's decision making. It was claimed that this model would help improve employment, education, administrative transparency and public security.
According to statistics provided by the governor's office and contemporary analysts, his governorship would reduce bureaucracy, create places for school students, strengthen the infrastructure, and the kidnapping rate fell dramatically. It is claimed that 1,200,000 poor people entered the subsidized health system.

CONVIVIR

Within his jurisdiction, Governor Uribe openly supported a national program of cooperative neighborhood watch groups that became known as CONVIVIR, which had been created by a February 11 1994 decree of Colombia's Ministry of Defense. The groups quickly became controversial – while some reportedly improved security in communities and intelligence coordination with the military, many members apparently abused civilians, without serious oversight of their operations. In 1998, Human Rights Watch stated: "we have received credible information that indicated that the CONVIVIR groups of the Middle Magdalena and of the southern Cesar regions were directed by known paramilitaries and had threatened to assassinate Colombians that were considered as guerrilla sympathizers or which rejected joining the cooperative groups".^[4]
After much political debate, in November 1997 the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled that CONVIVIR members could not gather intelligence information or use military-grade weapons; other restrictions included more legal supervision. 237 restricted weapons were returned to authorities by the end of 1997. In early 1998, dozens of groups had their licenses revoked because they did not turn in their weapons or information about their personnel. Due to these measures, some gradually turned in weapons and phased themselves out. Other members did not comply and later joined paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).^[5]

International awards

In May 2007, the American Jewish Committee gave Uribe its “Light Unto The Nations” award. AJC President E. Robert Goodkind, who presented the award at AJC’s Annual Dinner, held at the National Building Museum in Washington stated: “''President Uribe is a staunch ally of the United States, a good friend of Israel and the Jewish people, and is a firm believer in human dignity and human development in Colombia and the Americas''”.^[6]

2002 presidential election

'Álvaro Uribe''s Presidential campaign poster. The slogan reads "Firm hand, big heart."

Uribe ran as an independent liberal candidate, having unofficially separated from his former party. His electoral platform centered on confronting Colombia's main guerrilla movement, the FARC. Other relevant propositions included slashing the national administration's expenses, fighting corruption and a national referendum to resolve several of the country's political and economic concerns.
Until at least 2001, polls showed that at most 2% of the electorate contemplated voting for Uribe and that the Liberal Party's Horacio Serpa would probably win. But public mood shifted in his favor after the peace process against guerrillas degenerated. The administration of President Andrés Pastrana Arango's had failed for four years to secure a ceasefire, and Álvaro Uribe began to be seen as the candidate who may provide a viable security program. Former General Harold Bedoya Pizarro, a candidate with a superficially similar program, remained marginalized.
Uribe was elected President of Colombia in the first round of the 26 May 2002 elections with 53% of the popular vote. His running mate was Francisco Santos Calderón, a member of the Santos family who have a long-lasting tradition as members of the Colombian Liberal Party and as owners of Colombian daily newspaper ''El Tiempo''. Santos was also one of the founders of the anti-kidnapping NGO ''Fundación País Libre'', created shortly after his own experience as a hostage of drug lord Pablo Escobar.
Observers considered the elections mostly free of foul play at the national level, but there were instances of active intimidation of voters and candidates, by the actions of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. 47% of the potential electorate voted, down from the previous round of voting.
Some of Uribe's opponents made accusations during his campaign, especially in a speech by Horacio Serpa and a book published by Newsweek's Joseph Contreras, who interviewed Uribe that year. Claims centered on Uribe's alleged past personal relationships with members of the Medellín Cartel and the sympathy that some paramilitary spokesmen expressed towards Uribe as a candidate. Uribe and his supporters denied or undermined these claims, and critics have not committed to legal action.

2002-2006 presidency

Polls consistently show an unprecedented support for President Uribe by many Colombians, estimated at around 70% after his second year in office.^[7] Support is widespread, but highest among medium and higher income Colombians. Uribe's relative popularity is largely attributed to his administration's relatively successful campaigns against the FARC and the ELN, and in part to the efforts to begin demobilizing the paramilitaries (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). Also, analysts point out that Uribe is seen as a charismatic 24-hour workaholic and a promoter of personal and administrative austerity, which some interpret as a role model for other Colombians and politicians.
Uribe and his cabinet members travel outside Bogotá on weekends and, as part of the communitarian state model, organize weekly communitarian councils in every department, even remote regions of Colombia. The stated objective of these councils is to promote citizen participation and exchange direct feedback with local authorities, publicly hearing and discussing their concerns. These sessions are shown live on a public state television channel for several hours. Uribe's supporters widely believe that these councils have contributed to varying degrees of advancement in the resolution of local issues by simplifying "red tape". The councils are credited with keeping Uribe's popularity levels and reinforcing his image of a hardworking, plain-speaking politician.
Sympathizers consider that Uribe has achieved significant results in the fight against illegal armed groups, allowing civilian traffic to return to many roads abandoned during the 1990s. They believe he has tried to implement macroeconomic measures to stimulate internal commerce, growth and reduce unemployment, although he has not passed important bills such as a structural tax reform.
However, many of Uribe's opponents believe that his popularity may be overestimated and that most polls under-represent the opinions of poor voters who have no access to telephone lines or other standard polling methods, and may be less supportive of his administration. Some believe that Uribe has not done enough to address Colombia's problems or has contributed to them, and that the security and human rights situations still remain considerably fragile. A number of critics also consider Uribe's use of charisma during the councils a form of populism that, along with his general policies, may lead to lapses of authoritarianism on his part. Uribe has not done anything that openly violates Colombia's constitution or laws, though he supported a congressional modification of the constitution from 2004 to 2005 which reintroduced presidential reelection in the country.

Security policy

Uribe's declared priority has been to contain or defeat the three main armed groups in Colombia, the AUC, ELN, and FARC. Military operations against them have intensified since he took office, especially against FARC.
Uribe has stated that the government must first show military superiority in order to eventually make the guerrillas return to the negotiating table with a more flexible position, even if this would only happen after his term in office expired. Early in his government, he was quoted as saying that Colombia's main concerns are now the challenges of terrorism and the narcotics trade.^[8]
In a dialog with BBC's "Talking Point", Uribe stated: "Of course we need to eliminate social injustice in Colombia but what is first? Peace. Without peace, there is no investment. Without investment, there are no fiscal resources for the government to invest in the welfare of the people."^[9]

Army of Colombia - Bogotá

His security program is based on the application of what has been termed a policy of democratic security, aiming to:
# gradually restore police presence in all municipalities
# increase judicial action against crimes of high social impact,
# strengthen public institutions
# reduce human rights violations
# dismantle terrorist organizations,
# reduce kidnappings and extortion
# reduce homicide levels
# prevent forced displacement and facilitating the return of forcefully-displaced people
# continue to fight the illegal drug trade through interdiction, eradication and judicial action.
The policy intends to achieve these goals by:
# engaging the civilian population more actively
# supporting soldiers
# increasing intelligence capacity
# reinstating control over national roads
# demobilizing illegal groups
# integrating the armed forces services
# increasing defense spending.^[10]
In early 2002, Uribe's administration decreed a one-time tax of 1.2% of the liquid assets of the higher income Colombians and corporations, with the goal of raising US $800 million. More than $650 million was collected before the final payment quota was made, surpassing original expectations. Another goal was to increase defense expenditures from a current level of about 3.6% of GDP to 6% of GDP by 2006.
This policy has been considered controversial inside and outside Colombia, including by Uribe's political opponents and by some human rights organizations, because it allegedly provides an exclusively military perspective to the situation and places the civilian population at risk, increasing the dangers of abuses both by military forces, paramilitaries and guerrillas.
According to official government statistical information from August 2004, in two years, homicides, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks in Colombia decreased by as much as 50% - their lowest levels in almost 20 years. In 2003, there were 7,000 fewer homicides than in 2002 - a decrease of 27%. By April 2004, the government had established a permanent police or military presence in every Colombian municipality for the first time in decades.^[11]
The Colombian Embassy in Washington states that, as a result of this policy, the Colombian armed forces would now have: "60% more combat ready soldiers than four years ago; Helicopters which have significantly improved the mobility of Armed Forces throughout the national territory; Attack helicopters ensuring means to be more aggressive in the fight against FARC and AUC; Increased basic combat supplies, including rifles and ammunition; and [has received] significant less human rights complaints against them."
Many analysts tend to accept that there have been some factual improvements in security and to a lesser degree human rights, but question the exact validity and application of some of the statements. They point out that serious problems remain, especially related to paramilitaries. In January 2005, Human Rights Watch stated: "Paramilitary groups maintain close ties with a number of Colombian military units. The Uribe administration has yet to take effective action to break these ties by investigating and prosecuting high-ranking members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have collaborated with paramilitary groups. Credible reports indicate that some of the territories from which the military has ejected the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia, FARC) are now under the control of paramilitary groups, which continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population."^[12]
A February 2005 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the year 2004 stated: "Achievements and advances were observed in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law; however, there were also difficulties and contradictions...Progress was recorded in terms of prevention and protection, including strengthening of the mechanism of community defenders and the early warning system, as well as regarding the Ministry of the Interior’s programs for the protection of vulnerable groups. Weaknesses persisted in the Government’s responses to warnings, as well as in decreasing risk factors for vulnerable groups. The Government adopted positive measures regarding the destruction of stored anti-personnel mines. The armed forces occasionally carried out operations in which they failed to observe humanitarian principles."^[13]
An anti-terror statute criticized by many human rights groups was approved by Congress on December 11 2003 but was struck down in August 2004 by the Colombian Constitutional Court during its review. The statute granted the military judicial police rights and allowed limited arrests and communication intercepts without warrants. It was struck down due to an error in the approval procedure, an objection the court has also presented towards other bills.^[14] Analysts speculated that Uribe's administration would try to re-introduce a similar bill, though it has not yet.

International relations

President Uribe's concrete actions tend to show him as a staunch enemy of narcotics trafficking, as his administration has been responsible for arresting and extraditing more drug traffickers to the United States and to other countries than all other presidents to date. He has been publicly recognized as a supporter of the US war on drugs by continually implementing the anti-drug strategy of Plan Colombia.
He is also recognized as a supporter of the US war on terror, and the invasion of Iraq. In January of 2003, President Uribe ended a radio interview by asking "why isn't there any thought of [making] an equivalent deployment [as in the invasion of Iraq] to put an end to this problem [the Colombian conflict], which has such potentially grave consequences?".^[15]
In a November 22 visit to the coastal city of Cartagena, US President George W. Bush stood by the results of President Uribe's security policies and declared he would continue to provide Plan Colombia aid in the future: "My nation will continue to help Colombia prevail in this vital struggle. Since the year 2000, when we began Plan Colombia, the United States has provided more than $3 billion in vital aid. We'll continue providing aid. We've helped Colombia to strengthen its democracy, to combat drug production, to create a more transparent and effective judicial system, to increase the size and professionalism of its military and police forces, to protect human rights, and to reduce corruption. Mr. President, you and your government have not let us down. Plan Colombia enjoys wide bipartisan support in my country, and next year I will ask our Congress to renew its support so that this courageous nation can win its war against narco-terrorists."^[16]

The Uribe administration has maintained generally positive diplomatic relations with Spain and most Latin American nations. It signed several accords, including one in 2004 for the joint construction of a pipeline with Venezuela, a security and anti-drug trafficking cooperation deal with Paraguay in 2005, a commercial and technological cooperation agreement with Bolivia in 2004,^[17]
a defense agreement with Spain (which was modified in 2004 but still remained valid),^[18]
and economic and cultural agreements with the People's Republic of China in April 2005.^[19]
Several analysts consider that, being a relative ally of the USA, Uribe would be ideologically opposed to left wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. Yet, Uribe has participated in multilateral meetings and has held bilateral summits with presidents Hugo Chávez, Martín Torrijos, Lula da Silva, Ricardo Lagos, Carlos Mesa and Vicente Fox, among others. Colombia has also maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba and the People's Republic of China.
There have been some diplomatic incidents and crises with Venezuela during his term, in particular around the 2005 Rodrigo Granda affair, Colombia's frustrated 2004 acquisition of 46 AMX-30 tanks from Spain, and an Alleged planned Venezuelan coup in 2004 by Colombian paramilitaries. These internationally worrying circumstances have been ultimately resolved through the use of official diplomatic channels and bilateral presidential summits (in the first two cases).
International law enforcement cooperation has been maintained with countries such as the USA, Spain, the United Kingdom, México, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Honduras and Brazil among others.
Uribe's government, along with Peru and Ecuador, negotiated and (with Peru) signed a free trade agreement with the US. On December 30th, 2005, President Uribe signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Mercosur and gives Colombian products preferential access to the market of 230 million people. Trade negotiations have also been underway with Mexico, Chile, the Andean community and the USA over its current proposal.

Socio-economic policy

The Uribe administration has continued dealing with the IMF and the World Bank, securing loans, agreeing to cut expenses, agreeing to continue debt payments, privatize public companies and foment investor confidence, in order to comply with financial orthodoxy. These measures have been successful in reducing inflation and the size of the state's deficit, according to the government and analysts from the previously mentioned international organizations.

Álvaro Uribe in INNOVA awards 2006, designed to boost the development of micro and small industry

The government's High Advisor for Social Policy, Juan Lozano, stated in February 2005 that the administration had by 2004 achieved an increase of 5 million affiliates to the subsidized health system (3.5 million added in 2004, for a total of 15.4 M affiliates), an increase of 2 million Colombians that receive meals and care through the Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) (for a total of 6.6 million), an increase of 1.7 million education slots in the National Service of Learning (SENA) (for a total of 2.7 million), an increase of 157% in the amount of microcredit available to small entrepreneurs, a reduction of unemployment from 15.6% in December 2002 to 12.1% by December 2004, the addition of almost 200,000 new houses to existing housing projects for the poor, a total of 750,000 new school slots in primary and high school, some 260,000 new university slots, the return of 70,000 displaced persons to their homes (under an 800% increase in the budget assigned to this matter), and support for a program that seeks to increase economic subsidies from 170,000 to 570,000 of the elderly by the end of the term.
The High Advisor added that a "colossal effort" is still required and work must continue, and that this progress would constitute a sign of the Uribe administration's positive effects on social indicators.^[20]
Companies such as Carbocol, Telecom Colombia, Bancafé, Minercol and others, which were either already in crisis or considered by the government as overly expensive to maintain under their current spending conditions, were among those restructured or privatized.
Most direct critics have considered Uribe's administration neoliberal, and argued that it has not addressed the root causes of poverty and unemployment, because continued application of traditional trade and tax policies tend to benefit private and foreign investors over small owners and workers. Union and labor claim that many of the privatizations and liquidations have been done to please the IMF, the World Bank and multinational companies, and will hurt several national industries in the long run.^[21] Supporters of Uribe counter these claims by pointing to the rising per capita GDP, fast and sustainable economic growth, low inflation, rising wages, lower public debt, lower unemployment and increased social expenditures of Uribe's government.

Setbacks in 2003

A national referendum was promoted during Uribe's campaign and later modified by Congress and judicial review. The ability to revoke Congress was removed, as was the option to vote "Yes" or "No" as a whole. The modified proposal was defeated at the polls on October 25 2003, and several left-wing candidates opposed to the referendum were victorious at regional elections the following day. At least 25% of the electorate needed to vote on each of the 15 proposals in order it to be accepted, but overall participation was only 24.8% and only the first proposal ("political death for the corrupt") achieved this. All 15 proposals were approved by a substantial majority of those who voted.^[22]^[23]
Analysts considered these events a political setback for President Uribe, as one of his main campaign propositions had failed, despite his personal leadership. The "active abstention" and blank voting campaigns that his opponents, in particular the Independent Democratic Pole and the Colombian Liberal Party, had promoted were allegedly successful in convincing enough of their sympathizers to stay home and instead participate in the next day's round of elections.
A number of Uribe's own supporters did not participate, as they found the referendum, which had been modified by Congress and later by the Judicial branch, to be too complex, long and uninspiring. Some also pointed out that extraordinary electoral initiatives (that is, those voted outside standard electoral dates) have traditionally suffered complications in Colombia, including a lack of participation.
In September 2003, Uribe issued a speech that contained allegations against what he called "agents of terrorism" inside a minority of human rights organizations, while at the same time declaring that he respected criticism from most other established organizations and sources. Similar statements were later repeated in other instances.^[24]
These statements were sharply criticized inside and outside Colombia because they could endanger the work of human rights and opposition figures.^[25] In light of this stance and his family's background as wealthy cattle ranchers, critics reiterated allegations of his past ties to narcotics traffickers and paramilitaries.
Contacts begun in 2002 with the paramilitary AUC forces and their leader Carlos Castaño, which had publicly expressed their will to declare a cease-fire, continued in 2003 amid a degree of national and international controversy.
''See also: ''

Reelection proposal

In 2004, Uribe successfully sought a Congressional amendment to the Colombian Constitution of 1991 which, if approved by the Colombian Constitutional Court, would allow him to run for a second term as president. Uribe originally had expressed his disagreement with consecutive reelection during his campaign, but later changed his mind, first at a private level and later in public appearances.
Many analysts considered that, in order to secure the approval of this reform, Uribe may have slacked on his campaign promises, because of what has been perceived as his indirect bribing of congressmen, through the alleged assignment of their relatives to the diplomatic corps and through promises of investment in their regions of origin. Uribe's supporters consider that no actual bribing took place, and that a consensus among the diverse sectors that back Uribe's policies in Congress had to be reached through political negotiation.
The amendment permitting a single reelection was approved by Congress in December 2004, and by the Constitutional Court in October 2005.^[26]

Paramilitary demobilizations

Late 2004

''See also: ''
After some of the AUC's main leaders had declared a cease-fire and agreed to concentrate in Santa Fe de Ralito, several paramilitary demobilizations began in earnest, thousands of their "rank and file" fighters were disarmed and incorporated into government rehabilitation programs late in 2004. The main AUC leaders, who would be held responsible for atrocities, remained in the concentration zone and continued talks with the government's High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo. A number of the paramilitary members who initially demobilized in Medellín apparently did not actually belong to the AUC and this caused public concern. The AUC commanders claimed, as the year ended, that they had difficulties controlling all of their personnel from their isolated position, that they had already demobilized some 20% of their forces, and that they would await for the drafting of the necessary legal framework before making any more significant moves.

Electoral year

''See also: ''
In 2005 President Uribe and Colombia's congressmen prepared for the elections held in May and March 2006 respectively.
FARC, which some had been perceived as relatively passive, in February began to show signs of what analysts considered renewed vigor. It made a series of attacks against small military units, which left at least three dozen casualties. Uribe said in a speech that FARC remained strong and had never retreated, and he credited Colombia's soldiers for previous successes against FARC activities. He also said that he considers FARC to be cowards, because they hurt civilian targets during their ambushes.
Negotiations with the AUC also increased public anxiety. Discussions continued about the legal provisions to assure "justice, reparation and truth" after a full demobilization. Also according to many observers, paramilitary activity continued despite AUC's declared cease-fire, albeit at a reduced rate.

2006 presidential elections

Main articles: Colombian presidential election, 2006

On May 28 2006, Uribe was re-elected for a second presidential term (2006-2010), and became the first president to be consecutively re-elected in Colombia in more than a hundred years. He received about 62% of the vote, consisting of about 7.3 million ballots in his favor.^[27]
The Organization of American States (OAS) deployed electoral observers in 12 departements: Antioquia, Risaralda, Quindío, Atlántico, Bolívar, Santander, Córdoba, Cauca, César, Nariño, Magdalena and Valle. In a statement of May 28, OAS mentioned that the elections "have taken place in an atmosphere of freedom, transparency and normalcy", despite incidents "related to the use of indelible ink, voter substitution and the accreditation of electoral witnesses, though these have no effect on the electoral process as a whole" and "developments in northern Santander province that took the lives of army personnel and left others injured in an ambush carried out by subversive groups."^[28]

Controversy and criticism

Accusations of drug cartel involvement

Critics who have investigated his background have opined that his father was murdered by the FARC in 1983 in part because of his personal relations with Fabio Ochoa, a known drug lord and eventual supporter of paramilitary groups. Uribe and many of his supporters have denied any direct involvement with the drug trade, but they have not specifically addressed the nature of any previous relationship to the Ochoas and their associates.
Uribe's critics also claim that during Uribe's years as director of the Civil Aviation he did nothing to prevent drug dealers from acquiring licenses for the operation of airstrips and drug flights, and may have intentionally allowed them to do so. His supporters claim that actively preventing and prosecuting those activities was outside of his office's jurisdiction and was the responsibility of official law enforcement authorities.
A 1991 document from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency was declassified in 2004, containing a paragraph which linked Uribe with the Medellin Cartel, citing him as a collaborator and "close personal friend" of Pablo Escobar.^[29]^[30] U.S. authorities dismissed the allegations in the 1991 report and described them as unconfirmed, raw intelligence information presented in unedited form. In a public statement, Uribe's administration strongly denied his having any links to the drug business. The government's communique also pointed to several factual errors in the report. ^[31]
Other observers and his supporters note that in his previous political positions during the 1980s and 1990s, including as mayor of Medellín, state senator and governor of Antioquia, a limited passive acquaintance with the drug cartels would have been unavoidable for any politician who wished to avoid being kidnapped, exiled or killed by the cartels. It is also argued that allegations that Senator Uribe fought against the extradition of drug traffickers should be taken in context, because many politicians argued that a partially conciliatory stance toward the immensely powerful cartels was necessary during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Uribe himself claimed that he never argued against extradition per se, but favored postponing decisions until after the next national elections in 1990, in order to limit interference from the drug lords. Official statements from the president's office have stated that this position is available for consultation in the congressional archives for 1989 and in press reports.^[32] For example, it is mentioned that the Constituent Assembly of Colombia, under Colombian president Cesar Gaviria, banned the extradition of cartel members after more than 50 police officers in Medellín were assassinated, the country's second largest newspaper, ''El Espectador'', was bombed, and a major international airliner was hijacked. Guerrilla groups oppose extradition, as they tend to consider it an undue interference in Colombia by the US, the main recipient of extradited Colombians. One such group is the M-19, a former left-wing guerrilla group that became a political party during the period.

CONVIVIR controversy

Some critics consider that Uribe's past support for the CONVIVIR would make him a de facto ally of paramilitary organizations. But supporters have stated that Uribe considered the CONVIVIR to be a legal extension of programs successfully applied in other countries, such as Peru, though in Colombia it ultimately became flawed and evaded legal supervision. During the 2002 presidential campaign, some of Uribe's opponents described him as the "paramilitary candidate". Carlos Castaño Gil, a founder of the AUC, stated then that Uribe was "the man closest to our philosophy" and that the "social base of the AUC consider him their political candidate."^[33]

Policy controversy

Uribe is often characterized by his opponents as a "hard-line right-winger" on account of his stance against the FARC and the National Liberation Army (Colombia) (ELN) and as a "neoliberal" economically. However, some observers find his socioeconomic policies as a whole centrist, and mention that he has remained open to a negotiated end to conflict if armed groups first declare a cease-fire. He has emphasized not repeating the experience of the Caguan demilitarized zone that President Pastrana granted the FARC, which the FARC used used as their main operations base.

'Álvaro Uribe', Colombian National Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos during President Bush visit.

Uribe's strong anti-drug policy through support of Plan Colombia, which includes aerial fumigation with herbicide chemicals, has been considered counter-productive by several environmental scholars, a number of peasant and indigenous movements, and opponents of drug prohibition. They claim that it does not permanently eradicate coca crops but harms humans and the environment, and causes displacement. In January 2004, the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Chris Patten, arrived in Colombia and expressed criticism of the fumigation campaign.
Opposition organizations and critics say that although some improvements have been made, Uribe's focus on security results in an intransigent position on resolving Colombia's internal conflict, ignores the roots of Colombia's socio-economical concerns and divides the public into either supporters or critics of his persona and of his second term reelection.^[34] Uribe has not denied the roots of conflict, such as poverty and political alienation or exclusion, and has expressed that some efforts at socio-economic reform are already being made. The continued creation of jobs through private and public investment, together with economic growth, would eventually help address unemployment and poverty.
During Uribe's first term, a number of public hospitals and educational institutions considered to be inefficient by the government were privatized and a few closed down. However, opponents cite mismanagement of funds by the government, claiming these closures were preventable.
Claudia López, who has studied paramilitary influence in local electoral politics, wrote in a March 2006 column that "[Uribe's presidential campaign efforts] didn't need [aid from politicians with closer ties to the paramilitaries], although they did receive [such] support, four years ago, let alone now that the President is stronger and has a greater [political] backing. It is obvious that the paramilitaries would like Uribe. The President is the closest thing [available] to the extreme right that they have practiced. What is not obvious is that Uribe [himself] would like the paramilitaries, at least not now."^[35]

Parapolitics scandal

Main articles: Para-political scandal

In November 2006, a political crisis emerged as several of Uribe's congressional supporters were questioned or charged by the Colombian Supreme Court and the office of the Attorney General for having alleged links to paramilitary groups. Álvaro Araújo, brother of Uribe's Foreign Minister María Consuelo Araújo, was among those summoned for questioning.^[36] In November, the former ambassador to Chile, Salvador Arana, was charged for the murder of a mayor in a small town in the Department of Sucre.^[37]
In April 2007, Senator Gustavo Petro made several accusations against President Uribe during a televised congressional debate about paramilitarism in Antioquia. Petro said that some of the Uribe family's farms in the north of the country had been previously used as staging grounds for paramilitary forces. He also showed a picture of Santiago Uribe, the President's brother, together with Fabio Ochoa, a drug dealer, in 1985. Petro also argued that Governor Uribe's office allowed paramilitary personnel to participate in some of the legal self-defense groups known as CONVIVIR. Another accusation concerned the possible participation of a helicopter belonging to the former Antioquia Governor's administration during a paramilitary massacre.^[38]
Two days later, President Uribe publicly revealed that former US Vice President Al Gore had cancelled his participation in a pro-environment event Uribe was to attend in Miami due to the continuing allegations against him. The Colombian President reacted by organizing a press conference during which he addressed several of the accusations Senator Petro and others had made against him. Uribe argued that his family had nothing to do with any massacres and that they had already sold the implicated farms several years before the alleged events. He also stated that the Uribes and the Ochoas were both famous in the horse breeding business, causing their meetings to be both common and public. He claimed that the helicopter's hours and missions had been strictly logged, making it impossible for it to have participated in any massacre. Uribe said that he supported the CONVIVIR groups but was not solely responsible for their creation, adding that other civilian and military authorities also participated in their oversight. He also said that he dismantled some CONVIVIR groups when doubts began to surround their activities. ^[39]^[38]

References

External links

★ Presidency of Colombia

★ Colombian Presidential News

★ Colombian Government Online

★ BBC Profile: Alvaro Uribe Velez

★ Human Rights Watch

★ Latin Business Chronicle: Alvaro Uribe - Leader of the Year (2005)

★ Center for International Policy - Colombia Program

★ UN High Commissioner for Human Rights - Colombia 2005 Report (Spanish and English)

★

★ Washington Office on Latin America

★ U.S. Official Rejects Drug Allegations Against Colombia's Uribe

★ U.S. Intelligence Tied Colombia's Uribe to Drug Trade in '91 Report

★ National Security Archive: 1991 intelligence

★ 2004: Bush, Uribe Applaud Strength of U.S.-Colombia Partnership

★ 2003 Remarks by President Bush and President Uribe

★ Human Rights Watch: Colombia reports

★ [1]

★ [2]

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psst.. try this: add to faves

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